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THE EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OP EEINHOLD NIEBUHR
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Problem
A study of historical patterns in the American edu­
cational system reveals that this system has been influenced 
by two basic philosophies: that which has grown out of a
religious orientation and that which has grown out of a sec­
ular orientation. Today, in a society that is undergoing 
profound sociological and cultural changes, one of the prob­
lems confronting the educational philosopher is the need 
for a critical examination of the first of these two con­
flicting traditions. Secular philosophies of education are 
easily available; many have been produced during the past 
hundred years. But religiously-oriented philosophies of 
education, especially in Protestant circles, are not so 
easily acquired. Even though Protestantism dominated the 
educational scene in early American life, Protestant phi­
losophies of education have not been produced to any great 
extent.
The author of this study directs his investigations
1
2into this problem through a study of the philosophical 
thought of Reinhold Niebuhr. Niebuhr's works have been 
selected as a basis for this study because of his prominent 
position both in the intellectual and religious life of 
America during the first half of the twentieth century.
Born of Lutheran parents in 1892, he received an early 
training which combined the liberalism of Harnack with the 
conservativism of the Lutheran faith. He attended a denom­
inational college and completed his graduate training at 
Yale Divinity School. By 1915 he was pastor of a church in 
Detroit, and it was in this position that his dialecticism 
appeared. For here he discovered the need to reconcile the 
platitudes of Christian liberalism with the necessities of 
economic life. His penetrating search for a meaningful and 
yet religious answer to the basic questions of the human 
race led him to national prominence and finally to the posi­
tion of Professor of Applied Christianity in Union Theolog­
ical Seminary in New York. His writings, which include pos­
sibly as many as twenty books and a thousand articles and 
editorials, have critically examined and analyzed the Amer­
ican scene and challenged the religious thinking of the 
period to be more critical in its evaluations. Thus, his 
writings provide representative sources of study for a 
religiously-oriented philosophy of education.
The Purpose
The purpose of this investigation is to present a
3religiously-oriented philosophy of education based on the 
educational philosophy inherent in the writings of Niebuhr. 
In order for this statement to have relevance in contem­
porary education, some comparisons with other current phi­
losophies of education need to be made, but the primary 
purpose is to present Niebuhr's thought as that thought 
related to Protestant educational efforts.
Do the basic tenets of Protestantism have any sig­
nificant contributions to make to the educational thought 
of contemporary America? In this investigation an attempt 
to seek to answer this question has been made in the light 
of the educational thought of Niebuhr.
The Value
Two values of this investigation become apparent at 
the outset. First, the study provides an opportunity for 
investigating some of the basic theories of American educa­
tional thought, and for the comparing of those theories 
with the religious theories of Niebuhr. This investigation 
will necessarily provide a profound understanding of some 
of the basic thinking of the day; this understanding will 
be of further value in the development of an independent 
educational philosophy.
Secondly, this investigation will be of value to 
students of educational philosophy as they confront the 
differences existing between religious educational thought 
and secular educational thought. Factually Niebuhr's
4thought cannot be categorized precisely, but it is basi­
cally religious. Philosophically, an attempt to place him 
in a particular philosophical pattern results in defining 
him as an idealistic, traditional, pragmatic thinker.
Niebuhr is idealistic in that his metaphysics affirm 
a supernatural reality called God. In a search for final 
and ultimate truth, Niebuhr sees man driven to the reality 
of the presence of God, both as the creator and as the ul­
timate power in the universe. Niebuhr is traditional in 
that he regards the traditions of the Christian faith as 
valid. Although he respects the church in its pure form, 
he is not traditional to the extent that the church becomes 
the final Defender of the Faith. His traditional aspects 
end with the recognition of that part of the Christian 
faith which places God as supreme Creator, which accepts 
Jesus Christ as the revelation of God, and which holds that 
the nature of man is related to the nature of God. Beneath 
these factors, relativism becomes the rule and Niebuhr's 
traditional affirmations end. Niebuhr is pragmatic in that 
he believes that all events, including actions and thoughts, 
achieve meaning for a person when those events and thoughts 
are relevant to that person's particular experiences. He 
believes that each man must experience the presence of God 
individually if that presence is to play a significant role 
in the life of each human being. Furthermore, Niebuhr's 
pragmatism becomes actively progressive in that he believes
5that man is responsible for developing justice within the 
social environment. His many harsh indictments of the so­
cial injustices of his day suggest a prophetic role in 
which he seeks to point an exploited humanity toward purer 
forms of justice. Niebuhr is not an idealistic fundamen­
talist who seeks to escape from the struggles of life by 
looking forward to eternity. Neither is he an illusionary 
romanticist who believes that the world is good if man will 
but live harmoniously with it. In social ethics, he is a 
pragmatist, seeking, through struggle and effort, to build 
a society that will guarantee more equitable forms of jus­
tice for all people.
This philosophical pattern of Niebuhr's thus becomes 
a dialectical one, but it is one that is relevant to educa­
tion today. Niebuhr's writings stand distinctly between the 
ideal and the real, between the supernatural and the natu­
ral. Educators who are frustrated with the ineffectiveness 
of contemporary educational efforts— who can see little if 
any relationship between what is sought and what is actu­
ally achieved, will find wisdom and insist in a study of 
Niebuhr's thought.
The Limitations
This investigation is limited significantly in three 
ways. In the first place, Niebuhr has not addressed him­
self specifically to educational thought. Education, as 
the term is used in educational circles, is rarely mentioned
6in his writings. Consequently, much of his educational 
thought must be based upon inference rather than upon spe­
cific statements. One cannot ascertain with certainty 
exactly what Niebuhr would state if he were writing an ed­
ucational philosophy. One must make generalized, personal 
judgments about Niebuhr’s philosophical thought by compar­
ing Niebuhr’s philosophy with the basic educational theory 
and practice of the day.
In the second place, this investigation is limited 
to the extent that Niebuhr’s philosophical perspective has 
changed as his thinking has matured. His earlier writings 
indicate a tendency toward liberal thinking; his later 
writings indicate that he has become much more conserva­
tive with regard to religious concepts but more pragmatic 
with regard to social concepts. In this investigation, 
concern will be focused on his mature thinking. Where ear­
lier works are quoted, the attempt is to use that which is 
in harmony with Niebuhr’s later thought.
In the third place, this study is limited by the 
complex and speculative nature of the inquiry. It is im­
possible for one person to absorb and to state another's 
philosophy in any absolute sense. The limitations of lan­
guage will not permit it and the differences in personal ' 
perspective will not allow it. There is always the possi­
bility of misunderstanding and misinterpreting the thought 
of another. Certainly this is true in an interpretation
7of the thought of Niebuhr; there is always the danger that 
his thought, will be modeled to some preconceived pattern. 
Nevertheless it is possible, by logical inference, extrapo­
lation, and rational analysis to deduce Niebuhr's positions, 
It is within the framework of this conception that this 
study is presented.
Definitions
Except in those instances in which specific defini­
tions are given in the text of this investigation, the fol­
lowing definitions are used:^
Absolutism; A theory in which fundamental reality 
is constant, unchanging, fixed, and dependable.
Aesthetics t The nature of the values which are 
found in the feeling aspects of experience. The conscious 
search for the principles governing the creation and the 
appreciation of the beautiful in that creation.
Agnosticism; A theory which holds that the exist­
ence of any ultimate reality is unknown and unknowable.
Altruism: A theory which states that the interests
of others or of the social group are served by an individ­
ual's actions. One achieves selfhood in seeking the best 
interests of others.
A priori: Knowledge which is self-evident. Prin-
^These definitions have been drawn primarily from 
J. Donald Butler, Four Philosophies and Their Practice in 
Education and Religion, New York: Harper and Brothers,igwrpp.' —
8ciples which, when once understood, are recognized to be 
true and do not require proof through observation, experi­
ence, or experiment.
Atheism; The theory that there is no ultimate real­
ity in or beyond the cosmos which is Person or Spirit.
Authoritarianism: The theory that states that know­
ledge is certified by an indisputable authority or source.
Axiology: The branch of philosophy which deals with
the general theory of value. The nature of values, the 
different kinds of value, specific values worthy of posses­
sion.
Deism: The theory that God exists quite apart from,
and is disinterested in, the physical universe and human 
beings. But He created both and is the Author of all natu­
ral and moral laws.
Dialectical: Pertaining to those forces, substances,
or elements which are opposed to each other but which inter­
act upon one another.
Dualistic: Pertaining to the belief that reality is
two. Usually these realities are antithetical, as spirit 
and matter, good and evil. Commonly the antithesis is 
weighted so that one of the two is considered more impor­
tant and more enduring than the other.
Education: The processes by which an individual
achieves maturity, either through formal instruction or 
informal experience.
9Egoism; The theory that the interests of self 
should he served by an individual's actions.
Empiricism: The theory that sensation., or sense-
perceptual experience, is the medium through which know­
ledge is gained.
Epistemology; That branch of philosophy which deals 
with theories of the nature of knowledge.
Essentialism: The belief that basic ideas and skills
essential to our culture provide the basis for culture and 
that these ideas and skills should be tau^t all alike by 
time-tested and proved methods.
Ethics : The nature of good and evil. The problems
of conduct and ultimate objectives.
Hedonism: The theory that the highest good is pleas­
ure. Hedonist philosophies vary in their conceptions of 
pleasure, ranging from the intense pleasure of the moment 
to highly refined and enduring pleasure or contentment.
Idealism: The theory that ultimate reality lies in 
a realm transcending phenomena.
Macrocosm: A complex element that is a large-scale
reproduction of one of its constituents.
Metaphysics : The branch of philosophy which deals
with theories of the nature of reality.
Microcosm: An element that is the epitome of a
larger unity.
Monistic: Relating to the theory that reality is
unified. Reality is one.
10
Naturalism; A theory denying that an event or ob­
ject has any supernatural significance; specifically, the 
doctrine that scientific laws are adequate to account for 
all phenomena.
Neumenal: Relating to that which is known through
thought or intuition rather than through the senses.
Ontology: A branch of metaphysics which deals with
a particular theory about the nature of being or the kinds 
of existence.
Optimism: The theory that existence is good. Life
is worth living. The future can be faced with hope.
Pantheism: The theory that all is God and God is
all. The cosmos and God are identical.
Particulars: Separate parts of a whole. Individual
items or specific substances which relate to a larger whole.
Perennialism: The theory that reality is absolute
and is understood in terms of past knowledge.
Perfectionism: The theory that the highest good is
the perfection of the self, or self-realization. Perfec­
tionism may also have its social frame of reference, en­
visioning an ideal social order as the ultimate objective 
of society.
Pessimism: The theory that existence is evil. Life
is not worth living. The future cannot be faced with hope.
Phenomenal; Relating to that which is known through 
the senses rather than through thought or intuition.
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Physical; Of, or relating to, or according with 
material things or natural laws as opposed to things men­
tal, moral, spiritual, or imaginary.
Polytheism: The theory that spiritual reality is
plural rather than a unity. There is more than one God.
Pragmatism: The theory that the meaning of concep­
tions is to be sought in their practical bearings, that the 
function of thought is to guide action, and that truth is 
preeminently to be tested by the practical consequences of 
belief.
Progressivism: An educational theory which believes
that moderate political change and social improvement can 
be achieved through pragmatic methods in education.
Rationalism: The theory that reason provides the
basis for the establishment of truth.
Realism: The theory that reality exists in that
which is factual and in harmony with nature and real life.
Relativism: A theory that knowledge is relative to
the limited nature of the mind and the conditions of know­
ing.
Relevant : Relating to that which has a bearing upon
the matter at hand.
Religion: A commitment or a devotion to a super­
natural force.
Revelation: The process by which God reveals him­
self to mankind.
12
Romanticjam; A philosophical concept which is char­
acterized by an emphasis upon the imagination and emotions ; 
an exaltation of the primitive and natural man; an appre­
ciation for external nature.
Science; A system or method in which knowledge is 
attained through study and practice.
Skepticism: The doctrine that true knowledge is un­
certain; systematic doubt; suspended judgment.
Spiritual; Relating to that which is of a religious 
or supernatural nature.
Supernatural; Of or relating to an order of exist­
ence beyond the observed universe.
Teleology: Considerations as to whether or not
there is purpose in the universe.
Theism; The theory that ultimate reality is a per­
sonal God who is more than the cosmos but within whom and 
through whom the cosmos exists.
Uni versais ; Those elements which include and cover 
all or a whole collectively or distributively without limit 
or exception.
Utilitarian; Of or relating to the theory that the 
useful is the good and that determining considerations of 
value should be the usefulness of its consequences.
Utilitarianism; The theory that the greatest happi­
ness of the greatest number is the prime objective.
13
Summary
This Introduction has been an attempt to establish 
the basis for this study. The problem presents the need 
for a religiously-oriented philosophy of education. The 
purpose is to present such a philosophy in the light of 
Niebuhr’s educational thought. Religiously-oriented edu­
cational institutions will find the study beneficial as 
they confront contemporary educational problems. The study 
is limited in that Niebuhr's writings are not directed 
specifically toward educational problems. The next step 
toward understanding the problem is to examine briefly the 
philosophy of Niebuhr.
CHAPTER II 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF REINHOLD NIEBUHR
This study, which examines the philosophy of Rein­
hold Niehuhr, does not attempt to examine that philosophy 
in all its ramifications. To examine the total thought of 
Niehuhr would require considerably more space and time than 
that which is allotted to this particular study. Rather, 
this dissertation, since it is to provide a basis for an 
educational philosophy based upon Niebuhr, will limit its 
considerations to those aspects of his philosophy that are 
relevant to an educational philosophy.
In his metaphysics, Niebuhr is confronted with the 
presence of man's dilemma of the centuries— the reconcilia­
tion of the real world with the ideal world— and he continu­
ally finds evidence of a supernatural presence in the world 
of existence while he envisions the natural world as reach­
ing its fruition in infinity. His man, in the form of 
"Everyman," contains some aspects that are supernatural; 
his revelation of God, in the form of Jesus Christ, suffers 
and struggles and finally dies like any other man. In 
Niebuhr's writings, philosophical and theological speculation
14
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do not follow prescribed forms. There is an overlapping 
of the supernatural and the natural. The ideal and the 
real become fused in the central character in the human 
drama, man.
Since this is true, it becomes apparent that Niebuhr 
does not spell out his metaphysics in a concise manner. It 
can be only partially developed through a study of his en­
tire anthropological view. But in order to gain a basic 
understanding of his views about metaphysics, three areas 
will be investigated in this study: (1) the nature of God;
(2) the nature of man; (3) the relevance of history.
To the person with a naturalistic or scientifically
empirical orientation, Niebuhr's concept of God appears to 
be naive. Many theologians quarrel with him at this point 
for he does not attempt to define God in any philosophical
sense. To him there is no question about the final Abso­
lute; it is God. God exists; God simply is. Supporting 
the Judeo-Christian concept, he states:
The will of God is the norm, the life of Christ 
is the revelation of that will, and the individual 
faces the awful responsibility of seeking to do God's 
will amidst all the complexities of human existence 
with no other authoritative norm but that ultimate 
one .1
Thus, Christ becomes the revelation of God, the end 
of man's search for God. If man desires to know God, he 
but needs to study the life of Christ. As Niebuhr does
^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, 
Volume I, New York: Charles Scribner's ^ons, 1951, p. 58.
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attempt to define that revelation and its interrelation­
ships, he gives a further clue to his interpretation of 
God. "In . . . revelation God becomes specifically defined 
as Creator, Judge, and Redeemer."^
Niebuhr's interpretation of God as Creator, of God 
as Judge, and of God as Redeemer is paradoxical. When he 
states that "faith concludes that the same 'Thou' who con­
fronts us in our personal experience is also the source and
2
Creator of the whole world," he is making what to him is 
a simple statement of fact. But there are questions. Why 
would an omnipotently perfect God create an imperfect 
world? Or to make the problem even more complex: How
could an omnipotently perfect God create an imperfect 
world? Niebuhr answers these questions by simply stating 
that God is paradoxical. In essence, the answers to per­
plexing questions concerning the creation are beyond the 
limits of man's finiteness. But Niebuhr does attempt to 
draw conclusions by considering the nature of the individu­
ality of God. Just as every person possesses the mark of 
individuality. Creative God has a particular divine indi­
viduality which embraces the whole creation. The paradoxes 
of creation are resolved in the individuality of God. Al­
though Niebuhr does not state it directly, the theory is 
that the omnipotent, perfect, individual, creative God is
llbid., p. 32.
Zibid., 1:142.
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paradoxically a permissive God; that is, an imperfect crea­
tion is permitted through God's individual omnipotence.
Niehuhr views the second role of God, that of Judge 
of the universe, as a predicament. If God is divine per­
fection and upholds the standard of perfection before all 
the world, how can a perfect God judge an imperfect world 
with anything less than perfect standards? It is at this 
point that the revelation of God through Jesus Christ 
achieves significance. Niebuhr resolves the predicament:
From the standpoint of Christian faith the life 
and death of Christ become the revelation of God's 
character with particular reference to the unsolved 
problem of the relation of His judgment to His mercy, 
of His wrath to His forgiveness. Christian faith 
sees in the Cross of Christ the assurance that judg­
ment is not the final word of God to man; but it 
does not regard the mercy of God as a forgiveness 
which wipes out the distinctions of good and evil 
in history and makes judgment meaningless.-^
Thus, God's judgment is beyond the understanding of 
man. Through the Pauline interpretation of Christ man does 
discover that God's judgment is not subservient to a law of 
perfection but that there is a form of love and mercy which 
transcends perfection-judgment and this form of love and 
mercy is available to man as he errs in the natural world. 
This concept, however, can come to mean that the judgment 
of God is nothing but a hollow mockery and that no standard 
of perfection is demanded, but Niebuhr never permits such 
a loose interpretation. The mercy of God never frees man 
from the judgment of God's perfection. Niebuhr clarifies
llbid., 1:142.
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the demand for perfection;
The whole impact of the Christian doctrine of 
creation for the Christian view of man is really- 
comprehended in the Christian concept of individu­
ality. The individual is conceived of as a creature 
of infinite possibilities which cannot be fulfilled 
within terms of this temporal existence. But his 
salvation never means the complete destruction of 
his creatureliness and absorption into the divine.
On the other hand, though finite individuality is 
never regarded as of itself evil, its finiteness, 
including the finiteness of the mind, is never ob­
scured. The self, even in the highest reaches of 
its self-consciousness, is still the finite self, 
which must regard the pretensions of universality, 
to which idealistic philosophies for instance tempt 
it, as a sin. It is always a self, anxious for its 
life and its universal perspectives qualified by its 
"here and now" relation to a particular body. Though 
it surveys the whole world and is tempted to regard 
its partial transcendence over its body as proof of 
its candidature for divinity, it remains in fact a 
very dependent self.
God as Redeemer, according to Niebuhr's philoso­
phy, becomes the force which balances man's imperfection 
with God's perfection. In this role Christ becomes the 
ultimate, divine revelation of God, and man perceives his 
Redeemer through the Pauline interpretation of Christ.
God the Redeemer becomes the Redeemer through agape or 
grace; through the pouring out of divine love upon man who 
does not merit that love and its forgiveness. For God is 
not only divine judgment; he is also agape, the divine, 
forgiving love. To Niebuhr the recognition of this mystical 
realm of love and forgiveness becomes one of the marks of 
Christianity, the application of faith to the agape as re­
vealed by Christ. Niebuhr supports his thesis:
llbid., 1:170.
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The Pauline doctrine really contains the whole 
Christian conception of God's relation to human his­
tory. It recognizes the sinful corruption in human 
life on every level of goodness. It knows that the 
pride of sin is greatest when men claim to have con­
quered sin completely. ("Not of works lest any man 
should hoast.") It proclaims no sentimentalized ver­
sion of the divine mercy. It is possible to appro­
priate this mercy only through the Christ, whose 
sufferings disclose the wrath of God against sin, 
and whose perfection as man is accepted as normative 
for the believer, by the same faith which sees in 
Him, particularly in His Cross, the revelation of 
the mystery of the divine mercy triumphing over, 
without annulling, the divine wrath.^
God as Redeemer then is discovered in the contra­
dictory nature of the revelation of Christ. As Niebuhr 
continues:
Christian faith regards the revelation in Christ 
as final because this ultimate problem is solved by 
the assurance that God takes man's sin upon Himself 
and into Himself and that without this divine initia­
tive and this divine sacrifice there could be no rec­
onciliation and no easing of man's uneasy conscience.^
This concept of God is paradoxical because here God 
the Judge takes on mercy and perfect God takes on imperfec­
tion. This paradox becomes necessary for Niebuhr at this 
point for it is only through this paradoxical situation 
that man can ultimately relieve his anxious and uneasy con­
science. Through the Cross of Christ, God revealed to man 
just how far his agape can be extended and that the exten­
sion of that love reaches to unlimited boundaries and thus 
establishes the position of God the Redeemer.
llbid., 11:104.
Zibid., 1:143.
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Niebuhr's conception of the nature of man is sim­
ilarly complex. In any attempt to develop a concept of the
nature of man, several alternative courses present them­
selves. Niebuhr, however, rejects certain aspects of ac­
cepted concepts about the nature of man but accepts other 
aspects of those same concepts. He rejects the Calvinistic 
concept that all the world is evil but he sees within that 
concept some segments of validity in that the world is not 
totally good. He rejects the idealistic concepts of Tran­
scendentalism and involves man in a struggle which exists 
between the forces of good and evil. But in this conflict, 
he perceives that man possesses a limited capacity to tran­
scend his position and to better his situation in life if 
man will exert the personal will to do so.
Niebuhr defines his concept of the nature of man:
The Christian view of man is sharply distinguished 
from all alternative views by the manner in which it 
interprets and relates three aspects of human exist­
ence to each other; (1) It recognizes the height of 
self-transcendence in man's spiritual stature in its 
doctrine of "image of God." (2) It insists on man's 
weakness, dependence and finiteness, on his involve­
ment in the necessities and contingencies of the nat­
ural world, without, however, regarding this finite­
ness as, of itself, a source of evil in man. In its 
purest form the Christian view of man regards man as 
a unity of God-likeness and creatureliness in which 
he remains a creature even in the highest spiritual 
dimensions of his existence and may reveal elements 
of the image of God even in the lowliest aspects of 
his natural life. (3) It affirms that the evil in 
man is a consequence of his inevitable though not 
necessary unwillingness which involves him in the 
vicious circle of accentuating the insecurity from 
which he seeks escape.i
llbid., 1:3.
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From this statement it can be ascertained that 
Niebuhr regards man as being (1) a creature who possesses 
a touch of the divine in that man is created in the "image 
of Grod" ; (2) a creature who is a child of nature and who 
possesses carnality in that he is dependent upon God; and
(3) that in the resultant conflict between these two forces 
within himself, man becomes a "child of sin" in that he 
will not admit his dependence, and this results in the 
chief sin, pride. It is Niebuhr's further contention that 
out of the struggle which evolves from these conflicts, man 
becomes morally responsible, both personally and socially.
Niebuhr's concept of man in the "image of God" is 
not clearly delineated. But he does point out rather con­
clusively that man is not God; neither is man the revela­
tion of God as exemplified in the life of Christ. Man in 
the "image of God" is the reflection of God. Niebuhr at­
tempts to clarify his understanding of the concept as 
follows :
He (man) is made in the "image of God." It has 
been the mistake of many Christian rationalists to 
assume that this term is no more than a religious- 
pictorial expression of what philosophy intends when 
it defines man as a rational animal. We have pre­
viously alluded to the fact that the human spirit 
has the special capacity of standing continually out­
side itself in terms of indefinite regression. Con­
sciousness is a capacity for surveying the world and 
determining action from a governing centre. Self- 
consciousness represents a further degree of tran­
scendence in which the self makes itself its own 
object in such a way that the ego is finally always 
subject and not object. The rational capacity of 
surveying the world, of forming general concepts and 
analyzing the order of the world is thus hut one
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aspect of what Christianity knows as "spirit." The 
self knows the world, insofar as it knows the world,
because it stands outside both itself and the world,
which means that it cannot understand itself except , 
as it is understood from beyond itself and the world.
It would seem fairly accurate to assume from this 
statement that Niebuhr regards man in the "image of God" as 
having the capacity to view himself and the world from a 
position that is beyond and above his physical existence. 
Man also possesses the innate ability to make a limited
transcendence over nature and thus to regard life from a
higher position. This can be discerned in man's ability to 
dream, to plan, and, above all, to reason. This transcend­
ence involves the particular individuality of every person. 
Niebuhr continuess
Genuine individuality, embodying both discrete­
ness and uniqueness, is a characteristic of human 
life. It must consequently be regarded as the prod­
uct of spirit as well as of nature. Nature supplies 
particularity but the freedom of the free spirit is 
the cause of real individuality. Man, unlike animal 
existence, not only has a centre but he has a centre 
beyond himself. Man is the only animal which can 
make itself its own object. This capacity for self­
transcendence which distinguishes spirit in man 
from soul (which he shares with animal existence), 
is the basis of discrete individuality, for this 
self-consciousness involves consciousness of the 
world as "the other."
When Niebuhr undertakes to discuss the theory of 
man as creature or man as a child of nature, he is not con­
cerned chiefly with the natural instincts of man, but seems 
to be preoccupied with the struggles which result when the
llbid., 1:13.
Zibid., 1:55.
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’’image of God" creature and the natural creature are united. 
However, he is rather emphatic in stating that this does 
not result in a dualistic concept of man but that man is 
monistic. In this concept, Niebuhr does not completely 
evade the issue of man's natural drives and instincts; he 
merely fails to emphasize them.
As this concept is explored further it leads to 
man's very real dilemma in life. For man's real problem 
to Niebuhr, which results in what Niebuhr calls "sin," is 
not a conflict which breaks out between the limited tran­
scendent and the natural forces in man. He recognizes the 
struggle, but the struggle is not sin. Neither is sin the 
result of natural existence. Niebuhr is quite emphatic in 
one place in stating that the creation, as it came from the 
hand of the Creator, was good, even though it was not per­
fect.^ Rather, sin or evil grows, not out of man's finite­
ness, but out of man's limited transcendence. The very 
fact that man is in the "image of God" permits man the priv­
ilege of perceiving anticipations and hopes which are above 
his natural existence. This in itself is not sin, but the 
freedom which man possesses in connection with this tran­
scendence can lead to sin— the sin of pride. He states:
The sin of man consists in the vanity and pride 
by which he imagines himself, his nature, his cul­
tures, his civilizations to be divine. Sin is thus 
the unwillingness of man to acknowledge his creature­
liness and dependence upon God and his effort to make
llbid., 1:167.
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his own life independent and secure. It is the "vain 
imagination" by which man hides the conditioned, con­
tingent and dependent character of his existence and 
seeks to give it the appearance of unconditioned 
reality.1
Thus, sin is not man's finiteness; it is man's 
failure to recognize and accept his finiteness. In Nie­
buhr's concept of man and of man's relation to sin, sin is 
finally the result of a defect in man's will, not in man's 
finiteness. Man's way out of his predicament is to repent 
of his self-willfulness and to recognize his need for God. 
In this, Niebuhr approaches the concept that whatever is of 
God is right and that man is not to question the divine pur­
poses of God. But man does face the necessity of recogniz­
ing God as the final and absolute Force of the universe.
There can be little doubt that Niebuhr's conception 
of history is metaphysically related to the world. History 
— past, present, and future— becomes a foundation for re­
ality because through it God's revelation to man becomes 
more nearly complete. Niebuhr states that the events of 
history are related to revelation:
The revelation of God to man is always a two-fold 
one, a personal-individual revelation, and a revela­
tion in the context of social-historical experiences. 
Without the public and historical revelation the pri­
vate experience of God would remain poorly defined 
and subject to caprice. Without the private revela­
tion of God, the public and historical revelation 
would not gain credence. Since all men have, in 
some fashion, the experience of a reality beyond 
themselves, they are able to entertain the more pre­
cise revelation of the character and purpose of God
llbid., 1:137-138.
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as they come to them in the most significant experi­
ences of prophetic history. Private revelation is, 
in a sense, synonymous with '• general" revelation, 
without the presuppositions of which there could be 
no "special" revelation. It is not less universal 
for being private. Private revelation is the testi­
mony in the consciousness of every person that his 
life touches a reality beyond himself, a reality 
deeper and-, higher than the system of nature in which 
he stands.
Thus, to Niebuhr, the hand of G-od has been involved 
in the course of human history, and the spirit or will of 
Grod is involved in present history. Man's present history 
is man's spiritual relationship or association with God. 
Since Niebuhr also regards God as Absolute, he also con­
ceives future history as the destiny which God holds for 
the world and all that is in it. This does not eliminate 
man's responsibility for the construction of the best pos­
sible social and cultural forms, but it does place the final 
destiny of the world in the hands of God.
Niebuhr's epistemology, like his metaphysics, is 
not stated in his writings in a clear-cut, succinct manner. 
As Paul Tillich has stated:
The difficulty of writing about Niebuhr's episte­
mology lies in the fact that there is no such episte­
mology. Niebuhr does not ask, "How can I know?"; he 
starts knowing. And he does not ask afterward, '^ How 
could I know?", but leaves the convincing power of 
his thought without epistemological support.^
llbid., 1:127.
^Paul Tillich, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Doctrine of 
Enowledge," Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and
Political Thought, edited by Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. 
Bretali, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956, p. 36.
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Nevertheless, Niebuhr's epistemology cannot he 
lightly dismissed. For there is much searching for that 
which can be called knowledge in his writing. It is true 
that he breaks with the traditional philosophical patterns 
of analysis in his attempt to arrive at a workable plan of 
epistemology. He perceives life as a mysterious process 
which cannot be explained solely on a rationalistic basis; 
it must be explained on a paradoxical basis and this para­
doxical basis has often been defined as Niebuhr's plan of 
the "impossible possibility" of life.
To clarify this matter requires a consideration of 
his concept of reason. Reason, to Niebuhr, like much of 
life, is composed of two properties which exist in a uni­
fied condition. There is, first of all, the rationalistic, 
calculating form of reason which man uses in the solving of 
his concrete problems. Man uses this form of reason in the 
fashioning of tools which will provide for better means of 
adaptation to existence. Through this form of reason, man 
develops new inventions and makes new discoveries. Through 
it he studies his natural world and the expansive phenomena 
of his universe. But at this point Niebuhr challenges the 
traditional concept of man's knowledge, for to him man is 
not man if his experience ends at the level of rationalis­
tic knowledge.• In order for man to be man, the mystery of 
the paradox must be brought into play and man takes on a 
limited supernatural role in the utilization of a logos
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form of reason. This form of reason provides the incentive 
within man which drives him ever onward toward an under­
standing of the meaning of his existence that lies heyond 
the natural phenomena of life. It is through the use of 
logos that man creates art, literature, and music. Through 
the use of logos man keeps his calculating reason alive and 
searching; through the use of logos man develops his sys­
tems of religion. Man, driven ever toward a supernatural 
search in the natural phenomena, discovers, not necessarily 
positivistic evidence of a creative force, hut at least an 
attraction toward a creative force, and also discovers with­
in the order of the natural world evidence that will permit 
him to develop faith in the existence of that force.
A further exploration into Niehuhr's concept of the 
paradoxical nature of reason relates his theory of the 
"impossible possibility" to that mystical experience which 
Christians call faith. Niebuhr develops this study through 
his understanding of the nature of man and through his in­
terpretation of Jesus Christ. In the first place, identi­
fying Jesus Christ as a God-man is impossible from a ra­
tional point of view. One of the distinguishing differ­
ences between God and man is that God is infinite ; man is 
finite. If the logos is defined as the mind, the power of 
creation, the thought of God, then Jesus Christ becomes the 
incarnation of that idea or thought. Thus, he becomes the 
"impossible possibility," the logos in a man form. To
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Niebuhr, then, man achieves knowledge as he becomes aware 
of the "impossible possible" nature of Christ. Moreover, 
man becomes a reflection of the "impossible possibility” as 
revealed in Jesus Christ as man attains an understanding of 
the meaning of his existence through the process of faith. 
Niebuhr states:
A sane life requires that we have some clues to 
the mystery so that the realm of meaning is not simply 
reduced to the comprehensible processes of nature.
But these clues are ascertained by faith, which modern 
man has lost. So he hovers ambivalently between sub­
jection to the "reason" which he can find in nature 
and the "reason" which he can impose upon nature. B#t 
neither form of reason is adequate for the comprehen­
sion of the illogical and contradictory patterns of 
the historic drama, and for anticipating the emergence 
of unpredictable virtues and vices. In either case, 
man as the spectator and manager of history imagines 
himself to be freer of the drama he beholds than he 
really is ; and man as the creature of history is too 
simply reduced to the status of a creature of nature,  ^
and all of his contacts to the ultimate are destroyed.^
Niebuhr thus builds his own epistemology and that 
epistemology is based upon faith. His conception is that 
man, even though he possesses an awareness of the infinite, 
is still limited by finiteness, and that man can never know 
the ultimate. Knowledge and faith become inter-related. 
Although knowledge is enhanced by empirical research, know­
ledge does not derive from empirical research alone. If it 
did so, then man would be limited by naturalistic bound­
aries. The self possesses a form of freedom that will per­
mit knowledge to attain an understanding of the universal
^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History. 
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952, p. 8Ô.
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through the application of faith. Without this faith-know- 
ledge, man would constantly revert hack to the learning of 
the past and would not discover new areas of learning. 
Rational research will not reveal the significant truths 
and facts about God nor about man; neither will it explain 
the nobility and the misery of human freedom and existence. 
Some facts and truths are beyond the realm of method, and 
man's freedom is of such nature that he can expand his 
knowledge upon the basis of those facts and truths. The 
self transcends the reason.
A final statement concerning Niebuhr's concept of 
epistemology requires a consideration of that which he calls 
revelation. This includes the manner through which God has 
revealed himself or his truth to man. To Niebuhr, that rev­
elation is accomplished through the advent of Christ:
A man appears in history who is at the same time 
the second Adam and the revelation of divine mercy.
The Agape incarnate in his life is the norm of human 
existence which is approximated but not fully realized 
in all human history. When it is realized in history 
it ends upon the Cross, a symbol of the fact that the 
norm of human history transcends the actual course of 
history. But the Christian community discerns by a 
miracle of grace that this death upon the Cross is 
not pure tragedy. It is also a revelation of the 
love of a suffering God who takes the frustrations 
and contradictions and sins of man in history upon 
and unto himself. That is the only possibility of 
finally overcoming the corruptions of human freedom 
which will express themselves in history until the 
end and more particularly at the end (the Anti- 
Christ), for human freedom over nature constantly 
develops and with it the possibilities of both
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good and evil.^
In conclusion, Niebuhr's concept of epistemology 
evolves around a paradoxically circular concept of knowledge 
which ends in Christian faith. To the person who defines 
epistemology on an empirical basis, this is perhaps empty 
and meaningless. The knowledge about which Niebuhr writes 
cannot be defined by such methods. Neither can the exper­
ience of faith be established through such methods and ex­
perimentation. Niebuhr recognizes the accuracy of this 
predicament but still accepts the predicament on the basis 
of the fragmentary nature of life and on the basis of its 
own reality. In his reply to Paul Tillich's statement that 
he has no epistemology, he states:
If it is "supernaturalistic" to affirm that faith 
discerns the key to specific meaning above the cate­
gories of philosophy, ontological or epistemological, 
then I must plead guilty of being a supernaturalist.
The whole of the Bible is an exposition of this kind 
of supernaturalism. If we are embarrassed by this 
and try to interpret Biblical religion in other 
terms, we end in changing the very character of the 
Christian faith.^
In fairness to Niebuhr, it then becomes necessary 
to point out that he is not content to regard man's know­
ledge as being enclosed in a cosmos-puppet existence which
^Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Two Sources of Western 
Culture," The Christian Idea of Education, edited by Edmund 
Puller, New Haven: Yale tfniversiiy Bress, 1957, p. 237.
^Reinhold Niebuhr, "Reply to Interpretation and 
Criticism," Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and
Political Thought, p. 433.
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looks up and beyond itself to an ultimate knowledge that is 
impossible because of its idealistic nature. Neither is he 
content to regard man's knowledge as being circumscribed 
with man's natural existence. Instead of accepting either 
of these views, he describes man's knowledge in this cir­
cular form and thus attempts to remove some of the para­
doxes from it. Starting with essence, man moves to the 
realm of existence and then, making a full circle, comes 
back to a supernatural form of essence. Man's ability to 
think, to reason, to dream, to aspire, to hope, cannot be 
confined to the limits of man's naturalistic existence. 
These qualities are inherent in the nature of man and can­
not be defined completely within the boundaries of man's 
environmental development. They start from a source or a 
relationship with a source that is outside or beyond the 
natural limits of man. But these attributes are spelled 
out and experienced and defined within the limits of man's 
natural existence. Although man can dream dreams and have 
visions that are beyond his highest forms of ecstasy, he 
cannot communicate those dreams and visions except within 
the boundaries of his natural forms of existence. He can­
not think nor communicate beyond his thoughts ; he cannot 
express beyond his powers of expression; he cannot see be­
yond his comprehension. But at this point, Niebuhr's 
epistemology moves on to complete the circle. For man's 
thoughts, dreams, and aspirations can move man toward a
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recognition of or a sensing of the injustices which exist 
in this phenomenal world and urge him toward a constant and 
continuous striving for a kind of Justice that does not 
existentially exist— toward a realization of himself within 
the realms of the neumenal world. Thus, Niebuhr's concept 
of epistemology is based upon a form of philosophical 
thought that can be defined as theistic existentialism.
In most of the writings of Niebuhr, there is a rec­
ognition of three laws which guide and motivate man in man's 
search for the best understanding of value. A study of 
Niebuhr's axiology requires that his definition and under­
standing of these laws be examined. These three laws are 
the law of existence, the natural law of history, and the 
Christian law of love.
Generally, the law of existence is based upon an 
existential interpretation of metaphysics and knowledge.
Man merely exists; this is the only reality. All other at­
tempts to explain reality are shrouded in the dimmed mists 
of illusion. Each man, in his own existence, becomes the 
essence of reality. To the person who is guided by this 
philosophy, there is no explaining of life nor of the things 
of life except on an existential level. In its more extreme 
forms, this philosophy rules out all concepts related to a 
supernatural force. Man is merely an animal, existing in 
a natural world. In this philosophy, knowledge becomes 
man's understanding of his natural existence. He knows
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himself and his world by observing himself and his world.
He collects all the evidences of life in an empirical fash­
ion and evaluates those evidences in the light of his ex­
perience, both historical and contemporary. Value then be­
comes the creating of the best of all possible worlds, both 
individually and collectively. Man does not wait for a 
supernatural force to intervene in the course of human his­
tory and create an improved society. In the light of his 
knowledge, man constructs that improved world through his 
moral actions and attitudes.
In his evaluation of the law of existence, Niebuhr 
does not reject the theory of man's existential setting.
He recognizes that man is a responsible creature in his 
natural society and that man does possess some animalistic 
traits. He also recognizes that empirical research into 
the nature of man will reveal man's existential nature.
But he hastens to add that this does not complete the total 
nature of man, for man also possesses certain spiritual 
traits.
Niebuhr makes this interpretation explicit when he 
objects to Bertrand Russell's views on sex morality by 
stating that Russell "obviously disregards one important 
immutable aspect of the human situation, namely, the organic 
unity between physical impulses and the spiritual dimensions 
of human personality."^ Value in the sex act, like value
^Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History, New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949, p. iWo.
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in all of life's experiences, is achieved through a recog­
nition of the unity of.physical and spiritual life.
A definition of the natural law concept becomes
much more complex. Some would define it in terms of the
preceding philosophy. Others would define it in terms of
an innate sense of good which is an inherent part of man's
individual nature and of his collective society. Niebuhr
provides a somewhat loose definition of the term:
What is usually known as "natural law" in both Chris­
tian and Stoic thought is roughly synonymous with the 
requirements of man as creature and . . . the virtues, 
defined by Catholic thought as "theological virtues," 
that is, the virtues of faith, hope, and love, which 
are the requirements of his freedom and represent the 
justitia originalis.^
Man's highest value, then, grows out of his innate sense of 
goodness and justice. Historically, this sense of goodness 
and justice has been the guiding principle which has mo­
tivated classical idealism and Christian orthodoxy.
In his analysis and evaluation of the traditionally 
held natural law concept, Niebuhr is immediately confronted 
with a dilemma. Since he bases his epistemology on Chris­
tian faith, he cannot completely reject either classical 
idealism or Christian theology. He must accept some ele­
ments of both since they have become closely intertwined 
through the processes of history. Yet he recognizes that 
both of them have been sifted through the experiences of
^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man,
1:280.
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imperfect natural man and that they contain significant 
weaknesses. Classical idealism, “based on the theory of 
the application of general principles to particular situ­
ations, errs in that general principles are not absolutes 
but are ideals which are shaped by particular situations.^ 
Christian theology errs in that it regards love as an ab­
solute while love is actually conditioned by relative re-
p
lationships.
It is at this point that Niebuhr's dilemma with re­
gard to the natural law concept becomes apparent. He has 
stated that classical idealism and Christian theology are 
both subject to error. He has stated that an application 
of the law of love finally results in relative rules. How 
then, can he place any credence either in the value of 
Christianity or in the Church? He overcomes this dilemma 
by pointing out that there is a difference between existen­
tial Christianity and "pure" Christianity. He makes this 
same observation of the Church. The Church, to him, is 
"the one place in history where life is kept open for the 
final word of God's judgment to break the pride of men and 
for the word of God's mercy to lift up the broken hearted."^ 
With all its weaknesses the Church remains the institution
^Reinhold Niebuhr, "Reply to Interpretation and 
Criticism," op. cit., p. 435.
^Ibid., p. 435. 
3lbid., p. 437.
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which directs man toward Christianity, and Christianity be­
comes the force which directs man toward the final value—  
the will of God.
Niebuhr's concept of the law of love is that this 
law provides the highest form of value if man will but apply 
it to his existential setting. However, Niebuhr recognizes 
that the law of love is idealistic and that in the present 
social situation, it cannot be attained in its most pure 
form. Justice becomes the intermediate step which leads 
toward the application of the law of love. But Niebuhr 
does regard that form of Christian love as being relevant 
which results in forms of self-sacrifice in a spiritual way. 
If man achieves an understanding of Christian love as it 
was exemplified through the Pauline doctrine of Christ, man 
will find that he is sacrificing himself to the attainment 
of some form of human justice. This sacrificing of the self 
comes only through a submitting of the self to the will of 
God.
Man's way to value, then, lies not within the prov­
ince of his existence, but in the realm of salvation through 
God's grace. Man can approach value by repentance— by a 
recognition of the will of God and through submission to 
that will. This submission in turn leads man to a vicarious 
concern for all of life; such concern has for its prototype 
the cross of Christ. The cross becomes the symbol of the 
incarnate law of love— the agape in which individual man.
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like the Christ who died upon the cross, will dedicate his 
life to the fulfilling of God's will on earth.
Niebuhr, moreover, does not leave this concept of 
value in the realm of ethereal symbolization. He brings it 
into juxtaposition with a concept of human justice. To him, 
no man can look long at the cross without becoming con­
cerned about justice for a suffering humanity. And the 
achievement of justice requires an understanding of some 
form of equality. Niebuhr's words are:
Equality stands in a medial position between love 
and justice. . . . Thus, equality is love in terms of 
logic. But it is no longer love in the ecstatic 
dimension. . . .  Therefore, equal justice is on the 
one hand the law of love in rational form and on the 
other hand something less than the law of love.l
In recognizing that equal justice is "something 
less than the law of love," Niebuhr again is stating that 
man, in his natural existence, is confronted with the prob­
lem of being man. Man cannot attain the ultimate value be­
cause the ultimate value is an ever receding ideal or hope 
that retreats toward elusive supernatural existence. Al­
though some form of equal justice or love may be achieved 
in the world of natural existence, the final goal of value, 
the agape, remains beyond the existential grasp of man. In 
The Irony of American History, Niebuhr points out that Amer­
ican man's situation in the human drama has become ironic 
in that his very attempts toward altruistic living have led
^Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History, p. 190.
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toward a type of national egoism. All of man's efforts to 
achieve the reality of Christian love as exemplified in the 
cross have heen thwarted by man's inability to understand 
the total impact of the cross in terms of his own existence. 
The inner conflict remains constant and Niebuhr does not 
perceive of ultimate value in the form of ultimate love as 
ever becoming the possession of man. However, he does of­
fer some rays of hope for a better existence if not for a 
perfect existence. He is vaguely optimistic as he regards 
the commingling of experience and dogma. Man, through an 
understanding of his experience and through an interpreta­
tion of dogma in the light of that experience, will be able 
partially to overcome the inequalities which exist in his 
world of experience. But this partial overcoming will not 
guarantee man's complete redemption nor will it come even 
in a limited fashion, if present methods of political, so­
cial, educational, and religious trends continue. For to 
Niebuhr, redemption or complete fulfillment in life in its 
final analysis will come only beyond the boundaries of that 
which is now man's finite condition. But man can hope for 
some spiritual reflections from that infinite redemption 
and for the establishment of better forms of realistic jus­
tice by placing the destiny of the universe in the hands of 
the Creator rather than believing that it can be achieved 
through technocratic education. Man can never achieve per­
fect justice but he can achieve better forms of justice if
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ills contact with the Ultimate Source of all life and power 
is not based upon hypocrisy and if his hope is in that 
Ultimate Source rather than in his own existence.
In a summary of Niebuhr's philosophy, the following 
conclusions can be drawn:
1. God is the only Ultimate Reality in the uni­
verse. Man and man's experiences in history approach real­
ity as they are related to that Reality.
2. Absolute knowledge is not possible in an exis­
tential world, but as man uses both knowledge and Christian 
faith as directive principles, his understanding of the 
meaning of life will be more relevant and significant.
3. Christian love, as exemplified in the death of 
Christ upon the cross, provides the highest form of value; 
however, this absolute value is beyond man's natural exper­
ience. Man achieves a limited form of value as he strug­
gles for some form of justice that more nearly approximates 
the ideal of Christian love.
The next chapter of this study will develop a set 
of purposes and aims for education, using this plan or sys­
tem of philosophy as a base.
CHAPTER III 
THE PURPOSES AND AIMS OF EDUCATION
Education, in the twentieth century, is faced with 
the challenge of creating a society in which man enjoys the 
best experiences for his personal and collective welfare.
At the same time education is confronted with the possibil­
ity of creating a society in which man will become a puppet 
of technology. These two conflicting opportunities must 
lie at the basis of any statement of the aims of education.
To state the educational aims of Niebuhr becomes a 
challenging task. For Niebuhr, working as a theologically 
inclined minister, has not addressed himself specifically 
to educational philosophy. In all of his voluminous writ­
ings very little attention is given to the problem of edu­
cational philosophy. In a personal letter to Timothy Wayne 
Rieman, he states: "I have failed to address myself to an
explication of education, i.e., to its nature, ends, and 
methods.” Rieman states that Niebuhr, in this letter, ex­
presses his lack of interest in educational methodology and 
disclaims any competence in this area.^
1Timothy Wayne Rieman, A Comparative Study of the 
Understanding of Man in the Writings of Reinhold Niebuhr and
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Niebuhr, however, does investigate the adequacy of 
our American educational system to the extent that he be­
comes critical of its product. In The Irony of American 
History, in which he bewails the fact that our Puritan her­
itage has ironically produced a hypocritical society, he 
states :
The constant multiplication of our high school 
and college enrollments has not had the effect of 
making us the most "intelligent" nation, whether 
we measure intelligence in terms of social wisdom, 
aesthetic discrimination, spiritual serenity or any 
other basic human achievements. It may have made 
us technically the most proficient nation, thereby 
proving that technical efficiency is more easily 
achieved in purely quantitative terms than any 
other value of culture.
But merely to point out the weaknesses and fail­
ures of an existing cultural enterprise is not sufficient.
If there be a deficiency, that deficiency must be corrected. 
If our task is not to develop technical experts, what is it? 
Niebuhr would answer this by stating that the task of edu­
cation is to develop a creative individual within the cul­
ture who is cognizant of his proper relationship with that 
culture and with the ultimate Force which rules over, not 
only the culture, but also the individual and the universe. 
Niebuhr's writings indicate that he thinks that all educa­
tional processes should contain some basic forms of teaching
John Dewey and Some Implications for Education, Unpublished 
Dissertation, Évanston, Illinois ; Northwestern University, 
1959, p. 9.
^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History,
p . 60.
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that create a form, of spiritual inquiry and excitement 
within the life of the student. In a recent essay, he has 
stated;
The educational inadequacies of American Protes­
tantism must not blind us to the fact that the pro­
- a m  of religious education under public auspices 
in Europe has not preserved a vital faith on the 
continent. The picture in Europe is almost univer­
sally that of a formal structure of Christian cul­
ture while the population is even more secularized 
than our own. We must profit from both Europe's 
and our own experience in this matter. If we do we 
will establish a system of religious education which 
will transmit the essentials of our religious tradi­
tions which can be transmitted by educational tech­
nics and yet preserve the religious vitalities which 
are not transmitted by formal education.but by the 
contagion of individual and collective commitment.■*■
These statements point rather conclusively to the 
fact that Niebuhr is assured that our present methods of 
education are not considering man's total situation, since 
those methods are constructed on certain secular aims. The 
aims and purposes of education must consider the totality 
of man's existence and then relate that existence to the 
supernatural world. This would demand the inclusion of a 
consideration of the religious experiences of man. With 
this as a background, the aims and purposes of education 
according to Niebuhr's philosophy will include the follow­
ing considerations:
1. The primary purpose of education is to develop 
within the student an awareness that God is the ultimate
^Eeinhold Niebuhr, "Religion and Education," 
Religious Education, (November, 1953)» XLVIII:372.
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Force of the universe. It is true that to fulfill this aim 
objectively would in all probability become nothing more 
than totalitarian indoctrination. To teach that God is the 
ultimate Force, the center of the universe, cannot be ac­
complished through objective methods. In the first place, 
it is not possible to present God in an objective manner, 
for God is experienced subjectively. Furthermore, to pre­
sent the mystery of God to the students in an authoritarian 
manner would violate the students' rights to personal and 
individual free discovery. One of the points that Niebuhr 
emphasizes repeatedly is that if religion is to have any 
significance in the life of the individual, it must be an 
individual as well as a collective experience. Thus, to 
teach that God is the center of the universe must become a 
part of the subjective experience of the total educative 
process. The God-centered atmosphere grows out of the at­
titudes, the concerns, the ideals, the methodology, and the 
total social intercourse of the individual teacher, the 
total educational staff, and the total community. If the 
student is to search diligently for the final meaning of 
life, he must encounter a faith in the validity, the real­
ity, and the presence of God through some subjective exper­
ience .
2. A second aim of education is to present Jesus 
Christ as the revelation of God and of the will of God. 
Again, this aim diametrically opposes the tradition of the
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separation of church and state and also presents the problem 
of freedom in religion as well as in thought. But since the 
advent of Jesus and the influence of that advent become so 
significant to Niebuhr, the implications which grow out of 
that advent provide one of the basic aims of an educative 
process. To Niebuhr man simply cannot reach his highest 
fulfillment without having encountered the significance of 
Christ. It is foolish at this point to debate the question 
as to whether or not God is an illusion or if Jesus Christ 
is a myth. Niebuhr does recognize that man's conception of 
God and of Jesus Christ is limited by the finiteness of 
man's fragmentary condition, but to Niebuhr the God of 
history has existed in history from the beginning. The 
appearance of Jesus Christ upon the earth became God's meth­
od for revealing his real nature to man and for providing 
man with a pattern to guide him as he attempts to define 
that will in terms of life and its experience.
The theory of the revelation of God in the form of 
Jesus Christ can be applied more objectively to the aims of 
education than can the theory of the presence of God in the 
universe. Through this revelation of God's will in the 
life of Jesus Christ, including the event of the cross, man 
comes to realize that life does possess some elements of 
struggle and that the mature individual must accept his per­
sonal responsibility in the alleviating of the pain that is 
usually associated with that struggle. At the root of life
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is struggle for Justice and meaning. The cross is the 
point at which the struggle between perfect love and car­
nal selfishness meet, and every person finds this struggle 
inherent in his own life. The presence of the struggle is 
evident in Niebuhr's following conclusion;
The Cross is the symbol of love triumphant in 
its own integrity, but not triumphant in the world 
and society. Society, in fact, conspired the Cross. 
Both the state and the church were involved in it, 
and probably will be so to the end. The man of the 
Cross turned defeat into victory and prophesied the 
day when love would be triumphant in the world.
But the triumph would have to come through the inter­
vention of God. The moral resources of men would 
not be sufficient to guarantee it. A sentimental 
generation has destroyed this apocalyptic note in 
the vision of the Christ. It thinks the kingdom of 
God is around the corner, while he regarded it as 
impossible of realization except by God's grace.^
The full implications of this aim in education do 
not end, however, with the development of an awareness of 
the eternal struggle to the students. For this presenta­
tion alone would undoubtedly lead to a sense of frustration 
and produce a futile attitude within the lives of the total 
student body. The individual student who is made aware of 
the struggle and who grasps no subsequent challenge will 
certainly find life a chaotic existence. Consequently, 
Niebuhr sees in the ultimate triumph of Christ through the 
resurrection a challenge which makes all men responsible 
for the betterment of society. Man is not only involved in 
the struggle— he is also responsible for overcoming it, at
iReinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society,
p . 82.
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least as much as it can he overcome in this world. "We 
must he responsible to the limits of the power with which 
Grod has endowed us,"^ he states in a late essay. In an 
earlier work, as Niebuhr assumed the role of prophet by 
pointing out the dangers which exist in the ironic elements 
of American history, he placed the weight of this individ­
ual and social responsibility upon man:
Strangely enough, none of the insights derived 
from this (Christian) faith are finally contradictory 
to our purpose and duty of preserving our civiliza­
tion. They are, in fact, prerequisites for saving 
it. For if we should perish, the ruthlessness of the 
foe would be only the secondary cause of the disaster. 
The primary cause would be that the strength of a 
giant nation was directed by eyes too blind to see 
all the hazards of the struggle, and the blindness 
would be induced not by some accident of nature or 
history but by hatred and v a i n g l o r y . 2
In Niebuhr's philosophy of education, then, the 
need to acquaint the student with the reality of Jesus 
Christ as the revelation of God to the world is a fundamen­
tal aim. The achievement of this aim would not only ac­
quaint the student with God's revelation of himself in his­
tory; through the paradoxical nature of Jesus Christ it 
would also alert man to the real struggle between good and 
evil in the world. And in the acquainting of the student 
with the reality of the struggle, it would also involve him 
in that struggle and indicate to him that at least partially
^Eeinhold Niebuhr, "Our Dependence on God," The 
Christian Century, (September 1, 1954), LXXI:1034.
p. 174.
p
Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History,
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in the same way that God involved himself in the struggle 
in the form of Jesus Christ, the student is responsible for 
involving himself in that struggle as an intellectual and 
mature being. Thus, in the end, the truly educated and 
mature student, according to Niebuhr, would be one who is 
cognizant of the struggle in life and of his seemingly hope­
less condition in that struggle, but who still lives in op­
timistic hope because of his faith and trust in the final 
triumph of God.
3. The third aim of education is that of confront­
ing the student with the elements of truth through a con- 
frontation-response experience. Within this context educa­
tion is to confront the student with a sincere understand­
ing of reality and to develop a sincere response within his 
being. Taking place within the framework of an incomplete 
society and involving imperfect teachers and incomplete 
students, this process will be one of inevitable vacilla­
tion between experience and transcendence, but in Niebuhr's 
system it will be honest and sincere.
This confrontation-response aim, in a more specific 
application, will lead the student, first of all, to experi­
ence an exploration-discovery experience. In this experi­
ence the search for knowledge will be directed in such 
fashion that the student will learn to ask the secular and 
religious questions that are relevant to his experience.
In many instances, he will not find the answers within the
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framework of social experience and will be forced to press 
his search out beyond the realms of that social experience. 
In fact, if he secures ready-made answers for his questions 
outside of his mystical experience, the chances are that 
his education is incomplete. He will never completely ac­
cept the answers which society gives him until those an­
swers have been tested and proved to be relevant to his 
understanding of the natural world, to the total and ex­
panding universe, and to his conception of God. Man's ex­
ploration and knowledge must go full circle; it starts on 
a mysterious, supernatural plane, comes down and becomes 
involved in the struggle for relevant reality in an imper­
fect world, and finally asks questions which press that 
reality back into the realms of the mystical. Niebuhr 
would state that there has been no real exploration-discov­
ery process until the student has gone full circle in his 
personal search for knowledge, and made that full circle in 
honesty and sincerity, without any sham, pretense, or hy­
pocrisy.
A second process in this confrontation-response aim 
is the experience of establishing a relevant transmission 
of knowledge. Surely all of the knowledge that man has ac­
quired in his search for truth is not to be rejected. It 
is true that Niebuhr considers much of our cultural heritage 
irrelevant, but not all. There are certain elements of 
truth which can be carried over from one generation to an­
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other. For instance, the theory that honesty is of axi- 
ological merit has heen stated, at least verbally, for 
many generations. However, modern man proclaims the axi- 
ological merit of honesty but he fails to see the dis­
claiming of this age-old ideal in his practices of social 
and economic existence. History does have some validity 
in the experience of learning. Niebuhr's interpretation 
of this process would include the right of the individual 
to make the best possible choices; in fact, it would em­
phasize the necessity of the student's making the best 
possible choice for his own experience. However, Nie­
buhr's claim for the Christian gospel would emphatically 
hold that the dogmas of the Christian faith should be 
presented for the student’s personal consideration. The 
transmission of cultural data must be conducted in a com­
prehensive fashion so that the student will evaluate that 
data in the light of his specific needs. Niebuhr sub­
stantiates this thesis in his defense of democratic free­
dom as follows:
A free society is justified by the fact that the 
indeterminate possibilities of human vitality may be 
creative. Every definition of the restraints which 
must be placed upon these vitalities must be tenta­
tive because all such definitions, which are them­
selves the products of specific historical insights, 
may prematurely arrest or suppress a legitimate vi­
tality, if they are made absolute and fixed. The 
community must constantly re-examine the presupposi­
tions upon which it orders its life, because no age 
can fully anticipate or predict the legitimate and
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creative vitalities which may arise in subsequent 
ages
This, of course, would open the door to unrestrained 
liberalism if there were no systems of control or direct 
guidance. It would actually uphold the theory that the 
only transmissive process that is relevant to society today 
is that form of transmission which fairly well eliminates 
the data of the past. This unrestrained, liberalistic ap­
proach to the ideal of a transmission process, when consid­
ered in this way, apart from the total context of experi­
ence, is not consistent with Niebuhr's concept of reality.
In order to safeguard against this type of anarchistic 
transmission, after having pled the cause of individual 
creativity or personal vitality, Niebuhr places certain 
limitations upon individual freedom. He observes:
The limitations upon freedom in a society are 
justified . . .  by the fact that the vitalities may 
be destructive. We have already noted that the 
justification of classical laissez faire theories 
was the mistaken belief that human passions were 
naturally ordinate and limited.%
A third experience in the application of the con­
frontation-response aim is that of restoration. Education 
is an experience in which the individual is constantly re­
storing that basic understanding of life that deteriorates 
through the natural attrition of time and social experience.
^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the 
Children of Darkness, New York: Ôharles Scribner's Sons,
1944, pp. 63-64i
^Ibid., p. 6 7 .
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Niebuhr regards this loss as a significant factor and some 
provision should be made for a continual restoration in the 
life of the individual. To Niebuhr this attrition reaches 
its climax in his concept of man. Man is a rebellious crea­
ture, possessing the freedom to rebel against the truth of 
ultimate God, falling or sinning in that rebellion, and 
needing some restorative experience that will align him 
more closely with the values of God's truth. This becomes 
the experience of repentance.
But repentance is a theological term and does not 
lend itself to a set of aims for education. Furthermore, 
it has fallen into such ill repute through its having been 
used freely by semi-literate, ultra-fundamentalistic groups. 
Thus, the term restoration is used to designate this con­
stant process of renewal. To define this restorative proc­
ess in terms of an educational aim means that education 
seeks to develop within the student the powers of objective 
self-recognition and self-realization to the degree that he 
will be able, insofar as he is able, to assume a position 
outside himself and to discern his need for self improve­
ment. In this restorative experience, the student will 
come to understand that his ultimate self will be realized 
and recognized only as he transcends his physical state 
and reaches a spiritual awareness of the power of God; he 
will also be aware of the fact that there are instances in 
which the self-interests conflict with the altruistic in­
terests, and through this latter awareness, he will finally
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come to recognize the need for some form of human justice. 
All of this will necessarily he a continuing experience 
of restoration through an intellectual interpretation of 
the total meaning of Christian faith.
Finally, the confrontation-response aim of educa­
tion is to be achieved through the experience of self-real­
ization. In many ways, the achieving of this experience is 
closely related to and dependent on the previously dis­
cussed experience. Generally, most theories of education 
state that for a student to achieve some knowledge of his 
individual potentialities and to utilize those potentiali­
ties to their utmost, he must acquire some knowledge of 
their scope. Logically, Niebuhr would include this expe­
rience of self-realization in a list of aims for education.. 
He would even concur with the generally accepted theory 
that education should direct the student toward an under­
standing of his own nature that will enable him to be the 
sort of personality that he is meant to be. Niebuhr would 
qualify this, however, by stating that the student should 
endeavor to become the sort of personality that God meant 
him to be. It is true that Niebuhr's whole thought is per­
meated with the idea of man's inadequacy in his finite ex­
istence. But in a consideration of the two Adams, that is, 
the first Adam of creation, and the Christ Adam, he does 
perceive that man can discover a form of self-realization 
that will result in harmonious living even though it must
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be incomplete and fragmentary. Obser-ves Niebuhr:
The whole character of human history is thus 
implicitly defined in the Christian symbolism of 
the "first" and "second" Adam. To define the norm 
of history provisionally in terms of prehistoric 
innocency is to recognize that a part of the norm 
of man's historic existence lies in the harmonious 
relation of life to life in nature. To define it 
ultimately in terms of a sacrificial love which 
transcends history is to recognize the freedom of 
man over his own history without which historical 
creativity would be impossible. . . . The "essential," 
the normative man, is thus a "God-man" whose sacri­
ficial love seeks conformity with and finds justifi­
cation in the divine and eternal agape, the ulti­
mate and final harmony of life with life.
Niebuhr's philosophy of the nature of man contends 
that self-realization will lead to a humility before God 
rather than to an arrogance before man. The student who 
grasps this concept will find that the real virtues in life 
are discovered in the striving for rather than in the ac­
quisition of the best understanding of life. The student 
paradoxically learns to find himself hy losing himself in 
his search for final truth.
4. The fourth major aim or purpose of education, 
according to Niebuhr's social and religious philosophy, is 
that of teaching the student the fundamental bases of free­
dom and justice. To Niebuhr freedom and justice cannot be 
acquired by either medieval or romantic methods of educa­
tion, but only through a realistic teaching of the social, 
political, and religious struggles which are a part of
^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man,
11:80-81.
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man's existence.
Niebuhr, in his concept of freedom and justice, 
presents a pragmatic social concept. Far from being abso- 
lutistic, his social and political philosophy can be de­
fined as being relativistic. The individual strives ever 
to assert his self-freedom and personal individuality. In 
his social relationships this leads him paradoxically in 
the direction of being anti-social and selfish; in extreme 
instances it leads him to grasp excess properties and to 
refuse to participate in the maintenance of social order. 
Immediately, strife, tension, and even forms of conflict 
emerge as several persons become involved in such activity. 
The only recourse is to discover those plans and procedures 
in actions that will assure the most relevant justice for 
the individual and for the state. This calls for a con­
stant and continuous program of research into the various 
areas of social experience. In supporting this aim of edu­
cation, that is, the aim to teach the student the bases of 
freedom and justice, Niebuhr's philosophy states that the 
student must be taught the relative values of property and 
the best social uses of property. He must also train him­
self to work consistently for the preservation of the best 
possible forms of justice through democratic procedures.^ 
Furthermore, Niebuhr believes that the aim of freedom and
^Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society,
pp. 117-118.
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justice cannot be promoted and maintained in a philosoph­
ical system of education short of a teaching of the funda­
mental dogmas and beliefs inherent in the Christian faith. 
Man will finally solve his problems, insofar as he can solve 
them, only as he comes to recognize his dependence on a 
higher Power. Through submissive acceptance of that Power, 
man may come to some forms of social and political inter­
course that will more nearly proximate the ideals of free­
dom and justice.^
5. The fifth and final aim of education is that of 
utilizing education in a constant construction of a new 
culture that is based upon the true nature of the universe 
and of man within that universe. Niebuhr, although his 
final hope is in God, does not abandon all existent hope 
for man and for man’s culture in an existential setting.
It is true that he perceives the decay and disintegration 
of all existing cultural heritages and values, but at the 
same time, he does lift up an interpretation of life and of 
its potentialities that show some signs of moral and social 
progress. Such a concept becomes apparent in the bulk of 
his writings in which he ever avers the reality of strug­
gle . If there were no hope for bettering cultural condi­
tions, he would abandon the entire social and moral strug­
gle and revert to medieval theology. But Niebuhr is ever 
aware of man’s struggle for a better existence. Inherent
^Reinhold Niebuhr, ’’Our Dependence on God," The 
Christian Century, (September 1, 1954), LXXXI:1034-10^6.
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in this constant struggle is the theory that culture can 
experience at least some limited forms of progress. In 
contradictory paradox, Niebuhr observes;
To the end of history the peace of the world, 
as Augustine observed, must be gained by strife.
It will therefore not be a perfect peace. But it 
can be more perfect than it is. If the mind and 
the spirit of man does not attempt the impossible, 
if it does not seek to conquer or to eliminate 
nature but tries only to make the forces of nature 
the servants of the human spirit and the instru- . 
ments of the moral ideal, a progressively higher. 
justice and a more stable peace can be achieved.
But how can this progressively higher justice and 
more stable peace be achieved? What is the role of educa­
tion in that achievement? In order to answer these ques­
tions, one must turn to Niebuhr's basic philosophical con­
cepts. At least three basic assumptions must be applied to 
the present cultural pattern if there is to be any hope for 
civilization. These applications will then work toward the 
constant creation of a new culture that will more closely 
resemble the true nature of man and the nature of the uni­
verse . ^
In the first place, any plan for cultural advance­
ment must recognize that man is created in the image of God; 
thus, man is a creature of creation and a creator of crea­
tion; he cannot be comprehended except in the light of his
^Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society,
p. 256.
^Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political 
Problems, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953, pp. 175-
I79I
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personal identity and of his present existence. Human dig­
nity and freedom demand the free expression of every indi­
vidual personality. It then becomes the role of education 
to stimulate and to encourage and to inspire individual as­
piration.
A second assumption which must undergird the educa­
tional philosophy in the construction of a new culture is 
the assumption that things and events can be evaluated only 
in terms of their unique experiences. History is to be a 
teacher— not a hindrance. Since things and events assume 
meaning only as they apply to man and to man's experiences, 
they are significant and meaningful only in a consideration 
of them within their given context with relation to man's 
experiences. Thus, with a pragmatic interpretation of the 
significance of things and events, the way is opened toward 
a new life or a new culture based on man's self-giving rath­
er than on his self-seeking. Niebuhr envisions the new life 
as follows:
A new life is possible for those who die to the 
old self, whether nations or individuals, at any 
time and in any situation. But on the positive side 
there are also special words to be spoken to an age 
beside timeless words. The new life which we require 
collectively in our age is a community wide enough 
to make the world-wide interdependence of nations 
in a technical age sufferable; and a justice care­
fully enough balanced to make the dynamic forces of 
a technical society yield a tolerable justice rather 
than an alternation of intolerable tyranny. To ac­
complish this purpose some of our preconceptions must 
go and the same law of love which is no simple possi­
bility for man or society must be enthroned as yet 
the final standard of every institution, structure, 
and system of justice. . . .  A tolerable community
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under modern conditions cannot Toe easily established; 
it can be established at all only if much of what has 
been regarded as absolute is recognized to be rela­
tive ; and if everywhere men seek to separate the pre­
cious from the vile and sharply distinguish between 
their interests and the demands which God and the 
neighbor make upon them.
The third assumption that is to be a basis for the 
forming of a new culture is that God is the ultimate force 
of the universe. If all history is relative and man is a 
free creature with certain carnal inclinations, the ob­
vious result will be chaos if man does not attach himself 
to absolute Reality through his faith in the presence of 
God and thus experience that Reality in performing the will 
of God. The new life will be new because it will be of 
God; the new culture will be new because it will be the 
will of God. This becomes the heart of the social implica­
tions of the Christian gospel; it becomes the basis on
which education, according to the thinking of Niebuhr,
2
could build a new culture.
Upon the basic foundation of these three premises, 
the educational structure of society, following the tenets 
of Niebuhr's philosophy, permits the emergence of a new 
culture. It will be a constantly emerging culture, not 
fixed and absolute in its concepts and in its forms, but 
flexible and continuously developing in a pragmatic fash­
ion. It will be a searching, sweating, striving culture,
^Ibid., pp. 114-115.
2lbid., pp. 110-111.
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in which individuals are ever struggling against the hin­
drances of their egocentric selves and also against the vi­
cissitudes of a fragmentary society and an unpredictable 
nature. This new culture will be constructed around the 
premise that the power of God is relevant to man's exist­
ence, and when the power of God becomes a decisive factor 
in man's thinking and in his conduct, the egocentric will 
to power which leads to tyrannical domination wanes. In 
short, the culture that will grow out of a pragmatic appli­
cation of that which Niebuhr calls the power of God will be 
a part of man's existence.
This new culture will never attain the plains of 
Utopia, but it will evidence more meaningful forms of love 
and justice than are exhibited in today's culthre. This ex­
pression of love and justice will be accomplished inasmuch 
as man recognizes the ultimate power of God and utilizes 
that power in his understanding of the many areas of social 
experience.
In this chapter five major aims of education have 
been presented: (1) to develop within the student an aware­
ness of God; (2) to acquaint the student with the Revelation 
of God; (3) to confront the student with elements of truth; 
(4) to teach the student the fundamental bases of freedom 
and justice; and (5) to involve the educational structure 
in the construction of a new culture. In the next chapter 
these aims will be applied to the development of a curricu­
lum.
CHAPTER IV 
THE CURRICULUM
The curriculum is the tool by which the educational 
institution achieves its desired purposes. The effective­
ness of the school's program, then, is dependent upon an 
intelligent use of the curriculum in an effort to reach 
those purposes. That there need be some rather drastic al­
terations in current curriculum practices becomes evident 
in Niebuhr's critical estimation of the achievements of 
current forms of education. He states this dissatisfaction, 
not specifically with curriculum procedures, but with the 
total American social scene which is influenced by the 
schools. Since his philosophy is based on the presupposi­
tions of the Christian faith, his criticism is directed 
toward the lack of religious fervor, the lack of sincerity, 
and the evidence of hypocrisy which are prevalent in today's 
society. He critically states;
America is at once the most religious and the most 
irreligious of modern industrial or technically effi­
cient nations. It is most religious in the sense that 
a larger number of its citizens participate in the 
life of the churches and are related to them by some­
thing more than formal allegiance, as compared with the 
European nations, in most of which not much more than 
ten percent of the population claims any significant
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religious loyalty. It is the most secular of modern 
nations in the sense that the characteristic credos 
of secular liberalism have permeated the culture to 
a larger degree and have influenced even religious 
communities. As a result American Christianity is 
characterized by quasi-secular viewpoints to a larger 
degree than European Christianity. In fact the Amer­
ican culture could be described as a spectrum of col­
ors in which the specific Christian faith and the 
definitely anti-Christian secularism of the European 
culture is replaced by a variety of quasi-Chrisiian 
secular and quasi-secular Christian viewpoints
In this statement Niebuhr is not advocating a reli­
gious experience, and by inference an educational system 
like those found in Europe. For in this same discussion he 
goes on to disapprove of the educational products of both 
America and Europe. He criticizes European forms of reli­
gious education, stating that the institutions have failed 
to preserve a vital faith on the continent. His criticism 
of the American culture and obviously of the educational 
structures which support it, is that in America the sectar­
ianism of Protestantism has tended to produce a synthetic 
approach to life. So while the American educational system 
is producing synthetic personalities, the European educa­
tional systems are producing lethargic personalities. Nie­
buhr is actually criticizing all forms of educational en­
deavor in the nations of Western civilization.
By 1936 he was beginning to perceive that the heart 
of man's problem was deeper than an intellectual problem 
and that man was a sinner as well as an ignorant creature.
^Reinhold Niebuhr, "Religion and Education," 
op. cit., p. 371.
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That he never completely rejected rational education is 
validated hy his later statement:
The development of reason and the growth of 
mind makes for increasingly just relations not only 
hy bringing all impulses in society into reference 
with, and under the control of, an inclusive social 
ideal, hut also hy increasing the penetration with 
which all factors in the social situation are ana­
lyzed .
But the use of reason alone, according to Niehuhr, 
is not sufficient. It is necessary, hut alone it will not 
guarantee man a meaningful existence. In order for man to 
achieve a meaningful existence, he must become cognizant of 
the real struggle in life. By 1936 the reality of that in­
evitable struggle in life, which to Niehuhr is a struggle 
between good and evil, had become fixed in his mind. At 
this time he became opposed to the optimistic hope of the 
liberal and progressive movements. Man, if he is ever to 
experience any degree of hope in the conflict, must have 
recourse to some Power beyond his natural existence ; he 
must hope through the experience of religious faith. As 
Niebuhr expresses this hope:
The history of religion is proof of the efficacy 
of religious insights in making men conscious of the 
sinfulness of their preoccupation with self. There 
is nothing that modern psychologists have discovered 
about the persistence of egocentricity in man which 
has not been anticipated in the insights of the great 
mystics of the classical periods of religion.2
p. 32.
^Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, 
^Ibid., p. 141.
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In this way, Niebuhr has added a deeper and more 
penetrating dimension to the pragmatic movement, the dimen­
sion of a mystical Absolute. Instead of making experience 
an absolute, as most pragmatists have tended to do, Niebuhr 
has made the final Absolute the presence of God. It is 
true that man's knowledge of God is relative and can be 
based only on pragmatic evaluations, but God is still the 
Force beyond the universe and is the only Absolute. Robert 
E. Fitch has analyzed Niebuhr's relationship with the prag­
matic movement in these words;
So far as Niebuhr's relation to the general his­
tory of philosophy is concerned, we may place him 
squarely in the great American tradition of prag­
matism. He is the grateful heir of William James 
and the understandably uncomfortable colleague of 
John Dewey. It was William James who ripped open 
the bandbox universe to give us a pluralistic uni­
verse, and to affirm the potency therein of man's 
free will. It was John Dewey who put pragmatism 
under the disciplines of experimental science, and 
celebrated the glories of freed intelligence. It 
is Reinhold Niebuhr who has given pragmatism breadth 
and depth and height and vision, richness and sub­
tlety and scope of texture, by placing it within the 
heroic perspective of the Christian faith. Niebuhr 
cannot accept James's idolatry of the human intelli­
gence. Niebuhr knows only one absolute: the God
revealed in Jesus Christ. Nevertheless, for all the 
differences in sensitivity and in insight, these 
three men belong together, in methodology and in _ 
metaphysics, like variations upon a common theme.
Niebuhr, as he evaluates Fitch’s work through an 
analysis of religious naturalism, has given his personal, 
later thinking on the subject of empiricism:
^Robert E. Fitch, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Philosophy 
of History," Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and
Political Thought, pp. ï0ü-30$\
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The only trouble with the picture is that all 
significant truth and facts about man and God, about 
the nobility and the misery of human freedom, and 
about the judgment and mercy of God, are left out of 
the picture. Thus, culture which prides itself on 
its "empiricism" obscures and denies every "fact" 
which does not fit into its frame of meaning. The 
frame of meaning is determined on the one hand by 
the concept of "nature" or the "temporal process," 
and on the other hand by the so-called "scientific- 
method" which ironically enough is meant to ascer­
tain the "facts." Unfortunately, there are some 
"facts" which escape the "method." The irrational­
ity of this cult of "Reason" is that it merely de­
nies the reality of any fact which does not fit into 
its conception of rational coherences.^
In analyzing Niebuhr's evaluation of contemporary 
curriculum problems, with the attempt to discern what he 
would consider fallacious, one must quickly note that his 
evaluation, growing out of his dialectical nature, is one 
of both approbation and condemnation. Unlike many contem­
porary theologians who criticize current educational prac­
tices without any marks of qualified approval, Niebuhr 
finds certain aspects of them to be commendable and justi­
fiable. He presents one of his best evaluations of Ameri­
can education in Moral Man and Immoral Society;
. . . The ambition of socially minded educators 
(is) to save society by increasing the social and 
political intelligence of the general community 
through the agency of the school. One of the most 
prominent and most imaginative of these leaders in 
America, Professor Harold Rugg, states the social 
ideal of education in these words: "The new sec­
ondary curriculum will introduce youth frankly and 
courageously to_ the difficulties of experimenting 
with democracy in a country of Irrge territory, of 
varied climate, of heterogeneous population and
^Reinhold Niebuhr, "Reply to Interpretation and 
Criticism," op. cit., pp. 448-449*
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increasing urbanization. It will reveal the ten­
dency of dominant economic classes to control local 
state and national government. . . . Correspondingly 
the creative imagination of our secondary school 
youth will be released and set at the task of help­
ing to erect a nation-wide planned regime, in which 
the expert functions of government are performed by- 
trained and experienced specialists in these fields.” 
While this hope of the educators, which in America 
finds its most telling presentation in the educa­
tional philosophy of Professor John Dewey, has some 
justification, political redemption through education 
is not as easily achieved as the educators assume.^
Niebuhr does not regard a socially ambitious educa­
tional program as completely unfounded and without justifi­
cation. At the same time he does state that "political 
redemption is not as easily achieved as the educators as­
sume." Now, the questions become: If it is not as easily
achieved as they assume, how can it be achieved? What are 
the inherent weaknesses which hinder its achievement? In 
answer to these questions one major weakness that Niebuhr 
sees in the assumptions of current pedagogy is its failure 
to find substantial basis in a form of ultimate Reality.
In further analyzing his criticism and the questions which 
are related to it, it becomes apparent that the criticism 
can be regarded from two points of view. In the first 
place, ultimate Reality to Niebuhr is God; in the second 
place, our American bourgeois society has ironically placed 
its faith in material possessions and in material power. 
This is another way of stating that Niebuhr believes
Ipeinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society,
pp. 211-212.
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America has replaced the reality of God with the worship 
of power and material possessions.
In a consideration of the first part of his criti­
cism, that is contemporary man's failure to recognize the 
reality of God, Niehuhr feels that the contemporary con­
cept of reason has subdued man's inner instinctual aware­
ness of the God of the universe. He remarks, "Religious 
faith cannot he simply subordinated to reason or made to 
stand under its judgment. (When this is done) reason asks 
the question whether the God of religious faith is plausi­
ble. . . . Thus reason makes itself God."^ To Niebuhr this 
becomes absurd because, to him, the naivete of the Chris­
tian faith can alone point man in the direction of the ul­
timate Reality. He criticizes current philosophies in that 
they fail to consider the possibilities of faith, which, 
in his philosophy, eventually leads to God. He emphasizes 
this point;
Life has a center and source of meaning beyond 
the natural and social sequences which may be ra­
tionally discerned. This divine source and center 
must be discerned by faith because it is enveloped 
in mystery, though being the basis of meaning. So 
discerned, it yields a frame of meaning in which 
human freedom is real and valid and not merely 
tragic.^
Thus, Niebuhr would first of all state that our cur­
rent curriculum procedures have emphasized a form of materi-
^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, 
11:165-166.
^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History,
p. 168.
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al reality and have failed to accept the presence of God 
in the universe. Because of this, students, who later Be­
come the adults of society, find life to have very little 
meaning Beyond the realms of their day By day existence.
To Niebuhr this makes life a tragic existence instead of 
a hopeful experience. In considering the possibilities of 
life, he remarks;
If we examine any individual life, or any social 
achievement in history, it Becomes apparent that 
there are infinite possibilities of organizing life 
from Beyond the center of the self, and equally in­
finite possibilities of drawing the self back into 
the center of the organization. The former possi­
bilities are always the fruit of grace though fre­
quently it is the "hidden Christ" and a ^ace which 
is not fully known which initiates the miracle.
They are always the fruits of grace Because any life 
which cannot "forget" itself and which makes Brother­
hood the instrument of its "happiness" or its "per­
fection" cannot really escape the vicious circle of 
egocentricity.!
This failure on the part of society and education 
leads to the second part of Niebuhr's criticism, namely, 
that current American society has tended to make posses­
sions and property its source of reality instead of look­
ing on to the Beyond for God. In considering this aspect 
of our culture, Niebuhr has turned to some forms of social­
ism, hoping that it might possibly lead to a partial assuage­
ment of man's physical dilemma through the establishing of 
some forms of justice based upon the ideal of Brotherhood. 
For a period of time he studied Marxism and looked to it for
^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man,
11:123.
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illumination but soon rejected it. That the oppressiveness 
of the injustices which have ironically developed in our 
bourgeois democracy are still present, however, is evident 
in his accusation:
The crowning irony . . . about materialism lies 
in the tremendous preoccupation of our own technical 
culture with the problem of gaining physical security 
against the hazards of nature. Since our nation has 
carried this preoccupation to a higher degree of con­
sistency than any other we are naturally more deeply 
involved in the irony. Our orators profess abhor­
rence of the communist creed of "materialism" but we 
are rather more successful practitioners of material­
ism as a working creed than the communists, who have 
failed so dismally in raising the general standards 
of well being.^
In a consideration of the ironical hypocrisy or ig­
norant insincerity, Niebuhr's following comment can be ap­
plied more specifically to education:
Our modern commercial civilization mixes Chris­
tian ideals of personality, history, and community 
with characteristic bourgeois concepts. Everything 
in the Christian faith which points to ultimate tran­
scendent possibilities is changed into simple his­
torical achievements. The religious vision of a 
final realm of perfect love in which life is related 
to life without the coercion of power is changed 
into the pretension that a community, governed by 
prudence, using covert rather than overt forms of 
power, and attaining a certain harmony of balanced 
competitive forces, has achieved an ideal of social 
harmony.^
Niebuhr would break rather sharply with the prag­
matic movement at this point. He does not concur in the 
belief that man's daily experience provides the basis for
^Eeinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History,
p . 7 .
2Ibid., p. 12.
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an interpretation of life. In applying this idea to educa­
tion, he states that ignorance is not the sole cause for 
the injustices and inequities which grow out of a materi­
alistic interpretation of life. The schools, as they are 
conducted today, cannot solve the basic problems of man's 
existence because they do not consider the total man. The 
schools, moreover, are dominated by powerful pressure groups 
and these groups become the real hindrance to the establish­
ment of a society in which justice prevails.^ The true 
problem lies in the fact that man, individually, as well as 
socially, fails to recognize that the real detriment to 
social progress is egocentricity which becomes to Niebuhr 
the basis of evil. Any real and enduring solution to the 
problem will come only as this condition is recognized by 
the individual and by the society, and as ultimate perfec­
tion is recognized as a part of the infinite and is asso­
ciated with that final reality which is God. An overly op­
timistic society which places its hope in its own efforts 
to solve its problems by the elimination of ignorance will 
find that its hope fades into nothingness and its structure 
will tend toward chaos.
Niebuhr, however, with his pragmatic approach to 
social problems, does not eliminate the hope for social 
progress. He does look for limited forms of progress as 
man becomes aware of his proper relationship with God and
llbid., p. 213.
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thus in turn to his fellowman. Niehuhr even states that 
goodness might grow out of the present chaotic struggle, 
for this struggle might force man to recognize the true 
significance of that eternal value, love. He sees in the 
pragmatism that has characterized American history a possi­
bility for keener recognition of true reality and the pos­
sible emergence of a social structure in which justice will 
more nearly prevail. Optimistically, he observes:
The fluidity of the American class structure is 
primarily a gift of providence, being the consequence 
of a constantly expanding economy. But this good 
fortune has been transmitted into social virtue inso­
far as it has not only left the worker comparatively 
free of social resentments but also tends to make the 
. privileged classes less intransigent in their resist­
ance to the rising class.
But Niebuhr's ringing challenge to education becomes 
clear. The problem which education faces is the problem of 
ascertaining the real causes for and the real character of 
man's dilemma. Niebuhr's hope is that curriculum patterns 
will open those avenues in which human justice and human 
freedom are not violated but which also open doors which 
lead to a more spiritual understanding of man and of man's 
problems.
The second fallacious assumption that Niebuhr finds 
in current curriculum procedures is a misconception of the 
true meaning of fragmentariness; that is, these procedures 
are constructed on the premise that fragmentariness in know­
^Ibid., p. 1 0 3 .
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ledge consists of unrelated bits of experience and that 
this fragmentariness can be overcome by producing a unified 
experience. However, it should be pointed out that as he 
views the whole problem of the fragmentary nature of life, 
his charge against the current educational practices is not 
as violent as is that of many of the present theological 
educators, and that his concept of fragmentariness is con­
structed around a focus that is only similar to theirs.
For wherein they criticize contemporary education on the 
grounds that there is little unified relationship between 
the various curriculum offerings and thereby infer that this 
fragmentariness will be conquered through the process of 
making religion the center of all education, Niebuhr con­
ceives fragmentariness as man's inability to grasp the total 
truth. Instead of making religion the cohesive force which 
develops the unified man and unified society, Niebuhr makes 
man's utter dependence on God and man's submission to that 
dependence the illuminating force which teaches man how to 
live with his fragmentary condition. In this concept, Nie­
buhr is nearer to the philosophy of pragmatism than he is 
to the modern concepts of religious education, for he points 
toward a form of successful living with the problems of 
life rather than to a dark pessimism or to utter cynicism. 
Yet, in his final analysis, he rejects both patterns of 
thinking as the final means toward the end goal of man's 
self-realization.
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In order to discuss Niebuhr's concept of the problem 
of fragmentariness, it needs to be pointed out that man is 
not aware of the total problem. For Niebuhr states:
The hope that fragmentary portions of the truth 
will finally be pieced together into the whole truth, 
or the belief that intellectual intercourse is a kind 
of competition in which the truth will finally pre­
vail against falsehood, are admirable provisional 
incentives to tolerance. They are, moreover, pro­
visionally and relatively true.
A typical modern statement of this belief and hope 
is to be found in Professor John Dewey's A Common 
Faith. According to Dewey the divisive elementsin 
human culture are vestigial remnants of outmoded re­
ligious prejudices which will yield to the universal 
perspectives which modern education will inculcate.
This education will create practical unanimity among 
men of good will.
The difficulty with this solution is that it is 
only a provisional and not a final answer to the ques­
tion of the relation of the "whole truth" to the frag­
mentary truths of history. Obviously this issue is a 
segment of the whole problem of time and eternity.^
In his further rejection of this idealistic solu­
tion to the problem of fragmentariness, Niebuhr points out 
that at the very time that Dewey was writing A Common Faith, 
new divisive elements of society which drove society even 
more into fragmentariness were emerging.
Niebuhr, then, has again turned to his paradoxical 
interpretation of life. Life is fragmentary because it 
does not have the "whole truth" except in principle. Cur­
riculum experiences are fragmentary, not because they fail 
to show an intrinsic relationship, but because they fail to
^Eeinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man,
11:237.
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portray a final relationship to God through his revelation. 
They are fragmentary in that they are broken away from the 
final hope and revelation of Jesus Christ as manifest 
through his life, his teachings, and his resurrection.
Man's experience of educating his descendants, like the ex­
periences of adapting himself to the world and to society, 
will always be fragmentary because man himself is but a 
fragmentary creature. But Niebuhr believes that man's 
fragmentariness can be used to illuminate man's basic un­
derstanding of himself and of his God. To Niebuhr, the 
truly creative curriculum is one in which all the parts 
are eventually unified in a spiritual way through a compre­
hension of the will of God and in a manner which utilizes 
its very weaknesses to strengthen man's faith in God's ul- 
t imate truth.
A third inadequacy Niebuhr sees in current curricu­
lar theory and practice is too much presupposition. It is 
a common complaint among the religiously inclined educators 
to state that current educational practices are too empiri­
cal. According to this criticism, modern education is con­
cerned primarily with the gathering of factual data and ob­
serving those data in an objective manner. Although many 
of these educators look upon facts as important, they argue 
that what is generally called a fact in education is not a 
fact at all; it is merely man's interpretation of the data 
of his contemporary experience. Similarly, these educators
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state that it is impossible to be objective in any real 
sense of the word. Every consideration of phenomena must 
be strained through the personality of the viewer. Every 
objective view of every phenomenon carries within itself 
inherently the world view of the observer and also reflects 
his interpretation of history.
In a general way, Niebuhr concurs with these asser­
tions. This becomes apparent in his attack on John Dewey. 
Although he respected Dewey in many ways and held admira­
tion for Dewey's position in contemporary thought, it was 
his contention that Dewey trusted the scientific method too 
much and failed to recognize the magnitude of man's pre­
dicament by simply attributing the anti-social conduct of 
man to the cultural lag; that is, to the failure of social 
science to keep abreast with technology.^ Niebuhr spells 
out this criticism specifically when he states;
No one expresses modern man's uneasiness about his 
society and complacency about himself more perfectly 
than John Dewey. One half of his philosophy is de­
voted to an emphasis upon what, in Christian theology, 
is called the creaturelineas of man, his involvement 
in biological and social processes. The other half 
seeks a secure place for disinterested intelligence 
above the flux of process; and find it in "organized 
cooperative inquiry." Not a suspicion dawns upon 
Professor Dewey that no possible "organized inquiry" 
can be as transcendent over the historical conflicts 
of interest as it ought to be to achieve the disin­
terested intelligence which he attributes to it.
Every such "organized inquiry" must have its own par­
ticular social locus. No court of law, though sup­
ported by age-old traditions of freedom from party
^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man,
1:110.
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conflict, is free of party bias whenever it deals 
with issues profound enough to touch the very foun­
dation of the society upon which the court is reared. 
Moreover, there can be no "free cooperative inquiry" 
which will not pretend to have achieved a more com­
plete impartiality than is possible for human instru­
ments of justice. The worst injustices and conflicts 
of history arise from these very claims of impartial­
ity for biased and partial historical instruments.
The solution at which Professor Dewey arrives is 
therefore an incredibly naive answer to a much more 
ultimate and perplexing problem than he realizes.
For Niebuhr, three evils follow from this view: 
first, biological determinism; second, a type of bourgeois 
optimism about man's sense of security in the world; and 
third, a misconception of man's final destiny.
With regard to biological determinism, contempor­
ary educational theories regard man as a totally animalistic 
creature who reacts to the forces of nature in the same 
fashion that other animals react. To Niebuhr, this is fal­
lacious, for in his totality, man cannot be compared with 
other animals. To regard the total man in an animalistic 
fashion is to regard him incompletely; this type of thinking 
does not go far enough; it fails to consider man's greatest 
attribute— his spirituality. Niebuhr observes:
Every biological fact and every animal impulse, 
however obvious its relation to the world below man, 
is altered because of its incorporation into the 
human psyche. The freedom of man consists not only, 
as it were, of the windows of mind which look out 
from his second story; but also of vents on every 
level which allow every natural impulse a freedom 
which animals do not know. . . . Man has difficulty 
in controlling the vital force of the sex impulse, 
not because nature endowed it with an impetus beyond
llbid., 1:111.
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the requirements of human life ; on the contrary the 
sex impulse is controlled with difficulty because it 
is not embedded in a total order of natural process 
in man as in animal life.
Similarly, Niebuhr's philosophy perceives in con­
temporary curriculum theories the fallacious view that man 
is a secure being in his world and that he can confront 
the world with a bland, bourgeois optimism. The truth is 
that man is a very insecure creature and his naive opti­
mism can be quickly dispelled with the realization of his 
own position as a sinner. Much of the contemporary curric­
ulum completely ignores the fact that man is inherently a 
sinner, but Niebuhr will not forget it. He warns;
Modern man has an essentially easy conscience; 
and nothing gives the diverse and discordant notes 
of modern culture so much harmony as the unanimous 
opposition of modern man to Christian conceptions 
of the sinfulness of man. The idea that man is sin­
ful at the very centre of his personality, that is, 
in his will, is universally rejected. It is this 
rejection which has seemed to make the Christian 
gospel simply irrelevant to modern man, a fact which 
is of much more importance than any conviction about 
its incredibility.^
Niebuhr's remedy for this fallacious concept is 
that any life or all human life is incomplete until it has 
fought the struggles of life within the context of the 
Christian faith and therein won the temporal victory that 
offers temporary assuagement to man in his conflicting pre­
dicament. Niebuhr paradoxically presents the dialectical 
view:
llbid., 1:40.
Zibid., 1:23.
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The Christian doctrine of original sin with its 
seemingly contradictory assertions about the inevita­
bility of sin and man's responsibility for sin is a 
dialectical truth which does justice to the fact that 
man's self-love and self-centeredness is inevitable, 
but not in such a way as to fit into the category of 
natural necessity. It is within and by his freedom 
that man sins. The final paradox is that the dis­
covery of the inevitability of sin is man's highest 
assertion of freedom. The fact that the discovery 
of sin invariably leads to the Pharisaic illusion 
that such a discovery guarantees sinlessness in sub­
sequent actions is a revelation of the way in which 
freedom becomes an accomplice of sin. It is at this 
point that the final battle between humility and 
human self-esteem is fought.^
A fourth fallacious assumption which seems to weave 
its way into contemporary curriculum theories is the assump­
tion that man's security is an end toward which education 
strives. To many educators and students the final reward 
for educative effort is a utilitarian one. A student 
should be able to "sell" his education in a way that will 
give him some form of personal security. With this asser­
tion, the problem of defining security becomes the task of 
the educator and, once it has been defined, the educational 
experiences will reflect this definition in all of the edu­
cational activities.
In order accurately to analyze and evaluate Nie­
buhr's concept of man's real sense of security, his con­
cept of man's insecurity needs to be reviewed. Niebuhr 
states that man's greatest hindrance to security is his 
personal anxiety. Niebuhr uses the word anxiety repeatedly 
in his discussion of man's freedom. It is significant that
llbid., 1:26.
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at this point he avoids the word homelessness— the word 
that is used hy so many contemporary religious existential­
ists. Niebuhr's pragmatic interpretation of man's social 
condition evidently rejects the inferred incapacity of man 
when man is referred to as a homeless creature. To Nie­
buhr, the world as it exists is evidently man's home for 
as long as he lives in it. To be homeless would infer that 
man's goal is to reach home— to avoid becoming involved in 
the bitter struggle which attempts to better man's welfare 
in this world and to seek a home that is beyond the realm 
of practical experience. In spelling out the source or the 
goal of man's security, Niebuhr states:
In short, man, being both free and bound, both 
limited and limitless, is anxious. Anxiety is the 
inevitable concomitant of the paradox of freedom 
and finiteness in which man is involved. Anxiety 
is the internal precondition of sin. It is the in­
evitable spiritual state of man, standing in the 
paradoxical situation of freedom and finiteness.
Anxiety is the internal description of the state of 
temptation. It must not be identified with sin be­
cause there is always the ideal possibility that 
faith would purge anxiety of the tendency toward 
sinful self-assertion. The ideal possibility is 
that faith in the ultimate security of God's love 
would overcome all immediate insecurities of nature 
and history.
It becomes obvious that among contemporary concepts 
of security, Niebuhr's concept more closely parallels that 
of pragmatism. To romanticism one of the final ends in 
life is security through the release of individuality. To 
the authoritarian, one of the final ends in life is the
llbid., 1:183.
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achievement of security through the authority of dogma.
For the pragmatist, as the individual develops better meth­
ods in the direction and control of knowledge, security 
will come as a by-product of relevant experience and dis­
covery. For Niebuhr, as the individual develops greater 
faith in the relevance of God's love, personal security 
will be the inevitable result. But it should be noted that 
Niebuhr breaks with authoritarian religious dogma here and 
makes the faith in the relevance of God's love a personal 
.matter and not a prescribed part of the church's authority. 
Thus, for both Niebuhr and Dewey, as a representative of 
pragmatism, the attainment of security becomes an individu­
ally pragmatic affair; to Dewey it is the product of en­
lightened experience; to Niebuhr it is the product of an 
enlightened faith. But neither of them would say that the 
achievement of a sense of security should be the end of edu­
cation. In actuality, they infer just the opposite. Educa­
tion should disturb the individual's sense of security to 
the extent that he will study his particular situation and 
the events of life, to the extent that he will attempt to 
find better means for producing higher forms of human ex­
perience. To both Niebuhr and Dewey, one end of education 
should be, not to provide the answers to life's problems, 
but to ask the questions that will challenge the student to 
an active participation in the affairs of life.
A final fallacious assumption which Niebuhr finds
80
in contemporary curriculum theory is undue emphasis upon 
physical experience. To the adherent of scientism, man's 
destiny is closely related to his empirical discoveries of 
the realities of nature. Even John Dewey's experimentalism 
places the essence of man's destiny within the realm of an 
enlightened search for methods of control. In this regard 
Dewey states:
With the surrender of unchangeable substances hav­
ing properties fixed in isolation and unaffected by 
interactions, must go the notion that certainty is 
attained by attachment to fixed objects with fixed 
characters. For not only are no such objects found 
to exist, but the very nature of experimental method, 
namely definition by operations that are interactions, 
implies that such things are not capable of being 
known. Henceforth the quest for certainty becomes 
the search for method of control; that is, regulation 
of conditions of change with respect to their conse­
quences.^
But to Niebuhr no theory which evades man's spirit­
uality completes man's final destiny. None of them goes 
far enough. Por to him man's final destiny becomes a spir­
itualized form of mystical transcendence and, although it 
does not end in a naive conception of streets of gold and 
pearly gates, it does reach its final fruition in a naive 
form of Christian faith. This is evident as he remarks:
. . .  It is possible to make a truer analysis of 
human destiny upon the basis of a religious faith 
which has disavowed human pride in principle, though 
it must be assumed that any particular Christian 
analysis will not exhibit in fact what it has dis­
avowed in principle. But if the Christian faith 
really finds its ultimate security beyond all the
^John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, New York: 
Minton, Balch and Company/ 192$, p. l2B.
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securities and insecurities of history; if it is 
really "persuaded that neither death, nor life, nor 
angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things 
present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, 
nor any other creature, shall be able to separate 
us from the love of God, which is Jesus -Christ our 
lord," it may dissuade men from the idolatrous pur­
suit of false securities and redemption in life and 
history. By its confidence in an eternal ground of 
existence which is, nevertheless, involved in man's 
historical striving to the very point of suffering 
with and for him, this faith can prompt men to ac­
cept their historical responsibilities gladly. From 
the standpoint of such a faith history is not mean­
ingless because it cannot complete itself; though 
it cannot be denied that it is tragic because men 
always seek prematurely to complete it.
Thus wisdom about our destiny is dependent upon 
a humble recognition of the limits of our knowledge 
and our power. Our most reliable understanding is 
the fruit of "grace” in which faith completes our 
ignorance without pretending to possess its certain­
ties as knowledge; and in which contrition mitigates 
our pride without destroying our hope.-*-
Man's destiny, then, becomes highly significant to 
Niebuhr for it contains the essence of a spiritual experi­
ence which will be highly influential to man in his physi­
cal experience. In this conception Niebuhr is utilizing 
all the resources of the past, including the Greek and 
Hebrew influences on present day culture. After using Greek 
rationalism and pressing it to its limit, he turns to He­
brew mysticism. The understanding and utilization of this 
Hebrew mystical experience becomes a vital part of a learn­
ing process for through it, the individual's total world 
view, including his view of himself, is affected. Niebuhr
^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man,
11:320-321.
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suggests that any curriculum which does not include at 
least some reference to this spiritual concept of man's 
destiny is operating on the fallacious assumption that 
man's destiny is achieved through physical experience 
alone.
There is no way of determining with any degree of 
exactness what Niebuhr's curriculum should accomplish for, 
as noted earlier, Niebuhr does, not claim to be a profes­
sional educator but one who has made his contribution to 
history in religious realms and he has not fully clarified 
his educational concepts. But he has left a clue to his 
understanding in his essay, "The Ethics of Jesus and the 
Social Problem." Here he discusses ethics in American cul­
ture and applies the teachings of Jesus to that problem.
He states:
We believe that it makes some difference whether 
a privileged group makes a stubborn and uncompromis­
ing defense of its special privileges or whether it 
has some degree of social imagination and tries to 
view its privileges in the light of the total situa­
tion of a community. Education ought to create some 
of that social imagination, and insofar as it does, 
it will mitigate the class struggle or the social 
struggle between races.
Although Niebuhr is here dealing with the specific 
problem of social ethics, this statement can be applied as 
his interpretation of the curriculum. Education should 
create forms of social inquiry that will lead to social
iReinhold Niebuhr, "The Ethics of Jesus and the 
Social Problem," Religion in Life, (Spring, 1932), 1:207.
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imagination. There should develop within the student an 
understanding of the meaning of justice and a comprehen­
sion of how to achieve it. In order to accomplish this end, 
the objective of the natural sciences shall be the discovery 
of all possible data illuminating the meanings of life. The 
objective of the humanities shall be the interpretation of 
those findings in the light of aesthetic experience. The 
objective of the social sciences shall be the application 
of those findings to the common experiences of social inter­
course. The objective of religion shall be the utilization 
of those findings in a personal and social definition of the 
meaning of life.
There are those who object to the inclusion of re­
ligion in the curriculum, stating that such offerings are 
a violation of the individual's free thought and that any 
such offerings will be sectarian and thus lead to indoc­
trination. It is true that any religious instruction will 
be sectarian and will follow certain religious presupposi­
tions which are a part of the teacher's world viewpoint and 
concept of history. It is also true that to ignore all re­
ligious influences and to remove all religious teaching 
from the educational offerings is sectarian in that such 
action teaches the principles of agnosticism and tends to 
indoctrinate the student in the light of that sectarianism. 
Any truly objective concept of history must recognize that 
its validity rests upon its relevance to the human situa-
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tion; therefore, the exponents of agnosticism must be will­
ing to subject their offerings to all the competition that 
religion can offer. Similarly, the exponents of religion 
must be willing to subject their offerings to all the com­
petition that agnosticism can offer. Any agnosticism that 
has not realistically confronted the challenge of religion 
is mere opinion; any religion that has not realistically 
confronted the challenge of agnosticism is mere supersti­
tion. If agnosticism cannot endure the challenge of reli­
gion, it will dissipate and disappear; if religion cannot 
endure the challenge of agnosticism, it will disintegrate 
and die. True forms of reality must withstand all the strug­
gles, the questions, and the vicissitudes that an intellec­
tual consideration of the human drama can present. To cur­
tail any part of human intellectual inquiry is to curtail 
man in his search for reality and will be, in a final analy­
sis, a form of indoctrination.
There are others who maintain that all religious 
education should be conducted through the efforts of the 
home and through the auspices of the church. But to limit 
religious training only to the home is insufficient. In 
order for all areas of human thought to have a fair hear­
ing, they must all meet on an equal plane of intellectual, 
social inquiry. If religious training is limited only to 
home training, it becomes informal and will not demand the 
respect to which it is entitled.
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The theory that religious training should be limited 
to the auspices of the church presents a far greater diffi­
culty. Protestant churches have attempted to provide this 
training through their "Sunday Schools" or "Church Schools." 
Of this effort Niebuhr states:
. . . Even the enlarged and constantly improved 
"Sunday School" instruction, with which most of the 
Protestant churches have sought to solve their educa­
tional problems, is totally inadequate. No amount 
of improvement within their present framework will 
greatly increase their adequacy because they offer 
neither the time nor the professional leadership to 
render the education they offer sufficient.!
The other possibility of rendering religious train­
ing through church auspices would be a return to parochial 
schools. Roman Catholicism follows this plan and their 
private schools seem to be doing an effective task in 
teaching religion along with the other disciplines. But 
the problem here is that there is danger that such action, 
if it should become a total social movement, would develop 
certain traits of religiosity and would indoctrinate the 
student in preconceived ideas. His religious training 
would not be confronting the intellectual challenges of the 
human drama.
Concomitant with the first problem, that of the re­
lationship between religion and the other disciplines, is 
the second problem of the separation of the church and 
state. Niebuhr faces this problem as he discusses the use
^Reinhold Niebuhr, "Religion and Education," 
op. cit., p. 371.
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of public school buildings for purposes of religious in­
struction;
There is . . .  no reason to believe that if the 
three great religious groups in this country were 
agreed on a program, and above all, convinced of the 
necessity of more adequate religious education, that 
a way could not be found to utilize public school 
buildings. After all the Constitution which pro­
hibits "the establishment of religion or the sup­
pression thereof" cannot in the long run be tortured 
to mean such a rigorous separation of church and 
state that no public school buildings may be put at 
the disposal of the churches, if this is done on a 
fair and equal basis. One need not be at all cyni­
cal in observing with Mr. Dooley that "the court 
follows election returns." The interpretation of 
the law is properly free from popular pressure but 
also properly not irrelevant to public sentiment.
The religious communities of this nation have, in 
other words, no insupperable constitutional or other 
obstacle in elaborating an adequate educational pro­
gram, if the religious communities are determined 
that it shall be established. This determination de­
pends upon a realization in all religious communities 
of the necessity and possibility of inculcating the 
Christian faith in a program in which education is 
properly related to personal commitment. This reali­
zation depends upon less apolegetic attitudes towards 
the historic traditions of our faith and a stronger 
belief among us that our religions have important 
contributions to make to our culture and to the form­
ing of character among our young people.^
Niebuhr is here making a defense for a type of re­
ligious training that would be an extension or an amplifi­
cation of "released time" religious training as it has been 
permi^tted in some states. However, since Niebuhr’s concept 
of reality, knowledge, and value all reach their culmina­
tion in forms of religious faith, there is justification 
for believing that if such an event should become possible,
l%bid.. pp. 372-373.
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Niebuhr would advocate the inclusion of religion in the 
school curriculum. He is advocating this type of religious 
education merely because this seems to be the best possible 
stepping stone toward a goal that will eventually allow for 
even greater possibilities in the area of religious train­
ing. The statement is used here to substantiate the thesis 
that Niebuhr does not perceive of any real difficulty in 
the presentation of religious education in the public as 
well as the private schools if the public thinks that such 
training is necessary.
When religious education is included in the curricu­
lum of the school, on the elementary level, the student 
should become aware of all the stories and events which are 
a part of the religious drama of history. These stories 
and events should be presented from a Christian viewpoint. 
Every child, if he is to understand the historical tradi­
tions of his culture, should become aware of the influence 
of religion in shaping his particular culture.
On the secondary level, the inquiry should move in­
to the realm of comparison and evaluation. Here the stu­
dent should learn to differentiate between relevant and 
classical myths. He will become aware of the problems of 
miracles and of revelation and will evaluate his awareness 
in the light of his particular experience. He will study 
the Hebrew conception of Yahweh and also the Christian con­
ception of God's revelation in Christ. He will, in his
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total educational experience, have opportunities for com­
paring these concepts with all the religious dogmas which 
are a part of the historical traditions of Western culture.
On the level of higher education, the student's 
religious training should move in the direction of creative 
religious inquiry. Here the student should study, not only 
those religious concepts which are a part of Western cul­
ture, hut also all of the religions of the world. He should 
become conversant with various cultures, and out of this 
experience, learn to evaluate his own religious experience. 
In so doing he should also become involved in the questions 
of theology. Higher education in the area of its religious 
emphasis should be a creative experience in which evalua­
tion and testing occur— an experience in which the student 
tries and tests historical religious dogmas according to 
the plumbline of man's historical drama. He should seek 
to find relevance in religion.
Niebuhr's failure to write much about the role of 
the natural sciences in society restricts considerations of 
science in the curriculum. But this does not imply that he 
fails to recognize the significance of the natural sciences 
in society; it simply points out that Niebuhr is more inter­
ested in man as a spiritual creature than he is in the prop­
erties of the world. He is not greatly concerned with man 
as a biological creature living in a world governed by nat­
ural law. This is understandable since his greatest fear
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in the realm of science is that man will come to regard 
science as an absolute; that man will make it an end in it­
self, thus allowing it to replace God.
But he does not reject the role of science in soci­
ety. In his "Intellectual Biography" he alludes to this 
problem. While refuting the charge that has been made' 
against him by the theologians of the Barthian persuasion, 
he points out that science cannot be easily eliminated from 
the world of man's experience. He establishes his position 
as he states:
These charges from opposing viewpoints prompt 
me to expand and defend my conception of the circu­
lar relation between faith and experience. Since a 
guiding presupposition, held by faith, acts as a 
kind of filter for the evidence adduced by experi­
ence, it would seem that the theologians are right, 
and that the modern scientists are wrong in making 
"experience" a final arbiter of truth. But the 
matter is more complex. Guiding presuppositions 
do indeed color the evidence accumulated by experi­
ence; but they do not fully control experience. 
Presuppositions are like spectacles worn by a near­
sighted or myopic man. He cannot see without the 
spectacles. But if evidence other than that gath­
ered by his sight persuades him that his spectacles 
are inadequate to help him see what he ought to see, 
he will change the spectacles. . . . Modern secu­
larism results from the disavowal of traditional 
Jewish and Christian faiths on what seems to be the 
incontrovertible evidence of experience. These 
faiths assumed a mystery of a person and a will be­
yond the observable phenomena of the world. Science 
proved these phenomena to be related to each other 
in sequences of efficient causation, and the meta­
physicians discerned higher rational essences above 
the level of efficient cause. It seemed unneces­
sary to bother with a realm of mystery in the face 
of this evidence, particularly since religion had 
discredited itself by neglecting the coherences of
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natural causes in which science is interested.^
In this statement Niehuhr is admitting that modern 
science has pretty well exploded the medieval concept of 
God. But unlike the theologians of the Barthian persuasion, 
he is not ready to reject the physical world and seek solace 
in an ethereal existence. The world is still here and the 
discoveries of science ahout that world are still relevant. 
Niehuhr will merely change his perspective as evidence war­
rants and find an enlarged evidence of a reality which will 
still allow him to live in the world, and, at the same time, 
transcend the world. In its discoveries science forced him 
to re-evaluate his religion and this re-evaluation resulted 
in the understanding of a new dimension within the Christian 
faith. He defines the point this way:
There is a difference between the implicit faith 
that some system of nature or reason embodies ulti­
mate meaning, and the Christian faith which appre­
hends a realm of mystery above and beyond the ascer­
tainable structures of the world. This is explicit 
faith because it is recognized that meaning must be 
discerned in the mystery above the rationally intel­
ligible structures of existence.^
There is no doubt in Niebuhr's mind about the valid­
ity of this mystical experience. Although it transcends 
the realm of rationality, it is still a part of his total 
experience. Thus, while he accepts the discoveries of
^Reinhold Niebuhr, "Intellectual Biography,"
Re inhold Nieb^r: His Religious, Social, and Political
Thought , p .~ Ï51
^Ibid., p. 17.
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modem science as pragmatically relevant in that they 
broaden the dimensions of man's faith, he enlarges the 
sphere of pragmatic experience to include some forms of 
mystical experience.
From this discussion it becomes evident that the 
key word for direction in the natural science curriculum 
is the word discovery. All of the natural sciences should 
be utilized in processes which will enable the individual 
to grasp a more comprehensive view of the meaning of life. 
Mathematics should constantly unfold new understandings 
about the complexities of the universe. Biology should 
constantly open new doors to the relationships which exist 
in life. Chemistry should discover substances and process­
es which will increase the physical well-being of life. 
Physics should open doors that will lead to the control of 
natural phenomena. On the primary level the student should 
become acquainted with the rudimentary truths of science ; 
on the secondary level he should explore the universe and 
all of its mysteries through the means of science; in high­
er education he should view science creatively and search 
for evidence of the force that is at the core of the uni­
verse .
If Niebuhr has provided a dearth of material in 
the realm of the natural sciences, he has provided a pleth­
ora of material in the realm of the social sciences. For 
again and again he has discussed and elaborated the meaning
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of justice in an unjust world, the depth of morality in an 
immoral world, and the height of spirituality in an un­
spiritual humanity. And through it all he has diligently 
inferred what ought to he and compared that sharply, and 
in many cases, dialectically, with what is.
The basis of Niebuhr's social philosophy can be de­
scribed as dialectical in nature. He walks a precarious 
path: one between pragmatism and idealism, between know­
ledge and faith, between the finite and the infinite, be­
tween history and eschatology. Recalling here that the ob­
jective of the social sciences curriculum is the applica­
tion of science to an interpretation of life that will as­
sure the best forms of social intercourse, Niebuhr now 
states his concept of the social sciences:
The question which confronts society is, how it 
can eliminate social injustice by methods which offer 
some fair opportunity of abolishing what is evil in 
our present society, without destroying what is worth 
preserving in it, and without running the risk of 
substituting new abuses and injustices in thé place 
of those abolished.!
In applying this risk more explicitly to the area 
of social science, he further states:
The social sciences trace the consequences of 
human behavior into the farthest reaches of social 
life. They are specialized and yet typical efforts 
of a growing human intelligence, to come into pos­
session of all facts relevant to human conduct.
. . .  If the social scientist is able to point out 
that traditional and social policies do not have 
the results, intended or pretended by those who
^Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society,
p. 167.
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champion them, honest social intentions will find 
more adequate instruments for the attainment of 
their ends, and dishonest pretensions will he un­
masked.
In his effort to discover those desired "honest 
social intentions," Niehuhr's dialectical development led 
him through many investigations. Early in his life he was 
influenced hy the appeal of progressive liberalism, hut in 
the area of social experience, Marxism led him to see the 
illusions of that liberalism. He toyed with the dreams of 
Marxism for a while, hut then the force of classical Chris­
tianity led him to perceive the illusions of dialectical 
2
materialism. In one of his later works he comes to place 
his greatest hope politically and economically in the ideal 
of democracy, stating: "Man's capacity for justice makes
democracy possible; hut his inclination to injustice makes 
democracy necessary."^
As his search for the meaning of justice in a 
world which knows injustice continued, Niehuhr finally re­
solved the inconsistencies in a pragmatic application of 
the Christian dogma of justification. His problem as a 
preacher was to resolve the ambiguity of the dogma; funda­
mentalizm was stressing that justification hy faith was
llhid., p. 32.
^John C. Bennet, "Heinhold Niebuhr's Social Ethics," 
Reinhold Niehuhr His Religious, Social, and Political 
Thought, p . 49.
3Reinhold Niehuhr, The Children of Light and the
Children of Darkness, p. xi.
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setting man apart from the struggles and vicissitudes of 
social experience. But Niehuhr, recognizing that there are 
mystical areas in which Christians do transcend the realm 
of physical experience, paradoxically and pragmatically 
utilizes the dogma of justification to pull man's religious 
faith into the realm of practical experience. Thus, a 
man's Christian faith should affect his total social view­
point and experience according to Niebuhr's following 
thought :
Justification by faith in the realm of justice 
means that we will not regard the pressures and 
counter pressures, the tensions, the overt and the 
covert conflicts by which justice is achieved and, 
maintained as normative in the absolute sense ; but 
neither will we ease our conscience by seeking to 
escape from involvement in them. We will know that 
we cannot purge ourselves of the sin and guilt in 
which we are involved by the moral ambiguities of 
politics, without also disavowing responsibility 
for the creative possibilities of justice.^
Having welded the spiritual to the physical, there 
is one further process which Niebuhr's social ethics would 
stress in a curriculum for social sciences. He would em­
phasize the fact that all social experiences— political, 
economic, and personal— reach their fruition in Christian 
love. The social science curriculum should endeavor to 
define all of man's social experience in the light of the 
meaning of Christian love as that love spells itself out 
in forms of justice. This presentation in turn should en-
iReinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man,
11:284.
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courage those "honest social intentions" which will result 
in honest social experience. On the elementary level, 
students should discover those social methods that will 
enable them to have acceptable social experiences with 
others; this would include a growing awareness of the pres­
ence of people in their own culture and of those in other 
cultures. On the secondary level, students should not only 
broaden their awareness of total society, for they should 
also develop traits of critical examination that will en­
able them to evaluate correctly the political and economic 
problems of society. In higher education, students should 
develop research techniques and creatively seek to satisfy 
the constant social demand for recognition of types of 
social injustice. And through all of this, the ideals of 
Christian love and human justice will mingle and develop a 
new concept of social experience.
The objective of the humanities, including art, 
music, sculpture, architecture, and literature, is to in­
terpret the findings and experiences of life through scien­
tific research in aesthetic experiences with the desired 
end of granting the student some aesthetic understanding 
of the meaning of life. The forms of expression and of 
communication in the humanities area should enable the stu­
dent to discern what has real meaning and significance in 
his personal life as well as in his collective life. Thus, 
the humanities become pragmatic and serve a utilitarian
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purpose as well as a spiritual purpose. On the various 
levels, the stages of interpretation and evaluation will 
progress according to the ability of the students to inter­
pret and to evaluate. Certainly one of the goals of the 
humanities area curriculum should be to enable the student 
to perceive that which is true and that which is false in 
the totality of man's existence.
In conclusion, Niebuhr's final goal for man is re­
demption— redemption from his individual and collective 
degeneration. The task of the curriculum is to effect that 
redemption through the auspices of the Christian faith. 
Thus, the curriculum is delicately balanced— balanced be­
tween religious idealism and social pragmatism. But in 
that balance it seeks to develop men and women with mysti­
cal wisdom and intellectual understanding into areas of 
meaningful existence.
CHAPTER V 
THE NATURE OP THE LEARNER
Another significant factor in a philosophy of edu­
cation is the concept of the learner. Since Niebuhr has 
stated that the Hebrew and Greek cultures have provided 
the basic sources for Western culture,^ a brief review of 
the concepts which these cultures had of the learner will 
be helpful.
The Hebrews were early in giving serious consider­
ation to the question of the nature of man and thus to the 
nature of the learner. Because of their preoccupation with 
events and movements, they did not state their theories 
philosophically, but the writings of the Psalmist in the 
eleventh century B.C. expressed a concept of the nature 
of the individual. In the eighth Psalm, the Psalmist cries 
out to Yahweh, "What is man that thou art mindful of him?
. . . Por thou has made him a little lower than the angels,
2
and hast crowned him with glory and honor."
But the Psalmist does not answer his question about
^Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Two Sources of Western 
Culture," loc. cit.
^Psalm 8.
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the nature of man; he does not develop an understanding of 
his own expression, "a little lower than the angels." It 
was not until several centuries later that Israel, when 
she was being beseiged by military powers and was facing 
national disaster, produced the prophets who could perceive 
a relationship between ethical morality and national 
strength. In doing this, the prophets went a step beyond 
man's knowledge at that point in history and perceived 
that the presence of ethical morality and ethical immoral­
ity proved the existence of an inner conflict within the 
life of man. Jeremiah, in the sixth century B.C., as he 
attempted to find sincerity in a world of insincerity, said:
Run ye to and fro through the streets of Jeru­
salem, and see, and know, and seek in the broad 
places thereof, if you can find a man, if there be 
any that executeth judgment, that seeketh the truth;
. . . And though they say. The Lord liveth; surely 
they swear falsely.
I will get me unto the great men, and will speak 
to them; for they have known the way of the Lord, 
and the judgment of their God; but these have alto­
gether broken the yoke, and burst the bonds.^
This theory of the constant struggle within the 
essence of man continued to be the basic pattern of Hebrew 
thought through the centuries which followed.
With the dawn of the Christian era, the Apostle 
Paul, under the impact of the early Christian thought con­
cerning the individuality of man, wrote to the Romans dur­
ing the first century A.D., making man's existence a more
^Jeremiah 5.
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personal and inward experience than even the prophets had 
done. For he states: "For the good that I would I do not:
but the evil which I would not, that I do."^
Through these statements there is a gradual develop­
ment of the Hebraic-Christian concept of the nature of man. 
Starting with a romantic view in which man is "a little 
lower than the angels," the view moves to an active pro­
gressive view in which man has become socially responsible, 
and finally on into a psychologically pragmatic view in 
which man has become a wretched creature, struggling within 
himself. It should be noted, however, that in this last 
view there are overtones of idealism in which man can 
achieve his most mature nature in a submissive relation­
ship with God.
The Greek concept of the nature of man progressed 
along lines similar to the concepts of the Hebrews, but 
more distinct differences of opinions are noted within the 
various branches of the Greek concept. To Homer, writing 
probably sometime during the ninth century B.C., man was 
merely a puppet of the gods. It is true that Homer's char­
acters, specifically Odysseus and Agamemnon, encountered 
tremendous struggles in their confrontations with the forces 
of nature and with the forces of society. But the gods were 
always lurking in the background. When the struggles became 
most acute, the characters had, through ignorance or inno-
^Eomans 7.
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cent selfishness, brought down upon their heads the wrath 
of some god or gods.
By the fourth century B.C., however, Greek civiliza­
tion had hardened into a cultural system and man's struggle 
had become an intellectual struggle rather than a spiritual 
struggle. Among the writers of this later period, Plato 
becomes distinctive in his attempt to analyze correctly the 
true nature of man. He idealistically defines the nature 
of man as follows: "Have we not found . . .  a path of
thought which seems to bring us and our argument to the 
conclusion, that while we are in the body, and while the 
soul is infested with the evils of the body, our desire 
will not be satisfied? And our desire is of the truth.
In this statement, Plato clearly defines his dualistic con­
cept of the nature of man.
Not all the Greeks, however, who were contemporary 
with Plato accepted Plato's idealistic concept in its en­
tirety. This questioning of the concept of the dualistic 
nature of man becomes apparent in the works of Plato's 
pupil, Aristotle, Althou^ Aristotle studied at the feet 
of Plato for twenty years, he could not accept this con­
cept of the natural world and the supernatural world as 
realistic. To him the evidences of the natural world were 
real; his problem was to define the supernatural entelechies
Ipiato, "Phaedo," The Dialogues of Plato, Third 
Edition, Translated by Benjamin Jowett, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1924, 11:207.
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within the realm of natural existence. If God is to he 
evident, he must he evident in the forces of the natural 
world; if man is to attain pure reason, he must do so 
through the use of his natural mind; for there is no real­
istic evidence of any other state in existence hut the nat­
ural state. As Aristotle developed a monistic concept of 
the world, and of the nature of man in that world, he wrote:
Now understanding in itself has to do with what 
is hest in itself, and the highest type of understand­
ing has to do with what Is hest in the highest degree. 
And an intellect understands itself insofar as it 
takes on its intelligible object; for it becomes in­
telligible by attaining and understanding its object, 
so that an intellect and its intelligible object are 
the same. For that which is receptive of something 
intelligible and of substance is an intellect; and 
it is actual when it possesses this. Hence it is the 
latter rather than the former state which seems to 
constitute the divine state of the intellect; and its 
act of understanding is the most pleasant and best. 
Therefore, if God is in that pleasureable state in 
which we sometimes are, this is wondrous; and if He 
is in that state in a higher degree, this is even 
more wondrous; and He is in that state. Life, then, 
also' belongs to him; for intellectual activity is 
life, and God is that activity; and the essential 
activity of God is the life which is best and eter­
nal. And we say that God is an animal, eternal and 
most excellent. Hence life and continuous and eter-^ 
nal duration belong to God, for this is what God is.
The Greek concept of the nature of the learner is 
thus variegated and complex. However, there is concurrence 
in that these concepts conceive of the learner as confronted 
with the inevitability of that which we today call a psycho­
logical struggle; the inner force struggles with the outer
^Aristotle, ’'Metaphysics,” The Works of Aristotle, 
Translated by W. D. Ross, New York: Oxford University
Press, VIII:1072.
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force in the life of every individual, and the individual 
becomes mature or educated when the inner force subjugates 
the outer force and attains its highest ends.
Niebuhr's concept of the nature of the learner, rec­
ognizing the influence of the force of these two cultures, 
is closely related to his concept of the nature of man.
Since this latter concept has been rather amply discussed 
in the second chapter, it is mentioned here and used as a 
basis for a more specific study of the nature of the partic­
ular individual who is maturing through educational proc­
esses. From Niebuhr's basic concept of the nature of man 
the following characteristics of the learner can be deduced;
In the first place, the student is a unified crea­
ture. As a young pastor in Detroit, Niebuhr clearly saw 
through what he believed to be the sham, pretense, and 
hypocrisy of a dualistic concept of man. He quickly noted 
how utterly foolish it was to preach to youngsters about 
the salvation of their souls while their feet were bare, 
their nakedness was covered with but tattered rags, and 
their bodies were emaciated. He discovered that the soul 
and the body were one. No amount of pious asceticism 
could offset the tragedy of the children's physical exist­
ence. No amount of spiritual mysticism could cope with 
their unfulfilled physical passions. By the time he wrote 
The Nature and Destiny of Man in 1941, his comprehension 
of this problem led him to take a firm stand, as the follow­
ing quote reveals:
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The essential nature of man contains two elements; 
and there are correspondingly two elements in the 
original perfection of man. To the essential nature 
of man belong, on the one hand, all of his natural 
endowments, his physical and social impulses, his 
sexual and racial differentiations, in short, his 
character as a creature embedded in the natural order.
On the other hand, his essential nature also includes 
the freedom of his spirit, his transcendence over 
natural process and finally his self-transcendence
By 1955 this view had crystallized even more when 
he stated in The Self and the Dramas of History, when speak­
ing of man's internal dialogue, that "the fact is that there
are not two distinct selves in this internal dialogue. They
2
are merely two foci of the same self."
This complex, monistic concept leads to the observa­
tion that the child or student is in the world and of the 
world and at the same time above the world and of the sphere 
that is above the world. To Niebuhr, the child is definite­
ly an animal in a physical world— living, breathing, eating, 
sleeping, and experiencing all the experiences of animal 
flesh. The "in the world" part of him is certainly a part 
of the child. Any education which ignores this fact is but 
an empty sham. The child is also "of the world." He can­
not escape being influenced and molded by the world in 
which he lives. All the forces of nature, including social 
relationships, and all the forces of history with which the
^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man,
1:270.
^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Self and the Dramas of
History, p. 6.
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child meets place a distinctive mark upon his character.
At the same time, this monistic creature is "above the 
world." The total personality cannot be confined nor de­
fined within the limits of the sensational experiences of 
the physical body. Surely there is a difference between 
the maturing child and the growing animal. All the child's 
dreams, hopes, and aspirations, in fact, the totality of 
his imaginative experiences are beyond the boundaries of 
his physical existence. When he has invented an intricate 
mechanical device or created an artistic masterpiece, there 
is something there that is not only of the flesh; it is the 
expression of his "above the world" self. Finally, the 
child is also of the sphere above the world. He may not 
be able to hear the singing of the angels, but he can feel 
the harmony of the infinite. There is that within a child 
which conveys some mysterious force of infinity. This has 
placed its stamp upon him and continues to do so through 
all his mystical experiences. And all of these experiences 
are still the child. Remove any one of them and he is no 
longer the child of man seeking his identity and fulfill­
ment. In the unity of these experiences he is a monistic 
creature with many complex forces within the essence of his 
being.
Niebuhr's philosophy also states that the child or 
learner is a unique individual. It can be observed that 
all children do not sing in the same key; they do not dream
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the same dreams nor have the same aspirations. They do not 
all use their hands in the same way, express their love in 
the same manner, nor have the same hopes for adult accom­
plishment and security. But Niebuhr makes the uniqueness 
of the individual the product of the "above the world” ex­
perience. In this regard he states that ”what is unique in 
man . . . may be translated as 'spirit' but the primary 
emphasis lies upon the capacity for thought or reason.”^ 
Niebuhr develops the theme more specifically as he discusses 
man's experience of self-transcendence:
Human capacity for self-transcendence is also the 
basis of human freedom and thereby of the uniqueness 
of the individual. Human consciousness not only 
transcends natural process but it transcends itself.
It thereby gains the possibility for those endless 
variations and elaborations of human capacities which 
characterize human existence. Every impulse of na­
ture in man can be modified, extended, repressed and 
combined with other impulses in countless variations.
In consequence no human individual is like another, g 
no matter how similar their heredity and environment.
In Niebuhr's criticism of current educational pro­
cedures, this area of the uniqueness of the individual pro­
vided him with one of the areas in which he became most 
critical.^ Current bourgeois society attempts to stamp the 
mark of conformity on every student. Education tends to 
treat all students as if they have the same intelligence,
^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man,
1:6.
2Ibid., 1:56.
3Ibid., I:82f.
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the same hope for attainment, and the same possibility of 
achievement, without recognizing that each one possesses a 
unique character that is private and personal. If formal 
education is to perform its function with due dispatch, it 
needs to remember that each child will be motivated best 
by those instructors who are cognizant of the child's unique 
capabilities and incapabilities. In attempting to discover 
the secret of the individual, Niebuhr was forced to con­
sider the basis of motivation. In the pastoral experience 
in Detroit, he observed that psychological factors and mo­
tivation are related; it does make a difference as to how 
the child is received in his home and in his social experi­
ences. The poorly motivated child is one who does not ex- 
perience acceptable social relationships. Niebuhr recog­
nized that the social relationships of the children in 
Detroit influenced the child personally and thus influenced 
the methods whereby he developed his unique qualities. In 
analyzing this situation, Niebuhr gives his interpretation 
of the role of the teacher as a psychologist:
The psychological sciences discover and analyze 
the intricate web of motivation, which lies at the 
base of all human actions. . . .  If the psychological 
scientist aids men in analyzing their true motives 
and in separating their inevitable pretensions from 
the actual desires which they are intended to hide, 
he may increase the purity of social morality.^
Thus, every learner is a unique creature possessing 
individual possibilities and individual expressions. Some
. ÏReinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society.
p. 32.
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of the latter are mere pretensions and alert educational 
leadership can, through psychological devices, discern the 
true individuality of the learner. In doing this, that 
leadership will direct the child to his own unique end.
Niebuhr further states that the learner, in his 
uniqueness, possesses freedoms and limitations. The learn­
er's freedom lies within his uniqueness and also in his 
ability to transcend the realms of his physical existence. 
Niebuhr states:
To a certain degree man is free to reject one en­
vironment for another. If he dislikes the spiritual 
environment of the twentieth century, he may con­
sciously choose to live by patterns of the thirteenth 
century. If he finds his physical environment uncon­
genial, he has the capacity to modify it.^
But at this point Niebuhr becomes critical of con­
temporary social structures, stating that these structures 
have failed to recognize that man's freedom does contain 
limitations. He continues:
The pride of modern man has sometimes tempted him 
to forget that there are limits of creatureliness 
which he cannot transcend and that there are inexor­
able forces of nature which he cannot defy. It is 
nevertheless important to remember that human spir­
ituality is sharply distinguished from animal exist­
ence by the measure of human freedom and the conse­
quent degree of discreet and unique individuality in 
man. ^
In this last statement the full impact of Niebuhr's 
concept of the limitations of man becomes apparent. In
^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man,
1:55-56.
Zibid., 1:56.
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applying this to current educational concepts and practices, 
Niehuhr contends that in educational experiences, educators 
tend to ignore the fact of man's real limitations.^ He also 
points out that those limitations are related to man's final 
form of spirituality. The learner can soar— but he can soar 
only so high.
Finally, according to Niebuhr, the learner finds 
fulfillment through his individual relationships. There 
are innumerable relationships in life, but Niebuhr makes 
only three of them significant in man's search for achieve­
ment: the relationship of the self with the self; the re­
lationship of the self with other selves, and the relation­
ship of the self with God. Of the first two, he states:
The self which knows itself guilty is the tran­
scendent self. Or, to speak more precisely, the self 
in the moment of transcending itself. The self in 
the moment of transcending itself exercises the self's 
capacity for infinite regression and makes the pre­
vious concretion of will its object. It is in this 
moment of self-transcendence that the consciousness 
and memory of original perfection arise. For in this 
moment the self knows itself as merely a finite crea­
ture among many others and realizes that the undue 
claims which the anxious self in action makes, re­
sult in injustices to its fellows.
Niebuhr thus believes that the learner will not 
reach a satisfactory stage in his development until he 
learns to distinguish and to comprehend his own intrinsic 
self. The individual must first of all experience a reward­
ing association with himself. To Niebuhr, this can come
llbid., I:82f.
2Ibid., 1:277. '
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only as the learner, by self-transcendence, sees himself 
in his finite limitations and imperfections. By the very 
act of recognizing these limitations and imperfections, he 
can seek forms of assuagement for those limitations and 
finally learn to live satisfactorily with himself through 
the process of repentance.
The second relationship involves Niebuhr's concept 
of social justice. The individual, in his attempts at 
self-transcendence, in his anxiousness about himself and 
his security, often unconsciously disregards his relation­
ships with his fellowman and thus ironically develops forms 
of coercion and social injustice. Certainly society will 
not adequately supply the needs of mankind until some forms 
of justice have supplanted injustices which are now preva­
lent. As the learner perceives these individual acts of 
aggression within himself— as he becomes aware of his own 
selfishness through repentance— and seeks to develop more 
humane relationships with his fellowman, the problem of 
social injustices will proportionately disappear. But it 
must be remembered that Niebuhr does not envision the dis­
appearance of these social injustices through any mystical 
means; social injustices will disappear only as men struggle 
to overcome social injustices.
But the relationship of man to man goes even deeper. 
Certainly this is a part of the ideal of social justice, 
but Niebuhr is sufficiently realistic to observe that the
110
individual, in his relationships with others becomes a part 
of a social whole— a universal soul— which is the product 
of the total social picture. Just as the learner lives in 
the world and is of the world, his relationships with others 
reveals his nature and the relation of that nature to the 
religious idea of man. Man's relationships with others be­
come just as much a part of the individual as do the rela­
tionships which exist between the parts of the individual.
Of man's relationship with God, Niebuhr states:
At its best the contemplating self is the finite 
self which has become conscious of its finiteness and 
its relation to God as the limit and fulfillment of 
its finiteness.
The learner will not have reached a satisfactory 
stage of development until he has developed a satisfactory 
relationship with his God— until he has repented and worked 
out an understanding of himself in relation to the total 
structure of things.
In order to evaluate Niebuhr's concept of the learn­
er and to apply that concept to contemporary educational 
philosophy, his concept of the learner must be compared with 
prevailing contemporary concepts. Today, these concepts 
can be classified in three general categories. Certainly 
there are wide deviations in each of the classifications 
but basically the three divisions in educational philosophy 
are still discernible. For this reason, the modern concepts
llbid., 1:259.
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of that nature of the learner will he discussed in this 
study from the viewpoints of these three major philosophi­
cal concepts: (1) the romantic progressive view; (2) the
active progressive view; and (3) the authoritarian view.
The romantic progressive view has gone through many 
cycles and has been classified under many headings. On the 
current scene it reaches its pinnacle of expression in the 
general term of naturalism. In pedagogical circles, nat­
uralism usually is closely related to romanticism, looking 
upon man as a creature worth redeeming. This becomes the 
impact of naturalistic pedagogy; if man is but a baneful 
disease and a blight upon the natural earth, there is little 
need for expending the effort of trying to redeem him. But 
naturalistic pedagogy does not accept this negative thesis, 
and most naturalistic educators, in considering the plight 
of man, look upon man as being educable and they interpret 
the education process as one in which the individual devel­
ops his natural abilities.
One of the leading modern exponents of pedagogical 
naturalism was Herbert Spencer, an English pedagogical 
philosopher. Spencer looked upon the learner as a little 
savage who, through his natural contacts with the forces of 
nature and with the restraints of society, would develop 
most efficiently if restrained as little as possible and 
allowed to develop according to his individual, natural 
instincts. Deploring the artificiality of parental and
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teacher restraint, he upholds the theory of cause and 
effect;
. . . Right conceptions of cause and effect are 
early formed; and hy frequent and consistent experi­
ences are eventually rendered definite and complete. 
Proper conduct in life is much better guaranteed 
when the good and evil consequences of actions are 
rationally understood, than when they are merely be­
lieved on authority. A child who finds that dis- 
orderliness entails the subsequent trouble of put­
ting things in order, or who misses a gratification 
from dilatoriness, or whose want of care is followed 
by the loss or breakage of some much-prized posses­
sion, not only experiences a keenly-felt consequence, 
but gains a knowledge of causation: both the one
and the other being just like those which adult life 
will bring.^
A contemporary of Spencer, the American pedagogical 
philosopher, G-. Stanley Hall, expressed the naturalistic 
philosophy through a more specific emphasis on the little 
savage:
. . . The spontaneous expressions of this best 
age and condition of life (youth), with no other oc­
cupation than their own development, have shown re­
versions as often as progress. The rupture of home 
ties stimulates ever wider vicarious expression of 
the social instinct. Each taste and train can find 
congenial companionship in others and thus be stimu­
lated to more intensity and self consciousness.
Very much that has been hitherto repressed in the 
adolescent soul is not re-enforced by association 
and may become excessive and even aggressive. While 
many of the race-correlates of childhood are lost, 
those of this stage are more accessible in savage 
and subsavage life. Freedom is the native air and 
vital breath of student life. The sense of personal 
liberty is absolutely indispensable for moral ma­
turity. . . . The student must have much freedom to 
be lazy, make his own minor morals, vent his dis­
respect for what he can see no use in, be among
^Herbert Spencer, Education: Intellectual, Moral
and Physical, New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1914,
pp. IÜ9-I90.
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strangers to act himself out and form a personality 
of his own, he baptized with the revolutionary and 
skeptical spirit, and go to extremes at the age 
when excesses teach wisdom with amazing rapidity, 
if he is to become a true knight of the spirit and 
his own morality.
According to this naturalistic philosophy, true 
education becomes a self-imposed process in which the 
learner, through the expression of his natural instincts, 
desires, and needs, learns the validity of the universal 
law of cause and effect. He learns which represented 
truths are most valid for the production of the best pos­
sible effects. For this reason, the authority of educa­
tion must be sympathetic and wise, performing the role of 
a counselling service in which the learner teaches himself 
those truths which will develop a rhythmical relationship 
with the rhythms of nature.
Where the naturalistic viewpoint of the nature of 
the learner regards the basic individualism of the individ­
ual as the primary concern of education, the active pro­
gressive viewpoint also starts with the individual learner, 
The distinctive mark of difference between the two philo­
sophical systems lies, not in the subject, but in the def­
inition of the subject. While naturalism regards the 
learner as basically an animal, responding to stimuli 
which stimulate animal responses, the active progressive
Stanley Hall, Youth; Its Education, Regimen, 
and Hygiene, New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1914,
pp. 228-229.
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viewpoint regards the learner as having higher, more aes­
thetic drives which should stimulate the animal drives to 
seek achievement in more idealistic experiences. The stu­
dent is animal but he is more than other animals. He also 
possesses a socially learned desire to elevate the welfare 
of himself and of the human race; he responds to this desire 
through artistic devices, through intellectual attainment, 
through scientific inquiry, and through the media of com­
munication. The outstanding proponent for this view on 
the contemporary scene has been John Dewey with his experi­
mental philosophy.
As a young philosopher and teacher, John Dewey ad- ■ 
hered to the tenets of conservative idealism, being strong­
ly influenced by the works of Hegel.^ But as his philoso­
phy matured through his own research and observation, he 
came to reject all forms of idealism connected with the con­
cept of the supernatural and developed his private form of 
empirical idealism which becomes pragmatic in its expres­
sion. To him reality was present only in that which sup­
plied the demands of the individual and of the society. Not 
that he rejected all the theories and arts of history as has 
so often been ascribed to him. In fact, in his study on 
moral ethics, he has stated that in the quest for moral 
theory one can draw from such sources as (1) the historical
^J. Donald Butler, Four Philosophies and Their 
Practice in Education and Religion, p. %4Ù.
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concepts of what is fair and equal; (2) the elaborated ma­
terial of legal history, judicial decisions, and legisla­
tive activity; (3) the combined knowledge of the various 
sciences such as biology, physiology, hygiene and medicine, 
psychology, psychiatry, as well as statistics, sociology, 
economics, and politics; and (4) the entire body of theoret­
ical history for the last two thousand years.^ He did not 
discard all the old truths; but the old truths became truths 
only insofar as they proved to be relevant to the pressures 
and demands of necessity which are a part of contemporary 
life. In order to discover more fully that which is rele­
vant, Dewey advocated the submitting of all experiences, 
events, actions, and thoughts to a scientific scrutiny and 
then to evaluate them on the basis of their present value.
In describing this empirical attitude toward history, he 
stated:
To re-establish a connection of histories within 
a longer course of events and a more inclusive state 
of affairs, requires delving, probing, and extension 
by artifice beyond the apparent. To link the things 
which are immediately and apparitionally had with one 
another by means of what is not immediately apparent 
and thus to create new historic successions with new 
initiations and new endings depends in turn upon the 
system of mathematical-mechanical systems which form 
the proper objects of science as such.^
Ijohn Dewey and James H. Tufts, "The Nature of 
Moral Theory," A Modern Introduction to Ethics, edited by 
Milton K. Kunit'FJ Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958,
pp. 5-14.
2john Dewey, Experience and Nature, New York:
Dover Publications, 195o, p. 138.
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Through this statement Dewey is presenting a view 
of his concept of the nature of the learner by implying 
that the learner is involved in the processes of evaluating 
relevant culture and also of creating new cultures. In 
pointing out what he considered to be some of the fallacious 
assumptions of traditional concepts of the nature of man, 
he presents his personal concept:
. . . There a contrast between physical ob­
jects and objects as they are believed to be, even 
though what they are believed to be is an unescap- 
able medium in observing what they are. Where is 
such a contrast to be found in the case of existing 
social institutions and standards? The contrast is 
not, as it seems to be in the case of knowledge of 
physical existence, between a belief, desire and 
aspiration for something which is better but non­
existent .
Such facts exemplify the difference between a 
bodily or a psychic self with a mind and mind as in­
dividual. Either the better social object is sEeer 
illusion, or else individual thought and desire de­
note a distinctive and unique mode of existence, an 
object held in solution, undergoing transformation, 
to emerge finally as an established and public ob­
ject.^
The learner, then, as he experiences the processes 
of the growth of his intellect, including the development 
of his storehouse of verifiable data based upon empirical 
speculation and his unique imaginative person, becomes the 
person. There is no dualism here; the individual is one, 
reaching the pinnacle of his own individuality through the 
experiences of his own mind. A tightly woven mesh of co­
herence within the individual unifies him in such a way
llbid., pp. 219-220.
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that to separate him into parts is violating his intrinsic' - 
personality.
The third interpretation of the nature of the learn­
er to be discussed here is an interpretation which looks 
upon reality as residing in some form of an idealistic ab­
solute— an interpretation which usually results in an au­
thoritarian concept of education. There are certain abso­
lute truths which remain aloof above the warp and woof of 
everyday experiences. The learner, coming into life in a 
state of innocent ignorance, must be taught these absolute 
truths. The learner, in his earlier experiences, is un­
tutored and empty; his intellectual powers are to be devel­
oped through the process of acquainting him or filling him 
with the substances of absolute truth. Whether this form 
of absolute truth is the authority of a religious dogma or 
the ideal of pure knowledge makes little difference in the 
concept of the nature of the learner; the learner is still 
to receive his intellectual growth by the learning of truths 
which are revealed to him through authoritarianrmethods.
In educational circles, elaboration of this subject 
reveals that the effective teacher, according to authori­
tarian standards, becomes the symbol of absolute truth, and 
the learning process is an experience in which the learner, 
almost a non-entity at this point in his preparation, ac­
quires insight into absolute truth. In all authoritarian 
education, knowledge is an absolute beyond and outside the
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sphere of experience of the neophyte learner, and the learn­
er is of a mutahle nature which can receive and accumulate 
knowledge when it is imparted to him. The same observation 
can be made of all forms of idealism which make knowledge 
an ideal outside the realm of the learner's pragmatic expe­
rience. Any system of philosophy which makes an ideal idea 
or concept an absolute, eventually must regard the student 
as removed from the absolute but able to comprehend portions
of it when it is transmitted to him.
When Niebuhr's view of the nature of the learner is 
compared with the contemporary views, Niebuhr makes eclectic 
choices from all of them, utilizing that which he finds 
valid and relevant and rejecting that which he conceives 
invalid and irrelevant. He largely rejects the concept of 
romanticism and yet, even though he does regard man as a 
sinner, he also sees opportunity for man to experience cer­
tain pleasures in life through the development of man's per­
sonality. Niebuhr's emphasis on justice compares favorably 
with Dewey's concept of relevant action.
In other areas, Niebuhr would object to the author­
itarian methods generally, but he does have his own brand
of idealism in his interpretation of an absolute God. He 
is authoritarian in that God, as revealed through Jesus 
Christ, is the final absolute of the world. Niebuhr's 
point of departure with many authoritarians occurs in that 
where they look to certain social systems for authority.
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Niebuhr looks pragmatically to a personal relationship with 
God. But even this must be qualified, for when Niebuhr 
makes history meaningful, he is making an interpretation 
of history a form of authoritarian power.
Prom all these comparisons it can be observed that 
Niebuhr develops his own personal and particular interpre­
tation of the nature of the learner. That interpretation 
grows out of his observations of the learner as that learn­
er experiences the events and the flow of history and of 
society. It is an interpretation that can be loosely de­
scribed as romantically and pragmatically idealistic— an 
interpretation that is based on a dialectical interpreta­
tion of the nature of the totality of life.
CHAPTER VI 
DISCIPLINARY CONTROL IN EDUCATION
Niebuhr's theory of disciplinary control in the 
total life of man, and thus also in education, is embedded 
in his monistic concept of the nature of man. In this 
monistic concept, which recognizes at least two conflict­
ing parts, the natural and the spiritual, Niebuhr contends 
that man's final obligation in this life is to subjugate 
the physical drives and impulses to the transcendence of 
the spiritual forces. Inherent in this idea is the theory 
that discipline, in its final application, becomes a per­
sonal matter; it cannot be determined by forces outside 
the individual; it must be based upon inner action— an 
inner compulsion, by which the individual becomes respon­
sible for his conduct and action. This is not to say that 
Niebuhr does not validate the use of certain social laws 
and even the use of force in the maintenance of those laws 
for the establishment of justice in society. Certainly 
some laws and some force in society are necessary and some­
times the force which will maintain those laws needs to be 
active, aggressive, and even violent if forms of justice
120
121
are to "be preserved. These laws reflect the accumulated 
goals of cooperating individuals and in turn they have as 
their aim the welfare of the total society. But Niebuhr's 
pragmatic interpretation of society would indicate that 
laws are no stronger than the will or determination of the 
individuals who live under those laws. Every individual 
has the power to break the law; thus, the true factor in 
any system of disciplinary control is the intelligent use 
of freedom on the part of the individual.
This theory places extensive responsibility upon 
education generally and upon the educator specifically. It 
would be a comparatively simple matter to enforce specific 
rules and regulations in the classroom or on the campus if 
all students were controlled all the time. At least, it 
would be simple to gain this goal on the surface. It be­
comes- a much more complex matter and a much more difficult 
procedure to develop traits of character within the individ­
ual students— traits of character which will not only main­
tain but also exhibit realistically and pragmatically the 
most ideal forms of human virtue and justice. To force a 
student to be "good" is one thing; to guide and to inspire 
students to be "good" is quite another matter.
In order to present and then to understand Niebuhr's 
theory of disciplinary control demands a more careful study 
of his system of social ethics. Niebuhr's position in the 
problems of sex and race will be considered extensively.
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Brief reference will then he made to the problem of economic 
and social justice.
In confronting the romantically-inclined, naturalis­
tic, psychological attitude toward sex, Niehuhr has specifi­
cally attacked two contemporary observations. In the first 
place, he challenges the contemporary psychological view 
that sex is a natural instinct and that it has reached sig­
nificance in society because of the repression and secrecy 
with which society has regarded it. In confronting this 
theory, Niebuhr quotes from L. P. Shaffer's The Psychology 
of Adjustment;
In the lower animals in a state of nature, and 
natively in man, the sex drive is a glandular and 
physiological one, satisfied by direct (though 
learned) mechanisms when it arises. In civilized 
man the direct satisfaction of the sexual urges is 
thwarted at their appearance in infancy and at their 
strengthening in the glandular changes of adolescence 
by social conventions and economic obstacles. This 
thwarting directs attention to the drive and attaches 
it to many substitute stimuli and substitute re­
sponses. ^
To which Niebuhr responds:
Both modern and traditional Christian thought 
would agree that sexual passion is a particularly 
powerful impulse which has expressed itself more 
vigorously throughout human history than the phys­
ical function of procreation requires. The usual 
modern explanation for this hypertrophy of the 
impulse is that it has been accentuated by repres­
sion. This explanation fails to take account of 
the fact that the social disciplines, which civ­
ilized society has thrown about the satisfaction 
of the sex impulse, are made necessary by the very 
fact that the impulse has exceeded the necessities
^L. P. Shaffer, as quoted in Reinhold Niebuhr,
The Nature and Destiny of Man, 1:235-236.
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of the preservation of the species, from the very 
“beginning; and that even in primitive man sex has 
never been merely "glandular and psychological."
The sexual, as every other physical impulse in man, 
is subject to^and compounded with the freedom of 
man's spirit.^
Niebuhr's second attack upon a psychological inter­
pretation of the problem of sex appears in his analysis of
2
the Kinsey report. In his evaluation of this report, 
Niebuhr lists three weaknesses as follows;
The report assumes that the modern revolt against 
sex disciplines is primarily due to the inadequacy 
of the standards established by the "Judeo-Christian" 
tradition, and that more adequate standards will be 
achieved by defining "normal" behavior through a 
statistical study of actual behavior. The first 
proposition is not altogether wrong. Neither Cathol­
icism nor Protestantism has ever completely realized 
the ideal of relating sexual life sacramentally to 
the whole of personality and to the whole of a loyal 
community of persons in the family partnership.
But the second proposition of the Kinsey report 
proves how much more grievously modern secularism 
errs in dealing with these issues. If the Christian 
faith has failed to bring tumultuous stuff of the 
sexual life under adequate discipline or sublimation, 
the philosophy behind the Kinsey report proposes to 
solve the problem, simply by ignoring all deeper 
aspects of human existence. Sexual drives are ana­
lyzed as if they were merely biological impulses 
and "sexual objects" are discussed as if "impulses" 
had to find their "objects" without the overarching 
of personality in each case.
Even more dangerous is the assumption that new 
norms can be created by a statistical study of the 
actual sex practices of the day. Here we have the 
modern sociological approach to the problem of norms 
reduced to its final absurdity. A learned doctor,
iReinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man,
1:235.
^Eeinhold Niebuhr, "Sex Standards in America," 
Christianity and Crises, (May 24, 1948), VIII: 65-66.
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reviewing the Kinsey report asks the relevant ques­
tion, whether the fact that most people have colds, 
in the winter establishes the cold as "normative."
The reflective observer will quickly note that 
there is a discrepancy here if Niebuhr's system of social 
ethics is defined as pragmatic. The error lies in the 
usual definition of the term pragmatic. In this evalua­
tion, Niebuhr is stating that there are higher realms for 
determining the basis of man's social ethics than the realms 
of normative action. Niebuhr is cognizant of this philo­
sophical gap and overcomes it in a later essay in which he 
points out that the intrinsic desire on the part of man to 
transcend his physical realm is a part of his pragmatic 
world— a part that is just as much an element of existential 
existence as are the actual experiences in human conduct.
Man is in the world and also above the world. Niebuhr 
bridges this philosophical gap by reinterpreting the true 
meaning of man's freedom and uniqueness. Man's freedom con­
sists of a spiritual freedom as well as of a physical free­
dom. Man does not achieve real freedom until the spiritual 
freedom has sublimated the physical freedom to those habits 
of conduct that will allow for spiritual freedom. This is 
as true of the sex impulse as it is of any other physical
p
desire or drive.
^Ibid., p. 65.
^Reinhold Niebuhr, "Sex and Religion in the Kinsey 
Report," Christianity and Crises, (November 2, 1953), 
XIII;138-T^r:
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In attempting to summarize Niebuhr's interpretation 
of the role of the educator with regard to the problem of 
sex, his earlier statements about the intrinsic nature of 
sex reveal his application of that which he terms the true 
Christian interpretation, not only of sex, and not only of 
love, but of all of life. In relating that Christian inter­
pretation of life to sex, he states:
From the standpoint of "pure nature" the sex im­
pulse is a natural basis of "alteregoism” ; for it is 
the method by which nature insures that the individ- 
- ual shall look beyond himself for the preservation 
of the species. The fact that upon the purely in­
stinctive basis both the self and the other are in­
volved in sexual passion makes it possible for spirit 
to use the natural stuff of sex for both the asser­
tion of the ego and the flight of the ego into an­
other. The sexual act thus becomes, in human life, 
a drama in which the domination of one life over the 
desires of another are in bewildering conflict, and 
also in baffling intermixture. Furthermore these 
corruptions are complexly interlaced and compounded 
with a creative discovery of the self through its 
giving of itself to another. Thus the climax of 
sexual union is also a climax of creativity and sin­
fulness. The element of sin in the experience is not 
due to the fact that sex is in any sense sinful as 
such. But once sin is presupposed, that is, once the 
original harmony of nature is disturbed by man's self- 
love, the instincts of sex are particularly effective 
tools for both the assertion of the self and the 
flight from the self. . . .
An analysis of sexual passion thus verifies the 
correctness of the seemingly contradictory Christian 
interpretation of the relation of sensuality to self- 
love. It contains both a further extension of the 
sin of self-love and an effort to escape from it, an 
effort which results in the futility of^worshipping 
the "creature rather than the Creator,"
In applying this paradoxical interpretation of sex
^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man,
1:236-237.
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to the role of the educator in disciplinary control in edu­
cation, Niehuhr's statement that the cross of Jesus Christ 
is the idealistic and supreme norm for a basic understand­
ing of the nature of human action and conduct becomes rel­
evant.^ The cross is the focal point in history that gives 
meaning to all the experiences of life and in turn to the 
proper attitude toward and the effective use of the sex im­
pulse. As Jesus Christ volitionally gave his physical life 
on the cross in order to reveal the ultimate meaning of 
Christian love, the individual who finds the true meaning 
of Christian love will perceive that the sex act is an out­
going expression of love. Instead of this experience con­
sisting of a violently-directed selfish grasping, it will 
be an action through which each of the persons involved In 
the experience will be expressing the deepest meanings of 
his love for the other. This does not indicate that Niebuhr 
ignores the complexity of the action; he does perceive self­
aggressiveness and escape. Oftentimes that aggressiveness 
and escape will become the dominating pattern of the expe­
rience. This is merely a part of the dialectical nature of 
man. Man desires and even strives for the realization of 
Christian love through the experience of sex, but in his 
carnality, this experience often degenerates into little 
more than an expression of self-love and violent power.
^Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Two Sources of Western
Culture," op. cit., p. 240.
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But those attitudes of self-aggressiveness and escape be­
come sublimated in an attitude of outgoing love which adds 
the spiritual dimension to the sex act, when that act is 
perceived and comprehended on the level of idealistic 
Christian love.
This makes the educator's task of disciplinary con­
trol in education complex and yet simple. Essentially, it 
consists in converting the student, when the term convert­
ing is used in a non-theological way. The student simply 
learns to aspire toward an attitude in life which makes the 
spiritual realization of life an ultimate goal. But thus 
to convert the student is a difficult and serious task.
The educator brings about this transformation proc­
ess through two media. In the first place, his own life 
speaks for itself as being honest, sincere, and truthful 
as it reflects the philosophy which he submits in the edu­
cational experience. In the second place, the educator, 
through his more objective educative contacts, enumerates, 
analyzes, and evaluates the ethical ideals and the implica­
tions of those ideals which society objectively supports. 
Certainly at this point in our civilized society, society 
still maintains, at least objectively, that fidelity in sex 
through a monogamous relationship is to be desired. The 
laws of the land still so read even though evidence reveals 
that many individuals do not live this idealism on the 
practical level. Niebuhr would concur with the legal ideal­
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ism, but not for the sake of legality. His concept of 
Christian love would point out that the attainment of spir­
itual freedom is man's most impractical and yet practical 
desire and that spiritual freedom, with all its complex­
ities and paradoxes, is best achieved through the intimate 
relationships which accompany fidelity and monogamy. From 
a practical viewpoint, it would be rather difficult for 
either a man or a woman to give himself or herself complete­
ly and wholly to another and thus attain the merits which 
accompany Christian love through promiscuous sexual rela­
tionships. The nature of the love of God for man becomes 
most uniquely dramatized through the mutual and faithful 
enactment of the love experience. The task of the educator 
is to portray this idealistic truth to the students, both 
objectively and subjectively.
In a second consideration, Niebuhr's concept of the 
best forms of disciplinary control can be ascertained 
through a consideration of his attitude toward the racial 
problem. For racial conflict, as it has emerged at this 
point in the twentieth century, cries out for a clearer 
definition of the meaning of the equality of men and the 
meaning of disciplinary control in the application of that 
equality. It is a well known fact among sociologists, and 
even theologians, that racial conflict presents one of the 
most acute social and religious problems of the century. 
Gordon Harland states:
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A profound revolution in race relations involv­
ing incalculable cultural consequences is taking 
place in America. No one can foresee all that is 
entailed, but everyone senses that it contains with­
in it a dynamic that will have a far-reaching im­
pact upon the total culture.^
Niebuhr's attitude toward the racial problem is 
theological with certain sociological and psychological im­
plications. This is not to state that he does not confront 
the problem pragmatically. Twelve years before the tragedy 
of Little Rock, he stated:
Racial conflict has become the most vicious of 
all forms of social conflict in the nation. And the 
racial tensions will become worse long before they 
will become better.^
But Niebuhr does make the problem primarily theo­
logical when he further states:
Racial bigotry is, in short, one form of original 
sin. Original sin is something darker and more ter­
rible than mere stupidity and is therefore not eradi­
cated by enlightenment alone, though frequently en- 
li^tenment can break some of its power by robbing it 
of some of its instruments of stupidity.^
Niebuhr's theological concept of the problem be­
comes even more apparent when he states that at its base, 
racial tension is a form of idolatry:
Both the dignity and the misery of man are greater 
than modern culture understands. The misery of man 
is derived from his idolatry, from his partly conscious
1Gordon Harland, The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr, 
New York: The Oxford Press, i9607 p. ^55.
^Reinhold Niebuhr, "Christian Faith and the Race 
Problem," Love and Justice, edited by D. B. Robertson, 
Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1957, p. 129.
^Ibid., p. 128.
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and partly unconscious effort to make himself, 
his race, and his culture God.
Niebuhr's method for solving the race problem, like 
his analysis of the problem, is basically theological. As 
he continues in his statement concerning race, he states:
Race bigotry . . . must be broken by repentance 
and not merely by enlightenment.
And in these brief.statements is the essence of 
Niebuhr's approach to the race problem. But this is not 
to state that Niebuhr's cognizance of the problem and his 
solution for it can be dismissed lightly and easily. When 
he states that the solution to the problem is repentance, 
rational thinkers are immediately confronted with the arti­
ficiality that is usually associated with the term. Re­
pentance, in its use, usually refers to a so-called accept­
ance of the grace of God and the observance of certain rit­
ualistic acts that are connected with church dogma. But 
when Niebuhr speaks of repentance as it relates to the 
racial problem, he is advocating that through this expe­
rience the individual who is repenting will become aware 
of two facts; in the first place, the individual will per­
ceive the reality of racial idolatry and will recognize 
that he is trying to make himself, his race, and his cul­
ture God; in the second place, he will recognize that in 
the truly Christian interpretation of the nature of man,
llbid., p. 129.
Zibid., p. 128.
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all men, regardless of race, hold equal recognition for 
dignity within the realm of God's grace. Niebuhr does not 
thus state that all men are equal and that all men should 
have equal opportunities. This platitude is not a part of 
his theological system. He does know that men are unequal 
in knowledge and in ability and that inequality leads to 
much struggle and tension in the total social enterprise. 
His equality is within the realm of God's grace and the 
truly Christian directed individual will allow that grace 
to temper the violence of his racial bigotry.
Niebuhr is most critical of current forms of reli­
giosity with regard to this idolatrous experience. He does 
not see the contemporary forms of religion as aware of the 
idolatry of race. Niebuhr squarely places the task of re­
demption in this area within the spheres of the organized 
churches but is not too complimentary in his remarks about 
what the churches have done to relieve racial tension. He 
states:
If, for instance, the church were to make a rig­
orous analysis of the motives that underlie the white 
man's pride and fear, if it allowed the word of God 
to be sharper than a two-edged sword, . . .  it mi^it 
help white people to see to what degree the very 
hysteria of their attack upon the Negro is the evi­
dence of an uneasy conscience.-*-
But the church in America has been woefully lax in making 
this penetrating experience a part of the repentance proc­
ess. It is a well known fact that the American churches
^Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Negro Issue in America,"
Love and Justice, p. 144.
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have remained predominantly segregated. Consequently, if 
the racial problem is to be solved, it will be solved 
through an educational process. The schools will develop 
national disciplinary control as they direct students toward 
this type of repentance experience.
Niebuhr apparently looks upon repentance as a para­
doxical experience which includes a personal, inner experi­
ence and an outer, communal experience. The first becomes 
a dynamic factor in terms of man's personal relationship 
with God; the second becomes a dynamic factor in terms of 
man's relationship with God expressed in man's relationships 
with others. The church, when it adheres to the tenets of 
Christian love, becomes a guiding influence in this vital 
paradoxical experience. The school, when it develops forms 
of social disciplinary control, becomes the force that makes 
possible this paradoxical experience. The pragmatic test 
of the school requires that its part in the repentance proc­
ess lead the individual to the place where he recognizes 
the hypocricies and artificialities which are a part of day 
by day living.
The second part of a true repentance experience 
alerts man to the fact that all men possess a natural dig­
nity in the eyes of God. In his discussion of this facet 
of repentance, Niebuhr is cautious and avoids the use of 
platitudes. The God-given dignity of man assumes a much 
deeper connotation than glib statements about the equality
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of all men. In fact, Nietuhr sets about to disprove this 
naive interpretation of the racial problem and searches for 
a deeper, more spiritually oriented solution. In commenting 
on this naivete, Niebuhr refers to a Primer on Race, issued 
by the Council on Christian Social Progress of the Northern 
Baptist Convention. The primer declares; "Science con­
cludes that there is no good evidence of inborn mental dif­
ferences between r a c e s . T o  which Niebuhr replies:
All this marshalling of scientific evidence for 
the essential equality of the races is perfectly 
good propaganda for the Christian idea of racial 
brotherhood. Yet there is something faulty with 
this scientific treatment of the race issue from 
the Christian standpoint. Most of our modern an­
thropologists assume that race bigots are ignorant 
of the facts of life and that they have been con­
fused by certain superficial differences in racial 
traitSpto assume the inferiority of the minority 
group.
Niebuhr rejects this scientific approach to the 
race problem, stating that it Is based upon history, and 
history illustrates that any group, when it becomes privi­
leged, tends to become a superior race. The mere proof of 
a fact scientifically does not penetrate the depths of the 
racial problem; Niebuhr states that the predisposition to
think ill of a divergent group is a dark and terrible abyss
•3
of evil in the soul of man. Bacial prejudice is a form of
^Reinhold Niebuhr, "Christian Faith and the Race 
Problem," love and Justice, p. 125.
Zibid., p. 125.
3lbid., p. 126.
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hatred that grows out of man's selfish nature. Niehuhr 
sees man working his way out of the abyss only by means of 
comprehending the meaning of sin or evil:
The preaching of the ideal possibilities of 
brotherhood that is not accompanied by a careful 
and pitiless analysis of the motives, of the inner 
fears, self-accusations, and self-justifications 
of those who deny brotherhood is not religious.
It moves on the plane of secular idealism and does 
not bring the terror of the judgments of the living 
God to bear upon the soul. Only if this is done 
can the mercy of God also heal the hurt that men 
have in their own heart and that prompts them to 
hurt each other.
Repentance, then, in its final analysis, as far as 
the educational experience is concerned, leads man to see 
his unworthiness before God and also his hope in God. It 
should become the basis for a type of world brotherhood; 
it should provide direction in the area of disciplinary 
control in that when man perceives his utter dependence on 
God, he will not be quite so prone to elevate himself to 
the point of ostentatious exhibitions of self-superiority.
This attitude toward the race problem,-then, pro­
vides a guiding principle in the area of disciplinary con­
trol for the educator. For through Niebuhr's insistance 
upon repentance, he is advocating that repentance be suffi­
ciently penetrating to reveal the hypocrisies of selfish 
living. True repentance makes the individual aware of his 
fragmentary condition; in order for him to remove some of 
the insufficiencies of this condition, he must develop cer-
^Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Negro Issue in America,"
op. cit., p. 144.
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tain patterns of self-control.
Thus, the task of the educator he comes one of devel­
oping patterns of self-control, based upon spiritual intel­
ligence. In doing this, his role becomes a dialectical 
role: his entire educational impact must be objective
enough to have meaning for the student, but subjective 
enough to warrant student participation and experience. 
Disciplinary control must be a part of the student's out­
ward expression of inner strengths. Disciplinary control 
must be a part of the student's personal fortitude. But to 
'state that the student must have personal fortitude is one 
thing; for him to possess spiritual strength and to apply 
that strength to his personal situation is another thing.
Por this reason, education which deals with personal con­
trol and disciplinary action must be education that is not 
artificial nor completely vicarious to the student; it must 
be a part of his daily spiritual experience.
Niebuhr's concept of economic and political justice 
is one in which the ideal of Christian love is the ideal 
norm for ethical conduct. But as he applies that norm di­
rectly to human conflict in the realistic world with con­
cern for political and economic injustices, he points out 
that it is an ideal or a product which becomes possible 
only when more directive or pragmatic measures are applied 
in the realms of human existence. Recognizing that the 
intermediate stage between selfishness and love is justice,
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he makes justice the pragmatic, workable plan for discipli­
nary control. As he specifically works out his system of 
social ethics, he breaks violently with the naive optimism 
of liberalism and the glibness of authoritarianism. The 
following quotation contains the core of Niebuhr's prag­
matic, dialectical, social ethics and states his dialecti- 
cism as it bridges the gap between the idealism of Chris­
tian love and the harsh reality of social experience;
Once it is recognized that the stubbornness of 
human selfishness makes the achievement of justice 
in human society no easy matter, it ought to be 
possible to see that war is but a vivid revelation 
of certain perennial aspects of human history. Life 
is never related to life in terms of a perfect and 
loving conformity of will with will. Where there is 
sin and selfishness there must be a struggle for 
justice ; and this justice is always partially an 
achievement of our love for the other, and partially 
a result of our yielding to his demands and pres­
sures. The intermediate norm of justice is partic­
ularly important in the institutional and collective 
relationships of mankind. But even in individual 
and personal relations the ultimate level of sacri­
ficial self-giving is not reached without an inter­
mediate level of justice. On this level the first 
consideration is not that life should be related to 
life through the disinterested concern of each for 
the other, but that life should be prevented from 
exploiting, enslaving, or taking advantage of other 
life. Sometimes this struggle takes very tragic 
forms.
It is important for Christians to remember that 
every structure of justice, as embodied in political 
and economic institutions: (a) contains elements of
injustice that stand in contradiction to the law of 
love; (b) that it contains higher possibilities of 
justice that must be realized in terms of institu­
tions and structures; and (c) that it must be supple­
mented by the graces of individual and personal gen­
erosity and mercy. Yet when the mind is not confused 
by utopian illusions it is not difficult to recognize 
genuine achievements of justice and to feel under 
obligation to defend them against the threats of 
tyranny and the negation of justice.
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Love must "be regarded as the final flower and 
fruit of justice. When it is substituted for justice 
it degenerates into sentimentality and may become the 
accomplice of tyranny,^
In this statement, Niebuhr discerns that dialecti- 
calism becomes the only practical method for solving the 
world's ills, especially in the areas of economics and pol­
itics. Christian love is still present, but that love has 
been tempered into the steel vÈiich cuts and hews at society 
until all forms of exploitation have been diminished.
When this theory of social ethics is applied to the 
role of the educator, that role becomes a position of ex­
ceptional responsibility. Por the enlightened educator 
does not have the smug assurance of authoritarianism nor 
the naive optimism of liberalism. He is working pragmati­
cally with the development of youth who even in their edu­
cational relationships are exploiting and being exploited; 
in fact, the educator himself is experiencing this ebb and 
flow in the drama of human struggle. The guiding principle 
becomes the creation of a social situation in which all 
problems, insofar as it is possible in the human drama, 
are worked out on the basis of justice— of justice which, 
approaches the mystical norm of Christian love but is not 
necessarily directed by it— of justice which builds, through 
its approach to that mystical norm, a practical, workable 
norm which will guarantee higher forms of justice in the
^Eeinhold Niebuhr, "Christian Paith and the World 
Crises," Love and Justice, pp. 282-283.
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ethical relationships of man. The dynamic force of this 
social situation becomes the method of disciplinary control 
in all social institutions, including the educational struc­
ture 8 .
CHAPTER VII 
AUTHORITY IN EDUCATION
The problem of man's exploitation of his fellowman 
has been apparent since the beginning of world history.
The Greeks with their democratic idealism were aware of 
this problem. Plato accepted the theory that in a society 
there will naturally be those who will rule over the lives 
of others; that some will utilize and benefit from the 
mechanical skills of others. In his plan or scheme for 
controlling exploitation, the exploitation was to be kept 
at a minimum through the beneficent wisdom of the philos­
opher kings. In their wisdom they were to control the so­
ciety by skillful and tactful methods of pre-conditioning.
Among the early Hebrews a similar philosophy of 
society developed. In this system, established by Moses, 
there were Levite kings or judges who ruled over the masses 
of the society, providing for their personal livelihood by 
utilizing the sacrificial products of the common laborers.
On the contemporary scene, numerous examples indi­
cate that all of the problems associated with the use of 
authority have not been solved. This is especially true of 
authority in education. Consequently, this study, which
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attempts to comprehend and to evaluate Niebuhr's theory of 
authority, seeks to analyze the problem objectively. For 
in every system in which organization occurs, either formal­
ly or informally, there is some form of authority which con­
trols that organization.
In searching for a definition of authority, the 
writings of Chester I. Barnard, whose The Functions of the 
Executive has become a classic in the field, are useful. 
Barnard has defined authority as follows:
Authority is the character of a communication 
(order) in a formal organization by virtue of which
it is accepted by a contributor to, or a "member"
of, the organization as governing the action he 
contributes; that is, as governing or determining 
what he does or is not to do so far as the organi­
zation is concerned. According to this definition, 
authority involves two aspects: first, the sub­
jective, the personal, the accepting of a communica­
tion as authoritative, . . . and second, the objec­
tive aspect— the character in the communication by 
virtue of which it is accepted. . .
This definition is adequate and supplies some basis
for an understanding of authority. Its one weakness, how­
ever, lies in the fact that it is concerned primarily with 
formal structures and formal authority; in educational cir­
cles there is some authority that is exerted on an informal 
basis and is actually promoted through informal association 
and communication. Consequently, this study turns to a 
broader discussion in the field of authority and discovers 
in the translation of Max Weber's Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft
^Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954, p. 163.
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by Henderson and Parsons that the translators have rendered 
Weber's definition as follows: "'Imperative control'
(Herrschaft) is the probability that a command with a given 
specific content will be obeyed by a group of persons."^
Having thus established a definition of authority, 
Weber then lists the possible forms of legitimate authority:
There are three pure types of legitimate authority. 
The validity of their claims to legitimacy may be 
based on:
1. Rational grounds— resting on a belief in the 
"legality" of patterns of normative rules and the right 
of those elevated to authority under such rules to 
issue commands (legal authority).
•
2. Traditional grounds— resting on an established 
belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and 
the legitimacy of the status of those exercising au­
thority under them (traditional authority).
3. Charismatic grounds— resting on devotion to the 
specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary 
character of an individual person, and of the normative 
patterns or order^revealed or ordained by him (charis­
matic authority).
In those states which follow democratic patterns of 
government, the attempt is usually to employ rational-legal 
forms of authority. The leaders are elected by the people—  
elected on the basis of their ability to perform the par­
ticular tasks of leadership for which they are elected. In 
the most idealistic forms of democracy, every citizen of 
the state becomes a participant in the total authority of
^Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organ­
ization, translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1947, p. 152.
^Ibid., p. 328.
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the state, exerting that authority at the voting booth.
When the theory of bureaucracy is utilized in a rational- 
legal system of authority, certain leaders are appointed to 
specific positions, again on the basis of their technocrat­
ic skill in the particular area to which they are appointed.
Traditional authority is usually found in more 
primitive cultures. There is a tendency for primitive cul­
tures to embrace traditional authority, to turn later to 
charismatic authority with the advancement of civilization, 
and then to turn even later to some form of rational-legal 
authority. In those primitive cultures where the society 
is usually tribal, the traditional chief is usually found. 
But in those tribal societies, it is not at all unusual to 
find elements of charisma developing, especially in the ac­
quiring of a new chief. On the other hand, the more civil­
ized states frequently vacillate between charisma and ra- 
tional-legalism, and sometimes bring in elements of tradi­
tional authority.
Charisma as a predominant force is most usually 
found in modern states in the forms of totalitarian govern­
ments. Hitler in Germany and Mussolini in Italy, with 
their Fascistic systems of government, based their author­
ity on charisma. Fidel Castro in Cuba is attempting to 
guide a charismatic state at the present time. Although 
Marxism was predominantly rational-legal in its earlier 
theories, practical experience in Communistic Russia is
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filled with illustrations of authority which is basically 
charismatic.
Charisma has also usually been the motivating form 
of authority in religious circles. Whether or not Jesus of 
Nazareth planned to establish a permanent system of religion 
is still open to question, and, if he did plan to establish 
one, whether or not he planned that its ongoing form of au­
thority should be charismatic is similarly open to question. 
His personal experiences are certainly expressive of char­
ismatic authority. From that day, religious systems have 
historically tended to be either traditional or charismatic, 
with a predominance on charisma. Weber used the hierarchi­
cal system of the Roman Catholic Church, with its theory of 
the infallibleness of the Pope, as one of his specific ex­
amples of charisma.^ However, the application does not end 
at this point. For in Protestant circles, even in the most 
congregational or sect forms of Protestantism, even in the 
smallest of congregations, when the minister is ordained on 
the basis of a "call" or on the basis of inherent personal­
ity traits, and not on the basis of technical proficiency, 
the authority has become charismatic. Even in those congre­
gations or "gatherings" where there is no officially or­
dained minister but in which some resident of the community 
rises up as the "bishop* or leader of the group on the basis 
of his "natural" leadership, he has become a charismatic
Ijbid., pp. 371-373.
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leader.
This factor is important for education in the United 
States. Historically, education was managed predominantly 
under religious auspices and for a long time the teachers 
were ordained clergymen or members of certain religious or­
ders. Today, the influence of the church-related colleges 
is still being felt and in those institutions in which a 
large number of staff members consist of ordained clergymen 
or "dedicated" laymen, the necessity for understanding the 
various theories of authority becomes apparent, for this 
understanding is directly related to the student's develop­
ing philosophy of life and to his acquisition of those 
technical skills which will enable him to live in a techni-
G
cal society. On the other hand, the same analysis can be 
applied to secular systems of education. In those institu­
tions, the theoretical form of authority is rational-legal, 
but whenever a superintendent or a president is employed on 
the basis of his personality instead of on the basis of his 
administrative skill, the form of authority becomes charis­
matic. In still another consideration, if, in the secular 
institution, the rights of academic freedom— that is, the 
recognition of employees as expert in their specific fields 
— is ignored, the authority is charismatic. It is even pos­
sible to have the most ideal forms of academic freedom and 
yet have charisma authority in the classroom. For it is 
possible, even in the most democratically liberal of 
schools, to have teachers whose teaching procedures reflect
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a concept of "divine right" rather than an adequate supply 
of technocratic skill in a particular field of study.
Clearly for Niehuhr, ultimate authority in the uni­
verse rests with God and is revealed in Scripture. Neces­
sarily, therefore, he has a wider perspective on the prob­
lem than does one whose view is limited to natural surround­
ings. Through this wider perspective, his concept of author­
ity states that authority cannot be confined within the lim­
its usually ascribed to it by traditional thought and his­
torical Christianity. Niebuhr does possess a degree of 
quasi-optimism about the improvement of man's condition in 
this world of social experience. One of these is in the
area of individual economic improvement;^ the second is in
2the area of the establishment of a system of world order. 
However, it should be pointed out that these optimistic 
views are a part of Niebuhr's idealistic metaphysics and 
are not to serve as actual directive measures in his prag­
matic interpretation of society. These idealistic opti­
misms become the connecting links between the spiritual and 
the physical— the forces which propel man toward the 
achievement of that form of pure justice which is the heart 
of Christian love. But.they are only motivating forces—  
they are not guiding principles which will effectively
^Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society,
p. 256.
^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of light and the
Children of Darkness, p. I8BI
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develop simple forms of Justice in all the relationships of 
a living and struggling society. To Niebuhr, in his later 
and most mature thought, the idealism with which Christian 
liberalism sought to build a new world— the Kingdom of God 
— is illusionary and unrealistic. The artificial piety 
with which the pacifists "turn the other cheek" is also il­
lusionary and is the evasion of participation in the des­
perate struggles of social responsibility.^ The role of 
human experience demands that all responsible persons be­
come involved in the struggle for the rights of human Jus­
tice— for the elimination of all forms of exploitation from 
the social scene.
The first and primary principle in authority in Nie­
buhr's writings is that all human relationships must be 
directed, insofar as it is possible, by the virtues of hon­
esty and sincerity. Or, to attack the problem as Niebuhr 
does, no social system can long endure which has hypocrisy 
and artificiality inherent within the lives of the individ­
uals who make up that social system. In discussing the 
problem of world government, Niebuhr states: "The law in
fact presupposes . . . mutual trust; and where it is lack-
2
ing, no constitution can function." No system of organi­
zation is any stronger than the mutual trust which grows
^Heinhold Niebuhr, "The Quaker Way," love and 
Justice, pp. 296-301.
^Reinhold Niebuhr, "Can We Organize the World?" 
love and Justice, p. 216.
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out of the honest and sincere relationships which exist be­
tween the people of the organization. The words, honest 
and sincere are not used here in an artificial fashion. 
Niebuhr is constantly striving for pure forms of communi­
cation. If people are to adjust to living satisfactorily 
with other people in this world, and if the world is to 
survive its present crisis, some social patterns must be 
established that are constructed around the true identity 
of the individual. This becomes the problem of the indi­
vidual— the problem of the discovering of the human iden­
tity. The end of this searching is not easy for in the com­
plexities of human nature no person is able completely to 
reveal his true identity to himself— much less understand 
that of his neighbor or reveal his identity to his neighbor. 
But Niebuhr would rest his theory of authority on the prem­
ise that man can be much more honest and sincere than he 
generally is.
In analyzing the complex social structure of Amer­
ica, including the economic, political, and religious pat­
terns of the nation, Niebuhr states that two forces have 
combined and have become the basis of that social structure, 
These are the charismatic power with which sectarian reli­
gion conquered the frontier and the optimistic hope which 
made economic success the mark of a good and happy life.^
^Reinhold Niebuhr, "Piety and Secularism in Amer­
ica," The Atlantic, (November, 1957), C:l80-184.
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These two forces have united until the American ideal of 
the good and happy man is that man who is prosperous and 
powerful.
Niebuhr, however, as he probes more penetratingly 
into the problem of authority in a comparatively recent 
book. The Structure of Nations and Empires, reveals that 
the delineations of authority are not as easily circum­
scribed as Weber's analysis would indicate. Niebuhr's 
basic thesis that life, including man, is of a dialectical 
nature, necessitates that his concept of authority provide 
for this dialecticalism. In this work he observes;
Man is that curious creature, who, though partly 
determined and limited by the necessities of nature, 
also possesses a rational freedom which enables him 
to harness the forces of nature in the world and to 
transmute the natural appetites and drives in his 
own nature so that he can conceive ends and enter­
tain ambitions which exceed the limits which pure 
nature sets for all her creatures except man. Man's 
freedom consists not only of the rational capacity 
for analysis and conceptual understanding which en­
ables human beings to transcend the flux of temporal 
events by conceiving the patterns which give meaning 
to the flux. It consists, in addition, of the 
unique capacity to transcend himself and the flux 
of finite causes in which he, himself, is involved. 
Therefore he is able to choose between various al­
ternative ends which present themselves to him and 
also to choose between the various forces which pre­
sumably determine his actions.
Niebuhr, here, obviously, is describing man gener­
ally, but since general man is a collective extension of 
particular man, the statement is relevant in that it pro­
vides a basis for the individual's attitude toward authority.
iReinhold Niebuhr, The Structure of Nations and 
Empires, New York: Charles Scribner's àons, 1959, pp. 287-
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Beyond those natural boundaries which limit man there is a 
surging drive for the expression of individual freedom, for 
the attainment of individual goals. The fact that these 
goals are beyond the reach of man's grasp does not alter 
the truth that the constant striving for attainment is pres­
ent. For Niebuhr continues:
It is man's ineluctable fate to work on tasks 
which he cannot complete in his brief span of years, 
to accept responsibilities the true ends of which 
he cannot fulfill, and to build communities which 
cannot realize the perfection of his visions.^
These two statements taken alone would place Nie­
buhr's concept of authority parallel to Weber's rational- 
legal system. Niebuhr has stated that man has the capabil­
ity "to choose between the various forces which presumably 
determine his actions" and that "man accepts responsibili­
ties which are beyond the powers of his ability." In the 
realm of authority, these statements recognize the possi­
bilities of man's freedom and if these alone directed a 
concept of authority, that concept would provide for demo­
cratic processes.
Niebuhr, however, does not envision the structure, 
whether it be social, political, or educational, as existing 
in such a neatly defined situation; the limitations are not 
so easily described. Democracy is a utopian ideal and it 
may be an ideal worthy of man's support. But in the area 
of social experience its limits become apparent and become
llbid., p. 298.
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influential forces in the controlling of the authority.
The powers or prestige of the state are not always the re­
sult of cooperation on the part of the members of the or­
ganization. Niehuhr states:
The prestige of a democratic government is clearly 
only partly derived from the idea that it speaks with 
the "consent of the governed." It must fashion equi­
libria :'f social and political power which will im­
press the people with its capacity to preserve order 
and to extend justice. If it fails in this purpose 
generally, if it operates only with the confused no­
tion of Rousseau's "general will," it will either lose 
the tacit consent of the whole people, haunted by the 
fear of anarchy, or it will lose the confidence of a 
section of the people, which feels itself particularly 
defrauded of justice. In that case it must meet re­
bellion with force,
furthermore, the Anglo-Saxon democratic tradition 
recognizes this necessity for some form of a strong central 
power in the actual experiences of social existence. In 
another statement Niebuhr makes this necessity more factual 
as he states:
The people may have "a right to resume their orig­
inal liberty"; but a simple theory which makes the 
principle of consent both a right and a power obscures 
the components of authority, both force and prestige, 
which implement the right in specific instances. For­
tunately the Anglo-Saxon democratic tradition, in both 
England and America, was not limited to a theory which 
only implied, but did not explicate, the actual experi­
ence by which the people achieved their rights, while 
the prestige and power of government remained in its 
traditional position.^
In order to clarify fully his meaning of "force and 
prestige" authority, Niebuhr states:
^Ibid., p. 61.
2Ibid., p. 56.
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For the traditional "majesty," a word which de­
scribed the authority of the state in traditional 
governments, we (in America) have substituted the 
more inclusive but weaker concept of "prestige" in 
order to include the reality in foreign relations 
as well as in domestic national life. We have as­
sumed that "power" and "authority" are in essence 
synonymous because they both describe the capacity 
of a government or state to gain obedience or com­
pliance. The two sources of this power or authority 
are "prestige" or "majesty"— which includes all the 
forces of tradition and history which induce obedi­
ence and compliance— and "force," the capacity to 
coerce. Usually the "majesty" of a state is the 
very source of its authority to use force, for the 
sake of coercing recalcitrants. But force, while al­
ways minimal in a well-established state, in compar­
ison with "prestige" or "majesty," may itself be a 
source of authority, at the beginning of a reign or 
after a revolution. Coercion enforces obedience un­
til the authority of the government has been estab­
lished, when it may win uncoerced consent by its 
prestige.
A democratic government, then, can be democratic, 
using the term in its generally accepted definition, which 
regards some form of equality, to only a limited extent.
In this discussion, "majesty" and "prestige" can be identi­
fied as having those attributes which Weber calls charis­
matic. This "authority by consent" becomes even more au­
thoritarian when Niebuhr identifies the terms as tradition­
al. Thus his concept of authority has been expanded to in­
clude elements of both charisma and traditionalism, and 
even goes so far as to recognize the necessity of using 
force to maintain that authority. But in order to preserve 
some of the desired ideals of democracy, he limits that au­
thoritarianism when he writes:
llbid., p. 8.
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If the sources of democratic governments are 
fully measured, it will be clear that the prestige 
of a state which allows the hazardous alteration of 
particular governments by explicit consent rests 
upon this (the) implicit trust of the people. This 
confidence is necessary to overcome disappointments 
in the preservation of what they conceive to be 
their vital interests in the short run. Implicit 
consent is, in short, not the fruit of a purely 
rational process or calculation. It is informed by 
emotions and attitudes which are not quickly formed 
and re-formed.^
From this statement it becomes obvious that Niebuhr's 
concept of authority, recognizing the necessity for forms of 
traditional and charismatic force, also recognizes that au­
thority is limited and directed by the attitudes of the gov­
erned. This then leads to his summarizing statement about 
authority which follows:
Through the long and tortuous decades modern men 
have learned that the absolute and irresponsible pow­
er of traditional monarchs is dangerous to the jus­
tice of the community, tending to sacrifice it so 
much to the boon of order that the order becomes more 
and more oppressive in a community of varying vitali­
ties and awakening and growing interests. But they 
have also learned that the majesty of government is 
not simply derived from the rational and explicit 
consent of the people ; and that the order and jus­
tice, necessary for the preservation of its prestige, 
are not simply the fruits of freedom or of reason.
They are difficult products of_a free expression and 
manipulation of social forces.
Thus, Niebuhr has rejected any form of authority 
that is based on any of Weber's pure forms of authority. In 
an earlier essay, Niebuhr has rejected charismatic authority 
more explicitly on the theory that it blinds the masses to
^Ibid., p. 62.
^Ibid., p. 54.
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the illusionary characteristics of their condition.^ Al­
though he does not attack traditional concepts of authority 
violently, he does note the injustices which grow out of 
one family's accumulation of vast amounts of wealth. This 
kind of authority tends to enslave the masses and subjects 
them to the whims and caprices of the few who are powerfully 
wealthy. He rejects pure bureaucracy, not only in his re­
marks in The Structure of Nations and Empires, but also in 
The Nature and Destiny of Man, stating that there are limits 
to planning and that man is too weak on his own power to 
fulfill the responsible role demanded of him in a bureauc­
racy and will therefore allow himself to become a part of 
a regimented machine.^ This rejection becomes even more 
apparent in his statement that in America, the people are 
now in danger of becoming the servants of an economic sys­
tem.^ This type of servitude certainly violates Niebuhr's 
theory that man's greatest end is to transcend his temporal 
surrounding and to achieve true identity in mystical experi­
ences^.
Consequently, according to both Niebuhr's earlier 
and later statements, his concept of authority must be based
iReinhold Niebuhr, "How Philanthropic Is Henry 
Ford?" love and Justice, pp. 98-99*
Zibid., p. 101.
^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man,
1:111.
^Reinhold Niebuhr, "Piety and Secularism in Amer­
ica," The Atlantic, p. l8l.
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on man's basic nature— man's "image of God" self and his 
carnal self. In this the primary elements will he struggle 
and compromise. The system would surely have a structural 
pattern somewhat like Weber's rational-legal pattern in 
that the leaders should be selected on the basis of merit. 
But after they are elected on this basis, they then must 
rely upon limited forms of charisma and traditionalism for 
the force necessary to perpetuate their authority. Bor he 
states explicitly;
Our best hope, both of a tolerable political har­
mony and of an inner peace, rests upon our ability to 
observe the limits of human freedom even while we 
responsibly exploit its creative possibilities.^
Furthermore, instead of Niebuhr's authority relying 
upon optimistic scientific research as is true of rational- 
legal authority, it would rely on struggle and compromise, 
with the hope that Christian love might supply a form of 
metaphysical norm. In this complex system of authority, 
Niebuhr's faith in the validity of the democratic principle 
indicates that he believes higher forms of justice can grow 
out of struggle and compromise.
In addition, Niebuhr's ideal of authority would 
contain some spiritual charisma in that he regards the 
Hebrew prophets as true leaders of their day. Similarly, 
he would ascertain that certain persons develop their "image 
of God" characteristics more than their carnal characteris-
^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Structure of Nations and
Empires, p. 299.
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tics, and that these persons surely possess a spiritual 
insight that is beyond those insights of persons who de­
velop a more carnal nature. However, it should be noted 
that Niebuhr's identification of pride as the chief sin of 
man places limits and restrictions on this charismatic 
leader. For Niebuhr, spiritual charisma is a true gift of 
God but whenever the leader becomes consciously aware of 
his charismatic leadership, he has fallen prey to the sin 
of pride and has made his charisma carnal. True spiritual 
charisma must be unconscious and also used in altruistic 
accomplishments. Whatever there is of it is subjective 
and is a part of man's "above the world" experience.
When Niebuhr's theory of authority is applied to 
the structural pattern of an educational institution, that 
structure will, on the surface appear similar to Weber's 
rational-legal conception. Outwardly, it will resemble ex- 
perimentalism's pragmatic conception. However, where in 
pragmatism individuals work together cooperatively, possess­
ing the optimistic view that they are building a new cul­
ture and the perfect society through that cooperation, Nie­
buhr's individuals will know that that cooperation consists 
of struggle and compromise— oftentimes vicious and bitter 
struggle and reluctant compromise, between all the branches 
of the educational system and also between individuals per­
sonally. In addition, the goal of the authority in the
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institution will be to maintain order and to preserve jus­
tice among the individuals in the institution, but the 
final force and authority of all of life will remain be­
yond the boundaries of the physical institution. The spir­
itually alert educators will know that their final achieve­
ment— the attainment of their final destiny— is beyond the 
limits and powers of man and that destiny resides in that 
mysterious Force which men call God.
CÎL^TER VIII 
CONCLUSION
This study has attempted to develop a religiously 
oriented philosophy of education through a study of the 
works of Reinhold Niehuhr. In this concluding section the 
outstanding weaknesses and strengths of that philosophy 
will he considered as well as a general assessment of Nie­
huhr as an educational philosopher.
In Niehuhr*s hasic philosophy, the most significant 
weakness is his tendency to disregard the implications of 
modern psychology. This is especially true in the area 
which deals with the nature of man. In Niehuhr*s effort 
to revitalize the Christian faith through an interpretation 
of man as a sinner, he noticeably ignores much of the psy­
chological learning of the past hundred years. To him, man 
departs from the norm of virtuous conduct because man is a 
sinner. Very little is said in Niehuhr*s writings about 
the psychological factors which might cause those ethical 
departures.
This fact creates a chasm in the realm of human ex­
perience. The historical Christian ideal in the area of 
more personal social contacts is too far removed from the
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world of real experience to be practical. Niebuhr states 
that justice should be the intermediate step between hate 
and love, but in the world of actual experience, there needs 
to be an intermediate step between hate and justice. That 
step is modern psychology. Perhaps the process of educating 
youth to perceive the causes of fears and frustrations will 
not come easily; perhaps it will be a slow development.
But a psychological understanding of inner hopes, desires, 
fears, and frustrations will provide youth with better re­
sources for meeting both the interior and exterior con­
flicts of human existence. If repentance and conversion 
could deliver man from his hates and fears, the world would 
long ago have "beat its plowshares into pruning hooks."
The leap from hate to justice is too great; the growing 
youth needs the aid of psychological understanding.
This same weakness is apparent in Niebuhr's discus­
sion on the problem of sex. Perhaps it is true that sex 
should achieve spiritual dimensions and that both Catholi­
cism and Protestantism have failed to regard sex sacramen­
tally. But to state simply that sex should become a sacra­
ment lays the foundation for a type of social conduct that 
could develop modern forms of fertility cults similar to 
those which existed in primitive cultures. Again, the as­
cent from the world of actual experience to the idealistic, 
spiritual realm is too great ; the leap is too far for mod­
ern man to make without the aid of disciplined psychologi­
cal instruction.
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These factors challenge a religiously oriented 
philosophy of education to give psychology high priority 
in its total effort. If any form of religion is to sur­
vive the test of the present spiritual crisis, the youth 
of today need to acquire a comprehensive understanding of 
the psychological nature of man and to associate that un­
derstanding with the experiences of life. A comprehensive 
understanding of this nature will probably meet with re­
sistance in contemporary religious circles. l’or it will 
reveal the fact that traumatic experiences of repentance 
and conversion usually result in at least minor forms of 
perversion. This understanding will reveal the masochistic 
tendencies which historically have been a part of the 
Christian interpretation of life, and also the sadistic 
tendencies which accompany other forms of religion such as 
Islam. Defenders of the faith will resist the idea that 
certain church leaders such as Paul, Origen, Augustine, 
Thomas Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin accepted masochistic, 
and in some instances, sadistic roles as a part of Chris­
tian faith. But only as the inquiring and growing youth 
of today grasp this fact will they be able to understand 
and utilize the spiritual forces that are inherently theirs 
Or to state the assumption more practically, as the youth 
of today confront the historical truths of religious faith 
with the scientific, psychological fact of man's nature, 
and out of this develop a new religious faith, they will
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find a faith that is relevant to their lives. Any other 
type of religious experience will not be meaningful to them. 
In many ways the resistance with which religious circles 
meet the psychological facts today is quite similar to the 
resistance with which religious circles met the mathematical, 
scientific, and physical discoveries of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Man is a sinner, but some of that sin 
grows out of his early experiences in life and is not neces­
sarily a product of Providence. He will overcome that "sin" 
as he better understands himself. Historically, repentance 
and conversion have not been sufficient; psychological un­
derstanding becomes the necessary link that will make re­
pentance and conversion relevant.
In today's naturalistic society, in spite of all the 
fears and frustrations that are a part of that society, the 
fear of God's judgment will no longer frighten the thinking 
man to the extent that he will lead an exemplary life. In 
this situation, the unthinking man might turn to traumatic 
forms of religious fervor that will result in perverted ex­
periences; but the thinking man will either reject all re­
ligious experience or turn to more realistic ways for con­
fronting today's problems. For that thinking man, the en­
lightenment of psychological understanding, when it is fused 
with the hope of Christian faith, can provide the means by 
which he can lead a life that is acceptable to himself and 
to his society.
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The second weakness that is apparent in Niebuhr's 
philosophy, as far as educational philosophy is concerned, 
is in Niebuhr's emphasis on the sinful nature of man. Nie­
buhr is so preoccupied with the reality of man's depravity, 
he fails to see the reality of man's altruism. It may be 
true that in a realistic interpretation of man's accom­
plishments, the depravity has historically overshadowed the 
altruism, but this does not eliminate the fact that altruism 
might still exist. In order to find any theory of social 
progress in the writings of Niebuhr, one must search a 
plethora of social accusations and state this theory only 
by inference. Perhaps Dewey's theory of the reconstruction 
of society through education is somewhat idealistic and op­
timistic; but at the same time, a penetrating criticism 
that is not alleviated with some form of hope can easily 
result in a feeling of despair. Surely in all the dramas 
of human history, man's altruism has served as a leavening 
process sufficient to warrant at least some faint gleams 
of hope. Niebuhr infers this in his ruthless attacks upon 
the injustices of contemporary culture, but a more positive 
statement would provide educators with a more enthusiastic 
approach to their total task. Without this hope and enthu­
siasm, their task can be a very futile effort.
The outstanding strength in Niebuhr's basic philos­
ophy is in the area of absolutes. He has presented cogent 
arguments to show that paradoxes can be absolutes. In a
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philosophical system that is influenced by naturalism, it 
becomes quite easy to categorize all paradoxes as unreal­
istic— to state that a paradox is merely a failure to con­
front life realistically. This, in its end result, leads 
to forms of nihilistic thinking.
The attempt to reconcile religious idealism and 
practical living simply cannot be accomplished through ra­
tionalistic devices. There are too many inexplainable as­
sumptions. Rationally, the omnipotence of God becomes im­
possible if one accepts the theory of the freedom of man.
If man has the privilege of disobeying the will of God, then 
God is no longer omnipotent; God's power has been limited, 
at least in the life of the individual man. The same dis­
crepancy is apparent in the acceptance of a theory of evil. 
If God's will is for perfect goodness, and if there is a 
possibility for less than perfect goodness, then God is no 
longer omnipotent. But Niebuhr avoids the tragedy of nihil­
istic confusion by stating that the nature of God is para­
doxical. This paradoxical element in the nature of God 
seems to be about the only way that rational man can still 
retain any faith in the absolute nature of God.
When Niebuhr's philosophy is applied to the problems 
of education, that philosophy presents a significant weak­
ness in that Niebuhr does not adhere to any consistent phil­
osophical pattern. His theory of metaphysics is stable 
since it is based upon an idealistic spiritual reality. At
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this point, however, his philosophy becomes insecure since 
it vacillates around his dialectical interpretation of man 
and of society. A stable theory of knowledge is extremely 
important to education since so much of education is con­
fronted with the acquisition of knowledge. When the theory 
of knowledge is not interpreted clearly, those factors 
which relate to knowledge will not be defined clearly.
This is also true of value. Education strives to 
develop within students some distinct images of that which 
is valuable in life. When those values are stated in vacil­
lât ory terms which move indiscriminately from the real to 
the ideal, the end result will be one of confusion.
This weakness becomes apparent in the discussion of 
the purposes and aims of education. The first two aims as 
stated in Chapter III, which relate to the ideals of Christi­
anity, can be stated clearly and succinctly. The other aims, 
which relate to the social and physical experiences of the 
student, cannot be stated with as much assurance and clarity. 
They are vaguely inferred in Niebuhr's writings, but his dia­
lecticalism makes their definition vague. Confronting the 
student with the elements of truth is surely a part of Nie­
buhr' s plan for the bettering of humanity, but when truth 
remains a spiritual ideal beyond the comprehension of nat­
ural man, that truth is inaccessible. The inference that a 
better society is possible is apparent in Niebuhr's writ­
ings, but the statement that an ideal society is impossible
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makes the inference somewhat meaningless. Thus, the aims 
and purposes of education become ambiguous.
There is, however, a significant strength in Nie­
buhr's purposes and aims of education. His unwavering faith 
in the omnipotence of God with regard to historical destiny 
provides a secure foundation for a world that is searching 
for stability. An educational philosophy which is founded 
on an immovable faith in God should remain secure in spite 
of the ambiguousness of social conditions. A culture which 
has looked to itself long enough to discover that it cannot 
find anything but a nihilistic basis within itself can con­
struct a relevant, religiously oriented culture around the 
theory of the omnipotence of God. An educational system 
which is confronted with the dialectical tendencies of his­
tory can possibly adjust to those dialectical tendencies 
with more stability if there is a Power above the world 
that is immovable.
Niebuhr's philosophical vacillation also influences 
the task of curriculum development. Niebuhr's weakness 
here is his proneness to offer adverse criticism of current 
efforts but hesitancy about offering constructive advice 
toward the construction of more effective procedures. Fur­
thermore, the development of any clearly prescribed curric­
ulum from Niebuhr is impossible since his criticisms are in 
the main general and do not relate to specific curriculum 
problems. His understanding of the curriculum is necessar-
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ily "based on inferences and generalizations.
Niebuhr's positive contribution in the area of cur­
riculum development lies in his insistance that religion be 
a part of every student's education. For it is true that a 
student's comprehension of Western civilization is strength­
ened through an unbiased, objective study of those religious 
concepts which have been influential in the total humanities 
area.
The outstanding weakness in Niebuhr's concept of 
the nature of the learner is his failure to recognize the 
psychological nature of the student. The student, like man 
in general, is moved and directed by psychological impulses 
and any education which is not cognizant of this fact will 
have difficulty in motivating the student to his highest 
level of achievement.
In contrast, however, Niebuhr's concept of the na­
ture of the learner can make a positive contribution to ed­
ucation through his concept of the learner as a unified, 
unique creature who is heir to both freedoms and limita­
tions— who is at the same time "above the world" and "in 
the world." For this concept will enable the educator to 
regard the student as an individual with unique possibili­
ties. It will also expand the educator's concept of the 
student in that the educator will be working with a creature 
who is responsive to both spiritual and physical inner im­
pulses .
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Niebuhr's dialectical theory of disciplinary con­
trol is weak in that it is based on an impossible-possibil- 
ity theory. Christian love is the ultimate goal or aim in 
disciplinary control, but Christian love is impossible in 
actual experience. Thus, the educator finds himself some­
what bewildered as he struggles back and forth between hate, 
justice, and love.
The significant strength in Niebuhr's dialectical 
theory of disciplinary control grows out of his insistance 
on honesty and sincerity. This insistance can provide a 
contribution for contemporary education through its revela­
tion of the hypocritical and artificial tendencies which 
are a part of contemporary cultural experience. For man is 
hypocritical and artificial. He is constantly making cer­
tain idealistic pronouncements orally, but living according 
to radically different patterns. Too many empirical studies 
into cultural behavior have demonstrated the truth of this 
charge for it to be refuted. Man sings about the ideal of 
liberty and equality, especially in religious circles, but 
resists making any changes that will alleviate the tensions 
of racial prejudice. Man proclaims the ideal of brother­
hood, but his thought is not significantly disturbed by the 
fact of the starving masses. He upholds the ideal of eco4 
nomic justice, but except in those experiences in which in­
dividuals are affected by labor disputes, they are lethar­
gic. Man deplores the evils of war, but is not anxiously
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concerned about the emergence of new and free nations. Man 
talks about equal educational and occupational opportuni­
ties, but is reluctant to confront the problem of over-pop­
ulation with realistic studies into the possibilities of 
birth control. In most of the major issues which confront 
society today— race, labor, political justice, war, over­
population— man makes his statements in platitudes that 
humanity is not willing to support nor to live by.
This fact is most significant in educational cir­
cles, for the youth who sit in classrooms are aware of 
these discrepancies. Their candid conversations, their re­
sponses to class discussion, their overt and covert revolt, 
all confirm this fact. And yet, they discover that in or­
der for them to survive educationally, they too must make 
this artificiality a part of their basic patterns. For too 
often the student is interested in achieving marks or 
grades in his studies instead of being concerned about an 
educational experience. In too many cases the student is 
forced to reflect the teacher's thinking rather than ex­
press his own creative thought. His awareness of this fact 
provides one of the causes for student revolt. Niebuhr's 
repeated emphasis on the artificialities and hypocrisies of 
contemporary culture could direct educators to seek more 
realistic expressions of true social ethics and religious 
idealism.
One of Niebuhr's most obvious weaknesses is in the
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area of authority. For there is no clear definition of 
authority nor any plan for cooperative activity in his writ­
ings. His vacillation from charisma to traditionalism to 
rational-legal patterns of social structure fails to provide 
a prescribed pattern for social conduct. Carried to their 
extremes, his discussions of authority could lead to over­
powering tyranny on the one hand and to violent revolution 
on the other.
But in between these extremes, Niebuhr's contribu­
tion to a comprehension of author ;y becomes apparent and 
provides a strengthening influence for educational philoso­
phy. For paradoxically, history does reveal that there is 
a degree of accuracy in his analyzations. In attempting 
realistically to confront these paradoxes, contemporary ed­
ucation can benefit from Niebuhr's struggle and compromise 
method for settling differences.
In America, noticeably, although the ideal of Chris­
tian humility has been a part of national ethics, the per­
sonal goal for success has resulted in many forms of con­
flict. Democratic cooperation is a beautiful ideal, but 
in many instances its beauty has been destroyed by the con­
flicts which grow out of personal ambitions. Perhaps this 
beauty cannot be achieved under existing social conditions, 
but it can be more nearly proximated when individuals are 
free to express their ambitions through struggle and com­
promise. Such a program requires wisdom and judiciousness
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on the part of all those who are involved in the processes 
of an educational institution, but where there is oppor­
tunity for free expression with the privilege of compro­
mise, the result will be more realistic than that which is 
found in an idealistic pleading for cooperation or a char­
ismatic demanding of obedience. The lines which separate 
the fields of academic activity among expert teachers can­
not be drawn explicitly enough to avoid certain forms of 
exploitation. Consequently, Niebuhr's ethical theory of 
struggle and compromise is highly relevant to the democrat­
ic processes in educational institutions.
To evaluate Niebuhr as an educational philosopher 
becomes almost impossible since he himself denies that he 
is an educational philosopher. Yet he has, through his 
writings and his teaching in Union Theological Seminary, 
had a profound influence on the theological thinking of 
America and of the world. Undoubtedly, this influence has 
been felt in educational circles.
His chief contribution to future education should 
lie in two areas: (1) his undying determination to under­
stand the reality of a situation and (2) his dialectical 
interpretation of man and of society.
His determination to find truth should be an in­
spiration to future educators. It will be perplexing and 
confusing because it has led him to make contradictory 
statements. The import of the contradictions, however.
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diminish before the realization that he has had the courage 
to change his opinion when experience has proved that opin­
ion to be in error.
Niebuhr's dialectical interpretation of man should 
prove valuable to future education because it should enable 
education to avoid wandering into extremism. Niebuhr's 
emphasis on the spiritual nature of man should keep educa­
tion from becoming too obsessed with the material dimen­
sions of life. On the other hand, his concern for social 
justice should save education from returning to the dangers 
of religious determinism.
Thus, Niebuhr is sufficiently alert to the seeming­
ly insurmountable problems of human existence to balance 
his philosophy precariously between the different forms of 
extremism. In this, his philosophy parallels the efforts 
of conscientious educators throughout America.
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